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Abstract
Located at the intersection of privacy studies, media studies, and cultural studies, this 
dissertation challenges the notion of post-privacy and radical transparency. It argues for 
the reinvigoration of the political dimension of personal information privacy and 
challenges readers to scrutinize the ways in which journalists, politicians, Facebook 
officials, and scholars alike make it more difficult for ordinary people to define and 
negotiate for themselves the meaning and relevance of their personal information privacy. 
The first chapter looks at seven years of journalistic reporting, Facebook's data use policy 
as well as The White House Guidelines for Consumer Privacy. I argue that journalists, 
Facebook officials, and politicians alike overemphasize individual user control and 
technical options as solution to the complicated relationship between PIP and Facebook. I 
criticize that journalists make no or only superficial attempts to connect Facebook's 
privacy policy to larger contextual factors – either political, cultural, or economical. The 
second chapter investigates the economic dimension of the PIP discourse and examines 
more closely Facebook's SEC statements, Facebook's quarterly business reports as well 
as other internal documents, and newspaper articles from the The Wall Street Journal and 
Fortune Magazine. I argue that journalists provide a one-dimensional and trivializing 
account of the economy. The chapter demonstrates how journalists and prominent 
scholars help to perpetuate the myth of the technological sublime and, in so doing, render 
themselves involuntary allies to Facebook's misleading rhetoric of individual user 
empowerment.
The third chapter attempts to correct the mistakes above and suggests first steps towards 
an articulation and assemblage theory of PIP. The chapter outlines how such a theory 
relies on the ordinary and pragmatic tradition of cultural studies while simultaneously 
introducing the notion of accountability for information. The final chapter applies the 
articulation and assemblage theory of PIP to the college class room. It discusses the 
foundations of a new PIP pedagogy, introduces a number of guidelines and exercises for 
the classroom, and discusses a variety of readings that address the issue of PIP in a 
network culture. The chapter culminates in a syllabus that is designed with a college class 
room in mind.
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Introduction
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published an article for the 
Harvard Law Review titled “The Right to Privacy” in which both authors contemplate the 
relationship between communication technology and the basic civil right to privacy. 
Warren and Brandeis were not the first to contemplate the conditions that shape our 
expectations and tastes for privacy. However, their essay describes the beginning to what 
would become a substantial body of literature about the legal dimensions of privacy. To 
this day, their essay “The Right to Privacy” remains the second most-cited law review 
article of all time1.
Roughly 125 years ago, Warren and Brandeis lamented how their right to be 
alone and thus, their ability to execute the right to “exercise extensive civil privileges”,  
was under the attack from a new technology – instantaneous photography – and a 
burgeoning newspaper enterprise. The disruptive potential of new communication 
technologies marked, Warren and Brandeis complained, “an invasion upon his (sic) 
privacy, subjected him (sic) to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted 
by mere bodily injury”2.
  At the current conjuncture, some challenge Warren's and Brandeis's urgent plea 
for the relevance of privacy. Sun Microsystems's CEO Scott McNealy's stated: “You have 
1 Fred R. Shapiro and Michelle Pearse “The Most-cited Law Review Articles of all time” Michigan Law 
Review 110. p.1489.
2 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Harvard Law Review IV.5 1890. 
<http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/Privacy_brand_warr2.html>
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zero privacy anyway. Get over it”3. Others conclude that “privacy is dead”4. Finally, 
Facebook's CEO and founder Mark Zuckerberg proposes “radical transparency”5 as a 
new paradigm eventually leading to a more “'open and transparent world', [where] people 
will be held to the consequences of their actions and be more likely to behave 
responsibly”6.
Yet another group of privacy skeptics suggest that the term post-privacy best 
captures our contemporary relationship to personal information. The concept of post-
privacy has received much attention as it tries to capture, to struggle with, and to deal 
with our alleged new information reality – assuming that we, indeed, live in such a new 
context. The German post-privacy advocate Michael Seemann outlines the basic 
principles of such an approach: 
The concept of post-privacy understood is the realization that certain 
assumptions, ideas, and expectations about privacy from the analogue world no 
longer fit the new networked and digital world. Therefore, post-privacy is an 
invitation to discuss these ideas and to formulate alternatives7.
This dissertation challenges the notion that post-privacy provides a meaningful 
alternative and argues that it is too early to close the books on the concept of personal 
information privacy. I acknowledge and discuss at length that the concept of privacy is in 
and of itself “in disarray”8, highly “fractured, ambiguous, perhaps even incoherent”9. 
However, I argue that the case study of Facebook makes clear how personal information 
3 Quoted in Julie E.Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.11.
4 Daniel J. Solove in his book Understanding Privacy provides a comprehensive overview of the many 
claims about the alleged death of personal privacy. See pages 3 to 5 and for citation information notes 
23 through 29.
5 Mark Zuckerberg quoted in David Kirkpatrick's The Facebook Effect p.200.
6 Ibid.
7 Michael Seemann ctrl+verlust my translation March 23, 2011. <http://www.ctrl-verlust.net/was-ist-
postprivacy-fur-mich/>
8 Daniel J. Solove Understanding Privacy p.1.
9 Helen Nissenbaum Privacy in Context p.2.
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privacy has become one of the principle battlegrounds on which ordinary people exercise 
(or refrain from) their right to negotiate their relationship to powerful institutions, 
organizations, and individuals. I argue that simply moving on to post-privacy brackets 
and, more dangerously, masks and trivializes the many political, cultural, and economic 
issues at stake with regard to personal information privacy.
In other words, I agree with Warren and Brandeis, and understand personal 
information privacy to be constitutive of who we are. Moreover, I consider PIP as 
foundational to political and economic circumstances that are characterized by a more 
equal distribution of power. However, in contrast to Warren and Brandeis, and many 
other legal scholars, I am not so much interested in PIP as an individual right. Instead, 
this dissertation is my attempt to develop an articulation and assemblage approach to PIP,  
which looks at the connections between our tastes and expectations for personal 
information privacy and broader issues of power distribution.
For example, the German information rights and IT lawyer Thomas Stadler argues 
that leaving behind the concept of privacy does nothing for those who lack power. Quite 
to the contrary, the powerful will continue to be in power and will actually use and abuse 
their powers more excessively and unburdened than before. He furthermore states:
The corrective power of the personal right of every citizen, which is know in 
Germany as the right of informational self-determination, will no longer exist. 
Therefore, we have to disagree vehemently with the argument according to 
which the concept of privacy is no longer good for the defense against 
surveillance. Rather, the right to privacy is the only effective argument against 
governmental surveillance.10
10 Thomas Stadler is a German information rights and IT lawyer warning against the “post privacy trap”. 
His thoughtful observations can be accessed on his blog Internet Law. May 15, 2013. 
<http://www.internet-law.de/2013/10/die-post-privacy-falle.html>
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Along these line, my articulation and assemblage theory of PIP is inspired by 
some of the central principles of the cultural studies project, probably best summarized 
by Lawrence Grossberg. He writes: cultural studies
is concerned with describing and intervening in the ways cultural practices are 
produced within, inserted into, and operate in the everyday life of human beings 
and social formations, so as to reproduce, struggle against, and perhaps 
transition the existing structures of power.11
Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise second Grossberg and emphasize that 
cultural studies is about “how inequalities of power are produced, maintained, and 
transformed through culture” - always keeping in mind that culture is understood as “a 
site of struggle [that] has a role in both reproducing inequality and challenging it”12.
The understanding of PIP, as an isolated phenomenon that exists independent 
from contexts, cannot make these articulations visible. Such an apolitical understanding 
of PIP leaves unanswered the important question about the relationship between personal 
information privacy and power at the current conjuncture. Moreover, the notion of post-
privacy circumvents and leaves out critical debates that view PIP as the terrain, maybe 
even battle ground, on which asymmetrical power relationships unfold and manifest. 
Borrowing again from Lawrence Grossberg, what we need to do instead is to 
investigate how people are empowered and disempowered by the particular 
structures and forces that organize their everyday lives in contradictory ways, 
and how their (everyday) lives are themselves articulated to and by the 
trajectories of economic, social, cultural, and political power.13
I turn to cultural studies because we need a new way of thinking about personal 
information privacy in a digital network culture; a way that takes into account that 
11 Lawrence Grossberg Cultural Studies in the Future Tense p.8.
12 Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise Culture+Technology.A Primer. p.2.
13 Lawrence Grossberg Cultural Studies in the Future Tense p.8.
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personal information privacy is a “daily, managerial task”14, as anthropologist Catherine 
Nippert-Eng points out. In other words, what we need is an approach that views PIP as an 
ordinary cultural practice that is part and parcel of everyday life. Therefore, personal 
information privacy is not isolated but embedded in culture. 
As Julie E. Cohen makes clear, individuals do not act “autonomously outside of 
culture” but “are constituted by social and political [and economic] cultures that surround 
them”15. I propose that privacy and culture are inseparably linked, which leads to the 
conclusion that personal information privacy is best understood as a site of struggle over 
meaning, too. In other words, the challenge is not to understand personal information 
privacy as justification for theories that take into account only individual actions. An 
articulation and assemblage theory of PIP centers around the idea that individual agency 
is always already restricted by structural conditions that shape our everyday lives. It is the 
ongoing interaction between individual agency and structure that we need to look at if we 
want to understand the new realities of personal information privacy in a networked 
culture.
I argue, in addition to understanding personal information privacy as plural16, 
contextual and relational17, and as “an interest in breathing room to engage in socially 
situated processes of boundary management”18, we need a way to think about privacy that 
focuses on the political, cultural, and economic, connections that become visible when 
14 Katherine Nippert-Eng Islands of Privacy p.8.
15 Julie E Cohen Configuring the Networked Self. p.25.
16 In Understanding Privacy Daniel J. Solove establishes himself as the principle advocate of the idea that 
privacy is an umbrella term that always already captures a plurality of issues.
17 In Privacy in Context Helen Nissenbaum insists that people are primarily concerned with the integrity 
of information contexts. 
18 Julie E.Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.149.
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we start interrogating the meaning of personal information privacy at the current 
conjuncture. An articulation and assemblage theory of PIP adds to Solove's, 
Nissenbaum's and Cohen's already sophisticated ideas, an understanding of personal 
information privacy as ordinary and as pragmatic; a concept in dialectical relationship 
with, what Anita L. Allen has called, an accountability net.
Conceptualizing PIP as ordinary “grounds” the concept and, to say it with Lawrence 
Grossberg, “begins where the people are”19. A pragmatic attitude towards PIP helps us to 
debunk totalizing and revolutionary claims, such as “privacy is dead”, about the 
relationship between communication technology and PIP at the current conjuncture. 
Finally, the question of accountability forces us to see our own informational activities in 
relation to other people. In other words, it forces us to engage with ethical questions and 
requires us to leave behind the isolationist perspective inherent to Warren's and Brandeis's 
right to privacy claim. Taken together, a pragmatic understanding of PIP as ordinary and 
as a concept in dialectical relationship with accountability requires us to contemplate the  
relationship between our own agency and certain structural constrains.
There is (at least) one other reason that makes Seemann's post-privacy claim 
problematic. Seemann seems to naively distinguish between an analogue world and a 
digital world, arguing that different rules must apply to our digital selves. It is precisely 
the ways in which our activities online and offline interact and thus cannot be viewed as 
separate that makes personal information privacy online such an important political issue.  
The story of Tyler Clementi's suicide is a particularly alarming example. 
19 Lawrence Grossberg. “Cultural Studies: What's in a Name (One more time)” Taboo 1 Spring, 1995. 
p.22.
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Clementi, a student at Rutgers University, was outed as gay by his roommate, who sent a 
twitter message informing his personal network that Clementi had a date with a young 
man. Hearing about this massive violation of personal information privacy, Clementi 
committed suicide. Clementi's room mate Dharun Ravi and another classmate, Molly 
Wei, were “charged with two counts of invasion of privacy for using 'the camera to view 
and transmit a live image' of Mr. Clementi”20 and his date. Less dramatic is the case of 
Ashley Payne. She had to resign from her teaching job in Barrow County, Georgia 
because Payne's Facebook account showed pictures of her drinking. Through Facebook 
friendships with teacher colleagues, her school principle found out about the pictures and 
told her to either resign from the job or to face suspension.21
Julie E. Cohen best summarizes the cultural studies approach to the complex 
relationship between our activities online and offline: 
Cyberspace is not, and never could be, the kingdom of mind; minds are attached 
to bodies, and bodies exist in the space of the world. And cyberspace as such 
does not preexist its users. Rather, it is produced by users, and not (in the most 
cases) as a deliberate political project, but in the course of going on about their 
lives.22
Discussing the nature of race online, Beth Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert Rodman, 
add that “all of us who spend time online are already shaped by the way in which race 
[and gender] matters offline, and we can't help but bring our own knowledge, 
20 Lisa W. Foderaro “Private Moment Made Public, Then A Fatal Jump” The New York Times September 
29, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?pagewanted=all>
21 Christina Warren “10 People Who Lost Jobs Over Social Media Mistakes” mashable June 16, 2011. 
<http://mashable.com/2011/06/16/weinergate-social-media-job-loss/>. To be fair, what counts as 
inappropriate social media etiquette varies hugely from case to case as this collection of social media 
faux-pas indicates. In this particular case, it is crucially important not to confuse the teacher who got 
fired over posting a picture that shows her drinking beer while being on vacation with the scandal that 
unfolded over congressman Weiner's stupid and ridiculous pictures to a social network site.
22 Julie E Cohen “Cyberspace As/And Space” Columbia Law Review 107, 2007. p.218.
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experiences, and values with us when we log on”23.
I first became interested in these questions concerning personal information 
privacy and Facebook in the context of two deeply personal and private events, my 
marriage in 2010 and the birth of my daughter in 2013. These two events made my 
partner and me contemplate a number of issues that Hollis Griffin has summarized in the 
question: “When is it Okay to reveal personal events on public social networks?”24.
We decided that neither did we want comments and photos of our wedding to be 
posted to our Facebook profiles nor did we want to distribute any information about our 
daughter on the social network service. My partner and I simply felt uncomfortable with 
the loss of control over this deeply personal information that the posting to our respective 
profiles would have entailed. We actually went a step further and, from that moment on, 
disabled our Facebook walls for outside comments entirely. These individual activities 
seemed, at the time, the only meaningful way to regulate the flow of information from 
and to our Facebook profiles. Especially with regard to our daughter, it quickly occurred 
to us that it was not just our Facebook activities and the work we were willing to invest in 
order to maintain the privacy of our information. We also depended on our friend's 
respect for our commitment to privacy. In the course of explaining our resolute approach 
to PIP to friends, we thought about how to act online and how to tell people what to do 
with information (e.g. photos) about us or our daughter.
But even back then, these measures appeared superficial and a drop of resistance 
in the bucket of information sharing that defines Facebook as a social network service. 
23 Beth Kolko, Lisa Nakamura and Gilbert Rodman quoted in Slack and Wise Culture+Technology.A  
Primer. p.168.
24 Hollis Griffin “Debbie Downer has a Facebook Problem: Regulating Affect on Social Media Networks” 
flowTV June 8, 2011. <http://flowtv.org/2011/06/debbie-has-a-facebook-problem/>
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Furthermore, it bothered us that we were responsible for monitoring Facebook for photos 
and comments that someone else could have posted about us to their profiles without our 
permission or consent. Gladly, all of our friends respected our requests (at least as far as 
we were able to tell) but that does not mean that we did not invest a great deal of time and 
effort into the protection of our personal information privacy. While the measures we 
took might appear as overly protective to some, we were clearly not alone with our 
concerns25.
What ultimately motivated me to start the research for this dissertation was not so 
much the concern about the regulation of affect that Griffin writes about in her article, but 
the question of regulation on Facebook in general. In retrospect, it simply seems unfair to 
outsource all the responsibility for the protection of their personal information to 
Facebook users while still leaving them dissatisfied about the measures available to them. 
It occurred to me that what was at stake in these highly personal questions was whether 
the peculiar division of labor necessary to protect PIP between user and Facebook was 
fair. Why were my partner and I exclusively in charge of this incredibly cumbersome 
work? While I had a sense that Facebook's official rhetoric would not offer any 
satisfactory explanations, I was curious to learn what journalists, politicians, and scholars 
had to say with regard to the right to privacy in the context of Facebook and the current 
conjuncture. 
Arguably, the question of what information to share, and where, and with whom, 
25 Claire McCarthy and Rey Junco “The Internet Never Forgets: Parenting the Facebook Generation” The 
Huffington Post November 20, 2013. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/claire-mccarthy-md/parenting-
the-facebook-generation_b_4303997.html> and Jeffrey Rosen “The Web Means the End of Forgetting” 
New York Times Magazine July 21, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-
t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>
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and under what circumstances (and with what possible consequences) is not new. 
However, Facebook's empirical dimension makes these questions appear in a new light 
and with a particular urgency. Facebook now connects a breathtaking 1.2 billion monthly 
active users26 and has evolved into a globally operating corporation. Since its IPO in May 
2012, countless online activities are now connected to Wall Street, albeit in ways more 
complicated than publicly acknowledged. The relationship between the social network 
company and the politically powerful in Washington D.C. resembles a revolving door. In 
the course of my study, the question to me became how all of these factors influenced my 
notion of what kind of PIP was possible on Facebook. To be more precise, to what extent 
where these contextual factors taken into account in the relationship between PIP and 
Facebook in the first place?
Critical media scholarship on communication technology offers a few historical 
examples for the ways in which expectations and tastes for PIP always experienced 
disruptions in the larger context of the introduction of new technologies. As James Carey 
has pointed out over ten years ago, communication technologies simultaneously tear 
down boundaries around socially negotiated concepts such as personal information 
privacy, while establishing new ones27.
Carolyn Marvin's work on the telephone for instance shows how the telephone 
was “the first electric medium to enter the home and to unsettle the customary ways of 
dividing the private person and family from the more public setting of community”28. The 
telephone, Marvin demonstrates, was to many a fundamental threat to “a delicately 
26 Number refers to the official Facebook statement as of September 30, 2013. 
<http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts>
27 James Carey “Historical Pragmatism and the Internet” New media & Society 7.4. pp.443-455.
28 Carolyn Marvin When old Technologies were new New York: Oxford UP, 1988. p.6.
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balanced order of private secrets and public knowledge”29. Marvin writes about the 
debate whether or not the telephone should broadcast an opera performance or more 
popular programs: 
What was exclusive and luxurious was domestically desirable. What was 
popular and Irish was not, and what was at stake was domestic peace at 
mealtime, one of the most stridently defended battlefields in the struggle of the 
middle-class family not to fragment into the rootless chaos of the boarding 
house.30
From her work we learn that our current experience and struggle over the meaning and 
relevance of PIP might be unique in detail, yet it is part of a legacy of struggles over 
social and cultural norms. Moreover, Marvin teaches us that the imagined shifts in the 
“dimension of the world and the human relationships”31 were not just a result of the new 
communication technology but also a result of the discursive work carried out by 
professionals and journalists.
Lynn Spigel investigates the ways in which the introduction of television to US 
American households during the 1950s also deterritorialized the boundaries around what 
counted as private. Spigel shows how TV as cultural form “was caught in a contradictory 
movement between public and private worlds”32. The TV became the catalyst for the 
“renegotiation of [social roles and norms as well as] the relationship between 
public/spectacle and private/spectator”33. Television offered the ground to simultaneously 
“recreate the sense of social proximity” of public entertainment while “retaining the 
necessary distance between the public sphere and private individual upon which the 
29 Ibid. p.61.
30 Ibid. p.81.
31 Ibid. p.3.
32 Lynn Spigel Make Room for TV Chicago: The Chicago UP, 1992. p.109.
33 Ibid. p.116.
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middle class ideals of reception where based”34.
For my project, Spigel's methodology is more important than her actual findings. 
In ways similar to Marvin, Spigel was mainly concerned with the remaking of “the 
intertextual context through which people [made] sense” of television and its impact on 
contemporary tastes and expectations for privacy. She looked at journalists, social 
scientists, advertisers and other professional writers as “machines for the production of 
discourse”35. In other words, she was interested in the ways in which discourses where 
symptomatic of larger cultural debates and how professional writers followed “discursive 
rules found in the culture at large”36.
Therefore, this dissertation is only partly about the question whether or not 
Facebook violates their users's right to personal information privacy. Instead, I examine 
the discursive work through which journalists, Facebook professionals, politicians, and 
prominent scholars of network culture shape what we think about privacy at the current 
conjuncture.
In the context of Facebook and the 21st century, journalists and communication 
professionals continue to function as engines of discourse. Their writing presents 
ordinary people with narratives about possible meanings for and values of PIP. We are 
being told about the many different actors, ranging from corporations such as Facebook, 
who sells our personal information, to governmental institutions such as the NSA, who 
constantly spies on us, to individuals or groups of individuals, who hack into our data and 
steal our identities for criminal reasons37. 
34 Ibid. p.117.
35 Ibid. p.6.
36 Ibid. p.7.
37 “Bundesamt soll von Datenklau gewusst haben” [Federal agency supposedly knew about the data theft] 
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In short, we are being told that there is an historically unprecedented number of 
outside actors willing to exploit the wealth of information we create in the context of our 
networked culture; a number of actors who are willingly ignore what many consider to be 
the right to personal information privacy. When I refer to networked culture rather than 
“the Internet” or “ being online”, I want to emphasize that we produce digital data all the 
time. That is to say, we produce digital data through technologies such as email, instant 
messaging, Skype, social network sites, or online shopping sites. Simultaneously, we also 
produce data by using credit or customer cards, when we use GPS devices, when we use 
our cell phone, or when we read a novel on our e-reading device38. Various infomercials 
promise us many more ways to advance our communication activities if only we give up 
a little more data/information about ourselves39. 
I am of course not so naïve to believe that we could simply stop using credit cards 
altogether. Many of our everyday activities are embedded in and rely on an infrastructure 
that makes it impossible or very difficult not to share personal data. For instance, 
purchasing an airline ticket and traveling throughout the United States is practically 
impossible without leaving a detailed data trail behind. 
Facebook's official rhetoric claims that the social network service itself has 
become integral to many aspects of our lives. Facebook's CEO Mark Zuckerberg has 
stated repeatedly that the goal for Facebook is to become a “ubiquitous tool” and a place 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung January 22, 2014 <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/hackerangriff-
bundesamt-soll-von-datenklau-gewusst-haben-12763419.html>
38 This list is by no means excessive. It makes clear, however, that the boundaries around activities 
associated either with cyberspace or that seem to take place outside of it are increasingly blurry.
39 Here is an impressive commercial by the corporation Corning that illustrates future possibilities. 
Corning manufactures interactive household glass surfaces such as kitchen counters and is one 
companies among many to promote the full digitization of our lives. 
Video can be accessed here:  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Cf7IL_eZ38>
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where the Facebook profile is “the first place where they feel safe expressing their real 
self”40.
Many argue convincingly, that living without the social network site has become 
increasingly difficult not just for personal reasons but for professional and economic 
reasons as well. For most students, participating in any social activities on campus during 
their freshman year is basically impossible without Facebook. Many of the graduate 
students I know report a similar dependence on the social network service, albeit for 
different reasons. Some grad students, who contemplated quitting the service or who 
actually did so, returned from academic conferences only to re-activate their accounts 
because it seemed necessary to further develop their careers.
To a certain extent, this dependence on Facebook is of course speculative. In any 
case, Facebook is a great case study because it illustrates a privacy paradox. Although 
users are aware of Facebook's repeated efforts to curtail their users's privacy and although 
many of us know that Facebook sells our information to third parties, without our explicit 
consent, most of us continue to use the web service.
Finally, an articulation and assemblage theory of PIP has several methodological 
advantages in that it “attempts to deploy theory strategically”41 rather than practicing 
theory for its own sake. In other words, the empirical context, the “real” must serve as 
starting point and theory merely serves as a tool to “arrive at a different and better 
understanding of [said] context than that with which it began”42. Consequently, a careful 
40 Excerpts from a speech that Mark Zuckerberg gave at the launch event for the new timeline in 2011.  
The video can be accessed at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9r46UeXCzoU>. Ubiquitous tool 
comment at min 8:25; second comment at min 10:50.
41 Lawrence Grossberg Cultural Studies in the Future Tense p.25.
42 Ibid.
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description of the discourse of personal information privacy and Facebook must precede 
the in-depth discussion of the central elements of an articulation and assemblage theory 
of PIP. To be more precise, it is from the empirical reality of this discourse that the need 
for a new approach to personal information privacy in the context of Facebook must 
emanate.
The first chapter of the dissertation looks at seven years of journalistic reporting, 
Facebook's data use policy as well as The White House Guidelines for Consumer Privacy 
and argues that journalists, Facebook officials, and politicians alike overemphasize 
individual user control and technical options as solution to the complicated relationship 
between PIP and Facebook. It criticizes that journalists make no or only superficial 
attempts to connect Facebook's privacy policy to larger contextual factors – either 
political, cultural, or economical. 
The second chapter investigates the economic dimension of the PIP discourse and 
examines more closely Facebook's SEC statements, Facebook's quarterly business 
reports, other internal documents, and newspaper articles from the The Wall Street  
Journal and Fortune Magazine. It argues that journalists provide a one-dimensional and 
equally trivializing account of the economy. This chapter demonstrates how journalists 
and prominent scholars help to perpetuate the myth of the technological sublime and 
render themselves involuntary allies to Facebook's misleading rhetoric.
The third chapter attempts to correct the mistakes above and suggests first steps 
towards an articulation and assemblage theory of PIP. The chapter outlines how such a 
theory relies on the ordinary and pragmatic tradition of cultural studies while 
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simultaneously introducing the notion of accountability for information. I introduce a 
number of scholars who take a critical stand towards the ideas of post-feminism and post-
racism and argue that post-privacy describes a sensibility that renders previous struggles 
over PIP meaningless. I take a brief detour through privacy theory in order to show how 
previous attempts to theorize PIP have failed to acknowledge that privacy is always 
context bound and intimately intertwined in questions of power distribution. Finally, I 
show how the parallels between Daniel J Solove's pluralistic notion of privacy, together 
with Julie E. Cohen's call for an approach to PIP that is “temperamentally postliberal and 
methodologically eclectic”43 provide the perfect ground for an interdisciplinary 
conversation between critical media scholars, cultural studies scholars, and legal scholars 
over the meaning of PIP at the current conjuncture.
The final chapter applies the articulation and assemblage theory to PIP to the 
college class room. I argue that communication studies and media studies class rooms 
possible space to alert students to the increasingly vital role PIP plays in their lives. 
Inspired by Nick Couldry's socially oriented media theory, I argue that the the context of 
critical digital media studies is probably best suited for interrogating the meaning and 
relevance of PIP from a perspective that acknowledges that our notion of PIP is “directly 
oriented to media, involve media, [or are] conditioned by media”44. Since both media and 
PIP play such a fundamentally important role in our lives as citizens, it seems only 
plausible to develop a curriculum that helps students to investigate this particular 
relationship.
43 Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.126.
44 Nick Couldry Media, Society, World p.180.
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My curriculum borrows Nick Couldry's wonderful question “what role should 
media play in our lives”45 and sends students on an exploration tour of their own 
embedded media habits as far as their personal information privacy is concerned. 
However, the goal of such an endeavor must go even further, as Couldry emphasizes, and 
should ask what it would mean to live a good life with media or “what is it to live 
ethically with, and through, media?”46 PIP is, as this dissertation demonstrates, an 
increasingly important dimension of this question, albeit one that remains overlooked and 
under-explored. A shortcoming that the proposed syllabus at the end of the chapter seeks 
to mitigate.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. p.28.
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Don't Blame the User – it's Context, stupid!
Just weeks after the Supreme Court took a landmark case featuring a demand for 
greater communication privacy, many took to Facebook to reveal the color of the 
bra they were wearing. In a breast cancer awareness effort, women (mostly 
women, I assume) updated their profiles with words such as "black," "leopard" 
or (interestingly) "camouflage." It is the paradox of the cyber era: A nation of 
exhibitionists demanding privacy. 
[…] The most interesting aspect of cyber culture, however, is not the quest for 
privacy but its disregard -- not the desire to protect private communication but 
the compulsion to make bra colors public.
The Internet is known for its milestones of exhibitionism. […] But the real 
revolution of the Internet has been to make personal disclosure routine. 
[…] While America worries about the legal protection of privacy and abandons 
its practice, the reticent, necessarily denied attention, still deserve praise. 1
Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook's chief, has managed to amass more information 
about more people than anyone else in history. Now what?'2
In an effort to make a broader yet empirically grounded argument about how 
personal information privacy in the context of Facebook is discussed publicly, I look at 
seven years of journalistic reporting in the New York Times (including its affiliated 
blogs), the Washington Post, and USA Today3. My analysis includes 659 articles4, all of 
which address the relationship between Facebook and personal information privacy more 
or less directly5.
1 Michael Gerson: “Status Update: Chatty; Is there any reticence left in Facebook Nation?” The 
Washington Post January 15, 2010. p.A25.
2 Somini Sengupta. “Facebook Test: How to Please the New Faces” The New York Times May 15, 2012 
Business Section p.1.
3 These three newspapers are not only among the Top 10 of daily read newspapers by circulation, they 
also continue to be the some of the most popular brands in the newspaper market 
4 New York Times and affiliated NYTimes Blogs published 288 articles between January 8 2006 and 
February 23 2013; the Washington Post published 192 articles between January 2006 and February 20 
2013; USA Today published 179 articles between March 9 2006 and February 19 2013.
5 In order to make the sample comprehensive I used Lexis-Nexis. I limited my search to articles that  
mentioned both Facebook and privacy explicitly. Furthermore, I only read through articles longer than 
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In tandem with a close reading and critical analysis of Facebook's data use policy6 
as well as The White House Guidelines for Consumer Privacy I argue that journalists, 
Facebook officials, and politicians alike overemphasize individual user control and 
technical options as solution to complicated relationship between PIP and Facebook. 
Second, I criticize that journalists make no or only superficial attempts to connect 
Facebook's privacy policy to larger contextual factors – either political, cultural, or 
economical. 
In her fantastic book Make Room for TV, Lynn Spigel explains that these various 
engines of discourse help shaping the ways in which we imagine PIP; their views are 
“symptomatic of wider cultural conventions”7. That is why I argue that journalists, 
Facebook officials, and the White House, establish “discursive rules”8 that make it more 
difficult for ordinary people to re-imagine and even reclaim the political dimension of 
personal information privacy. Therefore, in this chapter, I criticize that these prominent 
public voices fail, albeit for different reasons, to provide us with the language to imagine 
or maybe re-imagine alternative visions for when and how to expect PIP at the current 
conjuncture.
My analysis demonstrates, that the problem is not so much that Zuckerberg, post-
privacy advocates, most journalists, and the White House seem to say the same thing – 
they don't. The problem lies in the fact that they all trust technology to fix the problem. 
500 words or shorter articles that introduced an issue regarding FB and privacy that was not otherwise 
mentioned in the sample. I started the inquiry in January 2006 because FB became a mainstream 
phenomenon during that year -  accessible for anyone with a working email address and anyone outside 
the university system.
6 In my analysis I refer to Facebook's Data Use Policy from December 11, 2012. 
<https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy>
7 Lynn Spigel Make Rome for TV p.7.
8 Ibid.
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Whereas the motivation for Zuckerberg to declare the end of personal privacy seems 
logical, I challenge journalists, post-privacy advocates, and the White House alike to 
reinvigorate the political dimension of personal information privacy. In the process, we 
must refrain from viewing personal information privacy issues as isolated phenomena 
and must, instead, treat them as part of a systemic examination of unequal power 
structures. 
As part of this discussion we need to take into account a number of different 
“flows, connections, and interpretations among the living, the nonliving, producers, users, 
processes, possibilities, and energies”9. Why? Because beyond all fantasies of control, a 
theory of PIP must allow us to use the concept to analyze and criticize all the connections 
that become apparent when we begin to interrogate the conditions that shape our very 
tastes and expectations for PIP.
Let me start my inquiry with two representative examples. The Washington Post's 
Michael Gerson gets it right: our relationship to privacy – to personal information privacy 
to be more precise – is complicated. There are, however, many things that Gerson does 
not get right. In the opening quote above, he claims to find support for the nations' 
schizophrenic relationship to PIP in two separate case studies. As a first piece of 
evidence, Gerson cites a Supreme Court decision, in which the judges ruled in favor of a 
police officer, who asserted his fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search. 
The officer had used this constitutional amendment to justify his use of a communication 
device owned by his department to send sexually explicit messages to his mistress. The 
Court ruled in favor of this officer and confirmed, that he had the “reasonable expectation 
9 Ibid. p.97.
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of privacy” of his text messages. As a the second case study, Gerson complains about a 
number of women, who had used “private” information from their Facebook profiles to 
make a contribution in the fight against breast cancer. 
Arguably, there is much to discuss about both stated cases. What concerns me, 
however, is how Gerson connects both cases and reduces their complexity to a 
generalized argument about our ambivalent or negligent attitudes towards personal 
information privacy in the cyber era. To Gerson, privacy appears to be a uniform and one-
dimensional concept. 
Moreover, by ignoring the radically different contexts within which both instances 
of personal disclosure had occurred, Gerson's careless analysis strips PIP of its political 
character entirely. In so doing, Gerson's reductionist approach conflates a heterogeneous 
mosaic of individuals and groups of individuals into one monolithic “nation of 
exhibitionist”.
I take issue with Gerson's polemic because of the ways in which his argument 
coincides with and at the same time perpetuates the post-privacy claim that there is an 
inevitable connection between the multiple technologies that make up the internet and the  
assumed disregard for personal information privacy. Like post-privacy advocates, Gerson 
proclaims that this time the revolution is real and that it manifests itself in expectations 
and tastes for personal information privacy that are altogether different and new. Rather 
than looking at the ordinary strategies that people employ in order to manage their PIP, 
Gerson pursues extreme positions and ignores more moderate and pragmatic approaches 
to the possible shifts in our expectations for and practices of personal information 
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practices.
The second short quote in the grey box above is extracted from an article by The 
New York Times's Somini Sengupta. Her otherwise insightful contribution presents Mark 
Zuckerberg as the revolutionary CEO of Facebook; as a person with a powerful vision 
that could single-handedly change our understanding of PIP via his zealous commitment 
to radical transparency. This vision, Sengupta seems to suggest, could determine whether 
or not personal information privacy will soon be considered a concept of the past.
While it is hard to (f)actually prove her statement wrong, Sengupta's 
personalization strategy trivializes the important issue of personal information privacy 
and deflects from broader structural questions. Certainly, the omnipresent Facebook CEO 
is a central actor in the debate over PIP. That does not mean, though, that we should 
reduce this debate to one person or even one institution such as Facebook. Doing so, 
ignores the heterogenous and oftentimes contradictory communication environment of 
today's network culture entirely.
Moreover, we need to take into consideration the various histories of 
governmental agencies such as the NSA , the FBI, or the STASI in the former GDR10 in 
order to historicize these types of claims. Sengupta correctly implies that BIG DATA now 
offers institutions such as Facebook or the NSA unprecedented opportunities to record 
even the most mundane details of our lives. Particularly the history of the STASI teaches 
10 The German Prime Minister has repeatedly and publicly made comparisons between the NSA scandal 
and the former Stasi regime in which he has warned the public about the consequences of known and 
unknown systematic surveillance. Most remarkably, he said: “Even if we cannot equate the NSA with 
the secret service in the GDR, it is still unacceptable that millions of citizens – which include friends 
and family members – begin to act of the phone like they did during the GDR” (my translation). Entire 
interview can be accessed at: <http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-
Gauck/Interviews/2014/140124-faz-Interview.html>
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us, though, that governmental agencies have always been going to great lengths to record 
the activities of ordinary people, oftentimes with severe and painful consequences for 
those involved. The German movie The Lives of the Others11 provides a powerful 
impression of the extent of these non-digital surveillance apparatuses. Arguably, the 
STASI techniques were no match for today's digital data gathering technologies but that 
does not mean that we should ignore them.
In addition, Sengupta overlooks that Facebook is neither the only data gathering 
actor nor is it necessarily the most powerful one. The social network service itself has 
been subjected to intrusive government surveillance practices. In other words, part of 
problem with Sengupta's argument is that she ignores the many different actors besides 
Facebook that also challenge our expectations for personal information privacy at the 
current conjuncture. The fact that Facebook itself has launched an initiative called 
“Restore the Fourth” in order to protest the invasion of privacy by the NSA indicates the 
contradictory nature of the battle over the meaning of privacy12.
Not only does Sengupta overlook this multi-faceted reality, she singles out 
Facebook's founder and thus deflects attention from a complex net of other commercial 
websites, all designed to gather personal information data. Even if we account for 
Sengupta's insistence that the comprehensiveness of digital surveillance apparatus is 
historically unprecedented, her diagnosis that Facebook plays the central role cannot 
withstand scrutiny. Instead, Facebook is better understood as merely the most obvious 
actor among an expansive structure, which Oscar Gandy has described as “the panoptic 
11 For a brief introduction to the movie, see the Internet movie data base (Imdb) “The Lives of the Others” 
<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0405094/>
12 See Facebook's own page <https://www.facebook.com/RestoreTheFourthAP>
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sort”. Gandy defines this infrastructure as a
Complex technology that involves the collection, processing, and sharing of 
information about individuals and groups that is generated through their daily 
lives as citizens, employees, and consumers and is used to coordinate and 
control their access to the goods and services that define life in the modern 
capitalist economy13.
Therefore, the problem lies in the fact that Sengupta's reductionist point of view 
naturalizes and takes for granted the very same hierarchies that Facebook's official 
rhetoric is trying to install – namely that Facebook holds within its vast data universe the 
capacity to change society.
Somewhere else in her article, Sengupta chooses a similarly generalizing tone and 
observes that “your information is at risk” through, for instance, third party applications 
such as games and other apps. It is true that the social network site records massive 
amounts of data about our daily activities. Yet, nobody outside of Facebook – and 
probably nobody inside of Facebook either – knows exactly what these digital dossiers14 
include, since it is algorithms rather than human eyes that track every move on the 
website. 
Therefore, I fear that Sengupta's alarmist warning underestimates the ambivalent 
potential of surveillance technologies. As Lawrence Lessig argues, under certain 
conditions, “surveillance technology might actually increase effective privacy if it  
decreases the instances in which humans intrude on other humans”15. It is therefore 
13 Oscar Gandy The Panoptic Sort p.15.
14 I borrow the term “digital dossier” from Daniel J. Solove's book The Digital Person to account for the 
ways in which corporate and governmental digital surveillance has reach a point in which all the 
electronic data points we produce via our daily activities (via credit cards, online shopping, using the 
Internet etc) produce a holostic account of who we are online which can be used to evaluate our very  
actions in advance. Solove defines “digital dossier” as: “a collection of detailed data about an 
individual” p.1.
15 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 p.225.
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difficult, at best, to estimate the alleged damage caused by the “leaking” of “your” 
information since no user knows what that means exactly.
If we broaden the scope of the analysis and move from these two introductory 
examples to the big picture, my sample shows that journalists across all publications 
describe privacy almost exclusively as a matter of user control16. Carolyn Hax, for 
instance, instructs and advises readers about how to manage online privacy between 
spouses. Asked by one of her readers whether or not she would share private passwords 
to computers, e-mail, phone, Facebook etc. with her spouse, Hax responds: “I think the 
details of passwords, etc., matter less than what you do with them and how trustworthy 
each of you thinks the other is”17. Frustrating about this kind of advice is not so much the 
precocious assumption that Hax could somehow help to figure out how to manage 
personal information privacy among partners, it is that the instructional tone as well as 
the narrow scope of the argument misses the opportunity to talk about how complicated 
the concept of personal information privacy is.
Amy Dickinson from the Washington Post is asked for advice because the 
children of one of her readers have become annoyed by an older aunt, who constantly 
posts embarrassing comments to their Facebook profiles. The mother wants to know:
How should these children respectfully get their aunt to stop checking on them 
via Facebook, short of blocking her? Talking with her is futile; she already 
knows her nieces and nephews are offended by her comments and postings, and 
this has not stopped her. I think the kids should be able to go on Facebook 
16 See for example the NYT: Helft & Wortham, May 27, 2010; Stross, March 8, 2009; Sengupta, August 
24; Sengupta, February 7, 2013, and John, September 10, 2006.
See for example The Washington Post: Hart, May 2, 2008; Kinzie and Noguchi, September 7, 2006; 
Balkam, June 9, 2012.
See for example USA Today: Swartz, June 16, 2010; Yu, December 13, 2012; Kornblum, October 23, 
2007; Swartz, July 2, 2009.
17 See Washington Post June 14, 2012.
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without having to worry about their aunt intervening in their "conversations." 
What do you think?
Dickinson responds:
There are plenty of middle-age people capable of navigating on Facebook, but 
the experience is easier for everyone if the older generation accepts that 
Facebook "rules" are dictated by people who want to be able to reveal all -- but 
don't want for anyone else to violate their "privacy." It's tricky.18
In another article, Dickinson responds to a mother, who is worried about her teenage 
daughters. The girls had recently opened a Facebook account and are now monitored by 
relatives. Dickinson writes:
The unspoken rule of Facebook for relatives is: Don't be too personal, too mushy 
or too lame with your younger "friends." If your relatives are skulking, or 
inappropriate -- or if the girls simply don't want to connect with them in this way 
-- then they should "unfriend" them. Work with your daughters to help them 
develop boundaries. Have them teach you how Facebook works -- and definitely 
ask them to show you their pages.19
From the NYTimes's “Q&A” section we gather yet another type of behavioral 
instructions on how to best shield our personal information from other Facebook users. 
This time, the protection of personal information privacy has less to do with monitoring 
or controlling somebody's behavior and more to do with straight-forward technical 
instructions.
Aside from your search privacy settings, the Privacy Overview page has plenty 
of other options to adjust if you want to limit what people, Facebook 
applications or even external Web sites can display on your profile page. You 
can also choose to block or limit your profile to specific users.20
In yet another article, Somini Sengupta informs us that four little questions are key in 
order to “fine-tune who can see your ''likes'' and pictures, and, to a lesser extent, how 
18 See Washington Post October 28, 2009.
19 See Washington Post April, 3, 2010.
20 See NYTimes January 17, 2008.
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much of yourself to expose to marketers”. All Facebook users have to do, is to find 
sufficient answers to the questions: “How do you want to be found on Facebook search? 
What do you want the world to know about you? Do you mind being tracked by 
advertisers? And finally, whom do you want to befriend?”21
In response to the questions, Sengupta offers generous advise and walks Facebook 
users through all the possible privacy settings the website has to offer as well as a number 
of external providers for privacy enhancing technologies such as software against 
trackers or software that helps you monitor your profile content you allegedly decided to 
share with your friends. Mark W. Smith describes Facebook as the “window to the web” 
and explains 8 steps to “fortify Facebook security”22 in which he essentially walks readers 
through the myriad Facebook privacy settings. Finally, Paul Boutin provides us “3 
essential steps to Facebook privacy”23 with a similar intend.
This brief selection of articles represents a straight-forward instructional approach 
to personal information privacy and stands out for the “how-to” nature of the arguments 
included. More importantly, all authors above hold the individual user accountable for 
managing their personal information privacy. By emphasizing various technical solutions, 
almost all of these contributions fall within what James Carey has called the 
technological sublime24. That is to say most of these journalists subscribe to an almost 
blind faith in technology's ability to fix all kinds of problems for us. In a classic case of 
circular reasoning, technology affords its users the ability to control technology.
Most importantly, the journalists in my sample ignore what the philosopher 
21 See NYTimes February 7, 2013.
22 See USA Today May 17, 2011.
23 See NYTimes Gadgetwise Blog June 21, 2011.
24 James Carey “Historical Pragmatism and the Internet” new media & society 7.4  443-455.
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Andrew Feenberg has called the “ambivalence of technology”25. The claim that technical 
features help users to maintain their personal information privacy, ignores that technology 
has the potential to both conserve and to break down power hierarchies. As Feenberg 
makes clear, new technology has the potential to undermine social hierarchies but it can, 
of course, simultaneously reproduce these structures. Technology is one piece in the 
puzzle to explain the “extraordinary continuity of power”26 
In her enlightening article The Turn Within, communication historian Susan 
Douglas provides a slightly more pessimistic version of the same story. She argues that 
the “the economic, the political, and the ideological system trump […] the revolutionary 
potential of technologies”27. This “irony of technology” seems to capture the current 
moment most adequately but seems to escape almost all journalists entirely.
Consent at Facebook is only another way to cement the asymmetrical relationship 
between users and the social network service
The discussion of opt-in versus opt-out approaches to personal information 
privacy28 and articles that discuss consent as a meaningful strategy to increase user power 
describe a particularly complicated subset of the privacy as control issue. Particularly the 
latter refers to Facebook's now no longer active policy to let users vote on privacy 
changes. From its beginning in 2009, the caveat for Facebook's democratic policy has 
been that user votes only counted if more than 30 percent of all active users participated 
in the voting process. At the current moment, that would have required roughly 400 
25 Andrew Feenberg Questioning Technology p.76.
26 Ibid.
27 Susan Douglas “The Turn Within” in Laurie Ouellette The Media Studies Reader p.97.
28 See for example Bloomberg News “Facebook 'Face Recognition' Feature Draws Privacy Scrutiny” in 
The New York Times June 9, 2011.
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million users to vote on any particular privacy issue29. This massive threshold prompts 
journalist David Streitfeld to observe that “Facebook's brief experiment with direct user 
democracy [...] was a policy that never amounted to much in the first place.”30 Moreover, 
his comments further contextualize Facebook's allegedly pro-user policy:
Facebook says the changes to the policy are minor and beneficial for users. One 
concerns the integration of Instagram data with Facebook; another changes the 
filters for managing incoming messages. Privacy watchdogs disagree. So do 
those who bothered to vote: Shortly before noon Pacific time on Friday, 476,718 
were against the proposed changes. A mere 68,884 were in favor.
But the really interesting change is that Facebook is proposing to end this 
system of direct voting, which was implemented in early 2009 after a major 
privacy flap. "If we are trying to move the world to being more open and 
transparent and to get people to share more information, having an open process 
around this is ultimately the only way to do that," Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook's 
founder, said at the time in a conference call.
The problem was that more than 30 percent of all Facebook users had to vote against a 
proposal for it to be binding. In the last vote, in June, the no's outweighed the yeses by a 
ratio of six to one, but the total votes were less than one half of 1 percent of the users. 
That made the vote simply advisory. And so Facebook went ahead and implemented the 
changes anyway. Barabara Ortutay states:
Facebook is proposing to end its practice of letting users vote on changes to its 
privacy policies, though it will continue to let users comment on proposed 
updates. The world's biggest social-media company said in a blog post this week 
that its voting mechanism, which is triggered only if enough people comment on 
proposed changes, has become a system that emphasizes quantity of responses 
over quality of discussion. Users tend to leave one- or two-word comments 
objecting to changes instead of more in-depth responses.31
Notable about this comment is the fact that Facebook makes its users responsible for the 
29 Tim Peterson “Facebook Users Vote on Policy Changes-Just not that many. AdWeek January 29, 2014. 
<http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/facebook-users-vote-policy-changes-just-not-many-
145717>
30 David Streitfeld, New York Times Blog Bits, December 7, 2012.
31 USA Today November 23, 2012.
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“failed” bottom-up approach to personal information privacy. It is their lack of 
engagement with already existing communication mechanisms, and not Facebook's 
failure to take a pro-user stand with regard to PIP, that ended a more transparent privacy 
policy approach.
What becomes immediately clear is that Zuckerberg's claim to make internal and 
foundational processes and decisions more open and transparent is merely a hoax or 
rhetorical trick. Furthermore, the fact that Facebook implemented changes to the privacy 
policy regardless of the obvious skepticism among users, only underscores that in 
Facebukistan, elections only matter if they confirm already existing decisions.
Despite its critical stand towards Facebook, both Ortutay and Streitfeld maintain 
some trust into the idea that Facebook could provide meaningful voting mechanisms for 
its users to make important changes to the PIP policy. In so doing, they continue to 
believe that pro-user conditions can be created from within Facebook's technocratic 
organization and via technical choices – for instance a voting button.
But this faith in the consent debate is misleading for a number of reasons. First, 
the power to decide which issues are being put up for vote remains exclusively in 
Facebook's hands. Secondly, it is entirely unclear, what options are available to Facebook 
users who disagree with its data policy but want to or need to continue using the service. 
Arguably, merely 5 percent of all Facebook users trust the website's policy anyways, 
irrespective of whether they have read Facebook's privacy policy or not32. Yet, that does 
not stop the majority of Facebook users from posting comments, pictures, and other 
32 Emily Ekins “Americans Say 75 Percent of Politicians are corrupt” 
<http://reason.com/poll/2014/04/03/americans-say-75-percent-of-politicians>
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personal information to their profiles.
A third and final way to talk about personal information privacy as a matter of 
control includes formulations such as “Facebook and Privacy Clash Again”33 or 
“Facebook reaches settlement with FTC on privacy concerns”34. This approach presents 
Facebook as an actor or as a thing with a life on its own. Facebook seems to operate 
independent from the human activities that code and program its very infrastructure, 
manage the data it generates, or that develop its software, games and apps.
Communication Studies scholars Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise 
explain that treating a technology such as Facebook merely in terms of its “thingness”35, 
assumes that Facebook can be understood as an object with discrete boundaries. Treating 
Facebook as a thing, however, divorces it from the labor as well as other the human 
activities that constitute it.
Thus, Slack and Wise remind us that we should not treat Facebook as a thing to 
begin with. Instead, in similar yet different ways than the internet, it resembles an 
“arrangement” that “does not occupy space” in the same way as more tangible objects. 
The fact that it still is widely conceptualized as something with a “discrete and 
isolatable”36 nature point at our flawed ways to imagine the social network service.
A variation of the argument describes Facebook as a thing that single-handedly 
changes how we conceive personal information privacy. Jenna Wortham quotes Elliot 
Schrage, Facebook's vice president for public policy:
33 Jenna Wortham New York Times May 6, 2010.
34 Cecilia Kang “Facebook reaches settlement with FTC on privacy concerns” The Washington Post 
November 30, 2011.
35 Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise. Culture and Technology. A Primer. New York: Peter Lang, 
2006. p.95.
36 Ibid. p.96.
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Facebook has been made the center of attention around a really important issue 
of how technology is changing the conception of privacy, control and sharing, 
[…]. People are uneasy about it, but as they start to see the benefits and 
advantages of it, they start to see the value of the experiences.37
Along similar lines, the New York Times journalist Randal Stross singles-out Facebook as 
a key actor in the dissolution of PIP in favor of some post-privacy condition. He states:
[It is] not because Facebook is hell-bent on stripping away privacy protections, 
but because the popularity of Facebook and other social networking sites has 
promoted the sharing of all things personal, dissolving the line that separates the 
private from the public.38
Dan Fletcher's article for Time Magazine titled “How Facebook is Redefining Privacy” 
takes a similarly flawed, because deterministic, point of view. Fletcher ascertains that  
“Facebook has changed our social DNA, making us more accustomed to openness”39.
Rather than understanding Facebook as part of an assemblage and as an 
arrangement of a variety of technologies, these statements render Facebook a single force 
changing and manipulating our tastes and expectations for PIP. This way of thinking 
ignores that certain concepts such as technology or privacy are, what Slack and Wise call, 
“polysemic”. “Polysemy, [they explain], refers to the fact that words can have many 
different meanings”40. 
Not only is the struggle over these meanings is always historically and 
situationally specific, what a concept such as PIP entails, always depends on a number of  
different factors and is never determined by any one organization or actor – even if that 
organization is as powerful as Facebook is. That, in turn, explains why the meaning of 
37 Quoted in Jenna Wortham, New York Times May 6, 2010.
38 Randal Stross. “When Everyone's a Friend, Is Anything Private?” The New York Times March 8, 2009. 
p. BU3.
39 Dan Fletcher “How Facebook is Redefining Privacy” Time Magazine May 20, 2010. 
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798,00.html>
40 Slack and Wise Culture+Technology p.98.
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privacy shifts and changes, is made and un-made as part of people's everyday activities. 
That is why in contrast to Wortham and Stross, I advocate an approach to PIP in which 
Facebook is one of many factors that shapes what privacy means to us.
A similarly relational approach should be taken to the personal information that is 
published on Facebook. In the same article I quoted above, Randal Stross concludes his 
eulogy for privacy and states:
Facebook does let members create customized subsets of friends. Members can 
selectively restrict access to some items, such as photo albums and videos. But 
customizing permissions for this or that, via multiple clicks, is no one's idea of a 
good time. 
For many members, ''friends'' now means a mish-mash of real friends, former 
friends, friends of friends, and non-friends; younger and older relatives; 
colleagues and, if cursed, a nosy boss or two. Everyone accepted as a ''friend'' 
gets the same access.
When the distinction blurs between one's few close friends and the many who 
are not, it seems pointless to distinguish between private and public.41
In Stross's defense, somewhere else in the article, he laments that Facebook does 
not set its defaults on the side of privacy. However, he simply overstates Facebook's 
power in determining the value of friendships and privacy. Only because the service uses 
a generic label for contacts does not mean that users treat all of their contacts in the same 
way.
While his criticism of Facebook's structural shortcomings is well-taken, Stross 
seems to confuse lateral information sharing among “friends” with the sharing of 
information with Facebook. While lateral sharing allows users to decide what to share 
with whom – something that Stross acknowledges himself – the real problem is that users 
41 Randal Stross. “When Everyone's a Friend, Is Anything Private?” The New York Times March 8, 2009. 
p. BU3.
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cannot be selective when it comes to sharing information with Facebook. The web 
service reads, records, and knows all digital activities that take place within its 
proprietary premisses (and sometime beyond).
Stross's argument serves as an example for the problematic flattening-out of 
information complexity that ignores the work that Facebook users invest already when 
sharing information. As Stross correctly points out and as I have observed above, the 
technical features that allow users to regulate access to bits of information are not enough 
and oftentimes cumbersome to maintain. But it would be an overstatement to say that this  
inevitably means the end to all dimensions of PIP. 
Facebook itself is an assemblage of various technologies all of which do different 
and require different information privacy work. Facebook users distinguish between how 
certain technologies share information more readily than others. For instance, whereas 
the first adaptation of Beacon42 caused a huge outcry for its felt violation of user privacy 
rights, users seem less concerned about the fact their information automatically finds its 
way to their friends' newsfeed. In the former case, the outrage was not about the fact that 
information was readily broadcasted to all friends, but about the fact that it was instantly 
combined with commercial content.
In addition, Stross makes a factual mistake when he believes that all information 
is shared instantly and equally with all friends. Taina Bucher's research about the ways in 
which algorithms determine visibility proves that content visibility depends on three 
components: affinity (the relationship between viewing user and item creator), weight 
(how popular Facebook considers an item), and time decay (the relationship between the 
42 The services that was launched in 2006 due to the users protest quickly cancelled shortly thereafter.
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recency or freshness of an information item)43.
In a peculiar sense, while challenging the idea of private information, Facebook's 
algorithms accidentally render some information more private than others. Moreover, my 
opening anecdote in the introduction shows that some Facebook users realize that certain 
types of information are more valuable to them than others and therefore need more 
protection. In terms of lateral visibility, Facebook users understand pretty well the 
difference between a status update and a personal message. While I acknowledge the fact 
that some users might underestimate some features of Facebook – such as the fact that 
photos remain accessible on the website long after they were taken – but that is different 
from saying Facebook blurs any and all distinction between public and private.
The pervasiveness of the Facebook thingness fallacy as well as the ideology of the 
technological sublime become especially clear when we look at the ways in which the 
Facebook's CEO Mark Zuckerberg draws from a similar set of ideas. In a letter published 
in the Washington Post, Mark Zuckerberg writes: 
We give people control. […] We have heard the feedback. There needs to be a 
simpler way to control your information. In the coming weeks, we will add 
privacy controls that are much simpler to use.44
In another article for the New York Times, Zuckerberg explains:
In general, the more control you can give people the better[…]. If you give 
people control over everything they do, you'll never put them in a situation that's 
uncomfortable.45
In The Facebook Effect, the book that is considered one of the few comprehensive written 
43 Taina Bucher “Want to be on Top?” p.1168.
44 Mark Zuckerberg. “A New Page in Facebook Privacy” The Washington Post May 24, 2010. A19.
45 Warren St. John. “When Information becomes T.M.I. The New York Times September 10, 2010. p.8.
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accounts that enjoyed Zuckerberg's participation46, David Kirkpatrick summarizes this 
official Facebook rhetoric concerning personal information privacy under the principle 
radical transparency47. Along these lines, Zuckerberg ascertains: 
If we give people control over what they share, they will want to share more. If 
people share more, the world will become more open and connected. And a 
world that's more open and connected is a better world.48
Of course, many journalists have criticized Facebook for its approach to personal 
information privacy and have recognized the contradictory nature of the personal 
information privacy debate. Janet Kornblum for instance cites the PEW research institute 
to argue that the sense of privacy as control is largely illusionary as information flows 
and travels from platform to platform, from user interface to user interface49. Legal 
scholar Julie E. Cohen highlights as well that “the idea of fixed local boundaries must be 
abandoned along with illusion of the ability to control self-exposure”50.
Nevertheless, Zuckerberg advocates technical affordances as solution to the 
personal information privacy challenge. Like the journalists above, he delegates the 
responsibility for the security of personal information to the individual user and holds 
him or her accountable to use Facebook's technical privacy management. Zuckerberg's 
rhetoric effectively cements a top-down relationship between software provider and user. 
Rather then encouraging a democratic approach51 to software and technology, in which 
46 David Pogue “Humanity's Database” New York Times July 2, 2010. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/books/review/Pogue-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>
47 David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010: 
48 Mark Zuckerberg. “A New Page in Facebook Privacy” The Washington Post May 24, 2010. A19.
49 Janet Kornblum. “Privacy? That's old-school; Internet generation view openness in a different way” 
USA Today October 23, 2007. p.1D.
50 Julie E. Cohen. Configuring the Networked Self  pp. 142-145.
51 A number of books have been published about the process of democratizing technology, of thinking 
about technology from the bottom-up. Langdon Winner's The Whale and the Reactor is a classic 
contribution to how a rethinking of the relationship between power and technology can lead to a better 
society. Richard E. Sclove's Democracy and Technology is probably the most widely know attempt to 
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users help to shape Facebook's entire architecture, Zuckerberg makes clear that user 
agency is purely reactionary and entirely limited to activities within the narrowly defined 
Facebook framework.
Yet, if we limit the protection of personal information privacy to Facebook's 
technical choices provided, we ignore that these choices “establish roles that are imposed 
on everyone who chooses to belong” to Facebook. As philosopher Andrew Feenberg 
reminds us, technocratic organizations are built on the premise that “technical devices 
prescribe norms to which the individual is tacitly committed”. In other words, technical 
privacy controls “conserve and legitimate [Facebook's] expanding system of hierarchical 
control”52. That is why the idea of user empowerment via technical controls is a 
dangerous fantasy that Zuckerberg perpetuates and that some journalists all too willingly 
advocate for as well.
While Zuckerberg presents himself as someone, who acts only with the best 
interests of his users in mind, he is better described as a benevolent dictator the 
technocratic kingdom Facebukistan53. His rhetoric fails to mention, that he can, 
practically overnight, change the rules that regulate all activities within Facebukistan  
without explanation or prior announcement. That is why Facebook illustrates that in 
many cases, “unfortunately, the obstacles to technical democracy are considerable and 
growing”54. Facebook's data policy makes this skewed perception of PIP obvious:
develop a more democratic approach to technology. However, Slack and Wise have a similar mission in 
mind when they develop their cultural studies approach to technology.
52 Andrew Feenberg Questioning Technology p.103.
53 The term is borrowed from Rebecca McKinnon's book Consent of the Networked. Mackinnon uses her 
book as a plea for a more democratic internet in which users re-claim cyberspace and begin to challenge  
the increasingly asymmetrical power structures that seem to dominate it.
54 Andrew Feenberg Questioning Technology p.132.
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While you are allowing us to use the information we receive about you, you 
always own all of your information. Your trust is important to us, which is why 
we don't share information we receive about you with others unless we have: 
received your permission; given you notice, such as by telling you about it in 
this policy; or removed your name and any other personally identifying 
information from it.55
Keeping in mind, we are asked only once to grant Facebook the permission to use our 
information, that is when we create our profile. After that, we are actually never asked 
again. Furthermore, notifications in the context of Facebook usually come in the form of 
announcing of yet another technology roll-out or new profile new layout. Our consent is 
therefore usually silent, hardly ever explicit, and can certainly newer specifically address 
all the possible dimensions of Facebook. The following excerpt from Facebook's data use 
policy underscores this problematic:
We use the information we receive about you in connection with the services 
and features we provide to you and other users like your friends, our partners, 
the advertisers that purchase ads on the site, and the developers that build the 
games, applications, and websites you use. For example, in addition to helping 
people see and find things that you do and share, we may use the information we 
receive about you:
• as part of our efforts to keep Facebook products, services and 
integrations safe and secure;
• to protect Facebook's or others' rights or property;
• to provide you with location features and services, like telling you and 
your friends when something is going on nearby;
• to measure or understand the effectiveness of ads you and others see, 
including to deliver relevant ads to you;
• to make suggestions to you and other users on Facebook, such as: 
suggesting that your friend use our contact importer because you found 
friends using it, suggesting that another user add you as a friend because 
the user imported the same email address as you did, or suggesting that 
your friend tag you in a picture they have uploaded with you in it; and
• for internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, 
research and service improvement.56
55 Facebook Data Policy Use Agreement date p.3.
56 Ibid.
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One of the more obvious problems has to do with the vague language Facebook employs 
in this statement. Who are Facebook's partners and advertisers? Would it not be fair to 
provide us with a better sense of whom we are agreeing to share our information with? 
Moreover, how is it fair to use our personal data in order to maximize Facebook's 
business model? While it might very well be that some Facebook users enjoy the 
customized ads on their profile, should they not at least be asked for permission for every 
single one of them? 
In other words, merely removing our names and other identifying information 
from out data is not enough to protect user PIP. It is certainly not a valid excuse for 
simply claiming universal rights over our information while leaving users in the dark 
about the specific ways in which their data is being used. Helen Nissenbaum, whose 
concept of contextual integrity I will discuss at greater detail in a later chapter, has argued 
convincingly that people get upset if they have the feeling that their personal information 
is used in contexts and for purposes that have little to do with the contexts within which 
the data was initially produced. Arguably, Facebook's data use policy is a case in point for 
such a PIP violation.
This problem is sometimes referred to as abuse of personal data for secondary 
purposes. The secondary use issue can be explained best by comparison to the secondary 
use of credit card purchasing histories. Part of the way in which credit card companies 
make money is by matching a purchasing history with a customers demographic 
information in order to sell those consumer profiles to advertisers. Similarly, Facebook 
creates demographic profiles from all of its users online activities on the website and 
39
those websites that are connected to Facebook, for instance via the “like” button.
Throughout its data use policy, Facebook states clearly that users are responsible 
for the management of their personal information. Users have to decide what counts as 
private to them and what does not. Facebook mentions rather casually that it receives 
various data about users that they “choose to share”. It follows that, since it is your 
decision to share information, you and only you can be held accountable to manage it. 
Mark Zuckerberg has repeatedly called this approach granular control57 to indicate that 
every little tiny step on the website is subject to the user's supervision.
Mark Zuckerberg has stressed over and again that giving people control over what 
they share, will motivate them want to share more. Furthermore, Facebook's data policy 
highlights that user trust in the company is important. Josh Constantine explains why:
If you don’t trust Facebook, you might keep an account, but you won’t share as 
much. So Facebook is aiming to educate users about privacy in the hopes that 
they’ll keep doubling the amount they share each year and uphold Zuckerberg’s 
Law. Facebook privacy can’t just be “good enough.” It needs us confident in our 
control, because as it runs low on people to sign up, attracting more data is the 
main way it will grow.58
In other words, maintaining the illusion of information control is critical to Facebook's 
business model. As I have argued before, hardly anybody trusts Facebook. Yet, because 
the website has found ways to capitalize the principle that “accessibility to others is a 
critical enabler of interpersonal association and social participation”59, its users find 
themselves in an unfortunate double-bind. In order to benefit from the websites extensive 
networks, users have to yield a number of substantial rights to Facebook without any 
57 Kirkpatrick Facebook Effect 2010 p.208.
58 Josh Constantine “More than privacy Controls, Facebook needs our Trust to keep growing” TechCrunch 
December 12, 2012 <http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/12/facebook-privacy-powers-zuckerbergs-law/>
59 Ibid. p.145.
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meaningful opportunity to challenge this status quo.
That is also why Facebook's data use policy can candidly state that users “should 
make sure to read [the] terms of services and privacy policies [from third party 
applications] to understand how they treat your data”60. Facebook makes clear, when you 
use apps, you pay with your personal data. For instance, withholding your User ID means 
that you will no longer be able to use some applications at all. It would, of course, be 
unrealistic to hold Facebook responsible for monitoring the privacy policies of the vast 
amount of websites and apps61 that run via the website. 
However, rather than outsourcing its responsibility for PIP entirely, Facebook 
could hold app developers accountable to a PIP code of ethics that is transparent and 
easily accessible. Moreover, Facebook could offer tutorials which help to understand 
possible loop wholes in the various privacy policies. In any case, since Facebook directly 
profits from the traffic that apps generate, it must take some responsibility for how these 
third parties value PIP.
A final observation concerning the idea of user control. The policy states: “if the 
ownership of our business changes, we may transfer your information to the new owner 
so that they can continue to operate the service”. Couched into these two short lines is the 
hard truth that most of our current digital information infrastructure is proprietary. 
Whereas Mark Zuckerberg might be a somewhat benevolent dictator now, a change in the 
ownership structure of Facebook could render the current data use policy invalid at any 
time. This fact radically challenges the notion of user control. More broadly, it suggests 
60 Facebook Data Use Policy Agreement p.6.
61 According to the business blog insidefacebook, Facebook currently supports roughly 9 million apps. 
Brittany Darwell April 27, 2012 <http://www.insidefacebook.com/2012/04/27/facebook-platform-
supports-more-than-42-million-pages-and-9-million-apps/>
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that the increasingly proprietary structure of the mainstream internet has placed a lot of 
control in the hands of the owners of this space. As Anthony De Rosa, product manager at 
Reuters, lucidly declares:
We live in a world of Digital Feudalism. The land many live on is owned by 
someone else, be it Facebook or Twitter or Tumblr, or some other service that 
offers up free land and the content provided by the renter of the land essentially 
becomes owned by the platform that owns the land.62
Therefore, web services such as Facebook mark an important rupture in the history of the 
internet, which was initially “deliberately constructed as a decentralized network to make 
it difficult to control the network from any single point”63.
The inherent contradiction between Mark Zuckerberg's plea for radical openness 
and Facebook's closed-up infrastructure describes the central conundrum to a more 
democratic understanding of personal information privacy. The exclusive promotion of 
technical solutions, makes it more difficult for ordinary people to define and negotiate for 
themselves the meaning and relevance they attribute to personal information privacy. 
These arguments foreclose a constructive debate over what personal information privacy 
might mean and why it might matter at the current conjuncture. 
Overall, it is important to remember that an arrangement of technologies such as 
Facebook can neither dissolve the line between private and public nor the idea of 
controlling information by itself; it is the people's activities which, in turn, are shaped by 
political, economic, and cultural factors, that reshape these boundaries. It is these 
contextual factors that I turn to next.
62 Quoted in David Carr “At Media Companies, a Nation of Serfs” New York Times February 13, 2011. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/business/media/14carr.html?
_r=3&adxnnl=1&ref=technology&adxnnlx=1396706437-cB+HcTww3/HwOBmffBMMqw> but 
originally published at tumblr <http://soupsoup.tumblr.com/post/2800255638/the-death-of-platforms>
63 Gilbert Rodman The Net Effect p.28.
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Part of the problem with the ways in which journalists conceptualize the 
relationship between Facebook, PIP, and context is tied to a generally simplistic 
understanding of cultural contexts in the first place. Rather than acknowledging the 
plurality of culture, most journalists refer to culture as one. As a consequence, 
conclusions about the current state of culture and PIP tend to be rather polemical and 
portray our current culture in a dismal condition. Many times we are being told that we 
are drifting towards a catastrophe, and that all of this manifests itself within the 
boundaries of Facebukistan. Most journalists investigate culture as an “enclosed and 
isolated place” and fail to analyze “the connections and disconnections, the circulations 
and movements, the ups and downs that make a culture a living culture above and beyond 
its singular location”64.
Kathleen Parker for instance speaks of a culture “that's all about me and mine” 
and connects this culture with the diminishing care for the self and others as well as the 
“death of privacy”. According to her analysis, “we're all paparazzi” that use Facebook 
and the likes for self-exposure in a “pathologically narcissistic culture”. Today, she 
claims, “shame, modesty and privacy have become old-fashioned notions” and the 
decreasing value of privacy is the consequence of our own actions. Parker shouts out: We 
are all “comfortable spectators of others' intimacy”65. We might want to shout back – are 
we?
If we believe Parker's assessment, we would indeed have reason to be concerned. 
Yet, are we all using Facebook this way? Can we reduce everything that takes place on 
64 David Oswell. Culture and Society Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006. p.9.
65 Kathleen Parker “If a Diary's not safe, what is?” USA Today October 13, 2009. p.11A.
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Facebook to this narrow set of activities? Are we all similarly dis-concerned with our 
personal information privacy? As David Oswell writes, “to study culture […] means to 
analyse the habits, customs, beliefs, ideas and arts”66 – all of which change and are 
struggled over, negotiated, among users constantly. Similarly, Slack and Wise remind us 
that culture is not reducible to one essential characteristic – culture is never just  
narcissistic – but, instead, consists of “practices, representations, experiences, and 
affects”67 that go hand in hand or, sometimes, work against each other. 
The debate over emotional boundary management on Facebook68 is just one 
indicator of the ways in which users negotiate constantly what might be considered 
“comfortable” behavior on the platform. Therefore, single-handedly connecting the end 
of privacy to a handful of seemingly general trends in our culture grossly underestimates 
the complexity according to which culture operates.
Janet Kornblum invokes a similar notion by referring to a “culture of constant 
feedback”. Moreover, Jon Swartz cites a Facebook spokesman who declares that “we 
have an open culture”69. Finally, Sharon Jayson ascertains that “today's mix of easy 
information sharing and celebrity-driven media culture is making us more narcissistic”70. 
Efforts to define culture as one, in turn, lead to similarly trivializing conclusions that 
“Facebook is flat”71, that all identities become one (Facebook) identity, and that all 
66 David Oswell. Culture and Society Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006. p.6.
67 Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise Culture + Technology. A Primer New York: Peter Land, 
2007. p.127.
68 Hollis Griffin investigates ways in which we deal with affect on social network sites. Her piece “Debbie 
Downer has a Facebook Problem: Regulating Affect on Social Media Networks” is an insightful 
analysis of some of the work we need to do in order to manage our emotions online.
69 Jon Swartz “Facebook draws protests on privacy issue” USA Today May 14, 2010. p.3B.
70 Sharon Jayson “Thanks for oversharing?” USA Today September 14, 2010. p.1D.
71 Jon Swartz “750 Million users befriend facebook” USA Today July 7, 2011. p.1B.
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culture is enveloped in the term “cyber culture”72. 
This reductionism undermines even otherwise nuanced contributions. For 
example, Michael Gerson rightly cautions his readers not to overstate the power of social 
networking (sites) which, “taken in small doses, (are) hardly toxic, and sometimes 
useful”73. However, in his next sentence, Gerson argues that Internet culture attacks 
modesty, complicates true intimacy, and rewards shallowness (without explaining how, 
where, when, and why). This reductionist approach to cyber culture is by no means 
limited to the United States but can be found in Germany74, too. Overall, it becomes 
evident that the discourse about privacy and Facebook, similar to that about the Internet 
at large, is dominated by “assumptions that flatten out the multifaceted complexities” 75 of 
culture.
Another problem with these accounts is that they build the foundation for 
Facebook's own rhetoric, which wants us to believe that Facebook can single-handedly 
change the world. It is articles such as the one by Lisa Guerney for The New York Times 
that underscore the pervasiveness of this “Facebook culture”76 claim. Equating culture 
with Facebook is effectively fulfilling Facebook's dreams of becoming one with culture 
or determining and framing what culture is. The reality is not only more complex but also 
locates cultural change in the practices and experiences of those who live culture: namely 
72 Michael Gerson “Status Update: Chatty” The Washington Post January 15, 2010. p.A25.
73 Michael Gerson “With Friends like these” The Washington Post October 5, 2007. p.A21.
74 For instance the debate in the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit between Nina Pauer, who is largely 
skeptical of facebook's cultural and symbolic power, and Ijoma Mangold, who pursuits a more 
supportive position towards Facebook. Both articles can be accessed here: 
http://www.zeit.de/2011/40/Facebook-Timeline versus http://www.zeit.de/2011/41/Facebook-Debatte-
Kritiker
75 In Virtual Publics: Policy and Community in an Electronic Age (Beth E. Kolko, ed.). New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003, p.12.
76 Lisa Guernsey “Picture your name here” The New York Times July 27, 2008. p.6.
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the people who use technology (or negotiate the meaning of privacy on Facebook). This 
bottom-up approach to culture is absent from the discourse. By contrast, mainstream 
journalism is shaped by a top-down view of culture that ignores the contradictory and 
diverse user practices that constitute culture.
Another way in which journalists overlook the contextual dimension of PIP has to 
do with the overemphasis on details within Facebook's data policy. Journalists across all 
examined newspapers discuss over and again how a newly drafted data use policy either 
advances or curtails the users's personal information privacy rights. Nick Bilton from The 
New York Times summarizes Facebook's new privacy policy saying: “when Facebook 
giveth, Facebook taketh away”77. USA Today writer Roger Yu observes: 
Facebook introduced changes to its privacy settings Wednesday, a move that will 
stir anxiety among change-averse users but one that the company says will make 
accessing the options easier.” He furthermore quotes Marc Rotenberg, executive 
director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, who argues that "[t]here's 
a better safeguard for apps but less control of your data. We think users should 
have more control of (their) data.78
Edward C. Baig, another writer from USA Today, quotes the same expert and applauds 
most of the recent privacy changes:
I've been digging into the new privacy settings Facebook is rolling out to 
address the issues. The basic promise is that you can control a swath of privacy 
settings with a single click, though you can fine-tune. […]
Facebook provides a "Recommended" middle-ground default set of settings, but 
make sure they jibe with your preferences. [...]
It takes longer to pore through the custom settings, but it's a good idea to explore 
your options. [...]
The new settings hardly remove all the confusion, complexity and controversy. 
But they do represent a major step in the right direction.79
77 Nick Bilton, December 17, 2012.
78 Roger Yu, USA Today December 13, 2012.
79  Edward C Baig, USA Today June 3, 2010.
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Jenna Wortham, also New York Times, quotes Chris Kelly, chief privacy officer for 
Facebook, regarding a privacy policy update from three years ago: “'Our overall 
philosophy is that people should be as open or as closed as they want to be.'” She later 
concludes that
For now the new features are available only to a limited number of users, but 
the company said it planned to provide them eventually to everyone on the site. 
The changes are part of Facebook's effort to simplify its privacy settings, which 
had ballooned to more than six pages and 40 different options. The company 
said that fewer than a quarter of its users regularly adjusted privacy settings, so 
it planned to condense them into a single, easy-to-navigate page.80
It becomes clear pretty quickly, that all of these commentators express a similarly blind 
faith in the technical fixes that I have criticized extensively above. However, not a single 
journalist in my sample of 7 years of mainstream journalism, went to the trouble look for 
other texts that help to explain some of the ideas that have shaped Facebook's data use 
policy. That is why the following pages go beyond Baig's “digging in” and, instead, show 
how Facebook's architecture exists within a broader political context in which corporate 
interests trump individual or collective user interests.
Interrogating the White House policies on privacy
My analysis of the White House Guidelines for Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked  
World81 provides evidence for this shift away from emphasizing a pro-citizen position on 
personal information privacy to a pro-business and consumer-centric approach to 
personal information privacy. I explain why Facebook's relationship to Washington is 
80 Jenna Wortham, July 2, 2009. other examples that illustrate this point include from the 
- The New York Times: Paul Boutin, August 30, 2011 (gadgetwise); Nick Bilton, June 25, 2012 or Nick 
Bilton “Semantics of Visibility vs. Privacy” NYTimes Bits June 26, 2012
- The Washington Post: Cecilia Kang, May 27, 2010; Kang, December 10, 2009.
- USA Today Jon Swartz, December 10, 2009; USA Today Jon Swartz, May 27, 2010.
81 The White House Consumer Data Privacy In a Networked World  report can be accessed here: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
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best described as a revolving door and how that might affect the users's PIP. 
The metaphor of the revolving door summarizes the intense exchange of ideas and 
staff between politicians in Washington and the Facebook headquarters in Menlo Park. It 
is simply alarming to watch a person such as Cheryl Sandberg effortless transition from 
the high gardens of an MBA education in Harvard, to the World Bank, where she worked 
as assistant to Lawrence Summers, to Washington, where she was chief of staff for the 
treasury secretary, and finally to Silicon Valley where she worked now for two giants of 
the industry google and Facebook82. The attention her book Lean In received, hints at 
some of the cultural capital and clout that emanates from these institutions. Moreover, the 
revolving door describes a condition and political zeitgeist in which one of the main 
functions of political leaders, namely defending the interests of the ordinary people 
whom they represent by way of serving as check and balance to various corporate 
interests, no longer  captures the political reality. 
In fact, while I acknowledge that the document I investigate is merely a guideline 
without any legally binding effect, it still communicates a general disinterest among 
policy makers for the PIP rights of ordinary people. Counter to its own claims, the 
guidelines fail to commit to a more equal distribution of power, foundational to any 
functioning democracy. In so doing, the White House misses an important opportunity to 
support and boost the rights ordinary people in the battle of the meaning of PIP.
Despite these critical initial comments, I applaud President Obama's remarks in 
the opening letter to the guidelines. He states: “we must reject the conclusion that privacy 
82 For a prolific introduction to Sheryl Sandberg see Ken Auletta's “A Woman's Place” in The New Yorker. 
Many actually suspect Sandberg to return to Washington eventually to run for a much higher office.
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is an outmoded value. It has been at the heart of our democracy from its inception, and 
we need it now more than ever.”83 Unfortunately, the guidelines that follow this promise 
leave little hope for more equality in the battle between corporations such as Facebook 
and ordinary people over PIP.
In the following passage, President Obama outlines why privacy is far from dead.
Never has privacy been more important than today, in the age of the Internet, the 
World Wide Web and smart phones. In just the last decade, the Internet has 
enabled a renewal of direct political engagement by citizens around the globe 
and an explosion of commerce and innovation creating jobs of the future. Much 
of this innovation is enabled by novel uses of personal information. So, it is 
incumbent on us to do what we have done throughout history: apply our timeless 
privacy values to the new technologies and circumstances of our times.
The trias of more democracy, more business, more jobs is a familiar trope within 
the White House rhetoric. Given Obama's own history of successful grassroots web-
campaigning and fund-raising, his enthusiasm for the ways in which digital technologies 
have made their way into politics is understandable. Yet, to what extend this trends has 
had any positive effects for users's PIP remains unclear. Whereas for the president, 
privacy seems to be a basic requirements for active citizenry, the title of the document 
“Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” suggests that the term consumer and citizen can be 
used interchangeably and seem to mean the same thing. In fact, the short opening letter 
communicates clearly that the White House has accepted the hegemony of digital 
corporations.
Furthermore, Obama contradicts himself when he argues that on the one hand 
privacy has never been more important than today only to then praise our timeless 
privacy values. The president seems rather confused about whether privacy is timeless 
83 Dated February 23, 2012.
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and therefore bears an essential characteristic that does not change, or whether today 
presents a new context within which privacy plays a particularly vital role.
Equally unclear is how privacy has contributed to the explosion of commerce and 
the creation of jobs. If anything, the current NSA scandal only proves that the 
government has a rather instrumental attitude towards the informational privacy of its 
citizens. It seems to value PIP in theory but only as long as it does not interfere with 
governmental interests. Overall, celebrating “novel uses of personal information” seems 
to say, look what a great job Facebook is doing.
In the concluding section of his letter, the president calls on companies such as 
Facebook to immediately begin “working with privacy advocates, consumer protection 
enforcement agencies, and others to implement these principles in enforceable codes of 
conduct.” Hence, the political vision of the White House for the protection of personal 
information privacy seems to rely entirely on the industry's willingness to self-regulate. It 
seems to make no attempt to develop any bottom-up strategies to strengthen the rights of 
individual citizens.
It is therefore not surprising to read that the actual guidelines suggest a public 
policy model that relies on enforceable codes of conduct, the FTC enforcement of 
consumer's data privacy right, and an increasingly global interoperability between the 
U.S. Consumer data privacy framework and other countries' frameworks84. The 
Consumer Bill of Rights then focusses on individual control and “recognizes that 
consumers have certain responsibilities to protect their privacy as they engage with an 
84 White House report on Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World p.7.
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increasingly networked society”85.
The problem with the way in which the White House outsources responsibility to 
individuals is that these guidelines assume a level playing field. However, throughout my 
dissertation I make clear that the reality is terribly skewed toward corporate interests.  
Leveling the playing field would therefore require a much more active governmental 
intervention that directly demands tougher privacy regulation rather than leaving the 
development and implementation of those to the corporations.
However, the guidelines express a surprising confidence in the already existing 
consumer privacy framework in the United States and praise the mix of industry's best 
practices, FTC enforcement86, and the creation of a “growing culture of privacy 
awareness within companies”87. The government argues that merely filling the small gaps 
in this framework will update and fulfill the governmental responsibility towards 
consumers (!). To be more explicit: the White House does not believe in providing more 
comprehensive Federal data privacy statutes and is reluctant to modify the existing 
ones88. Many legal scholars have described this approach as “mosaic-like”, “reactionary”, 
85 Ibid. p.9.
86 Can be accessed here on the FTC website under the heading Fair Information Practice Principles: 
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm>
87 The White House Consumer Data Privacy In a Networked World  report p 6.
88 These federal status include FCRA The Fair Credit Reporting Act; Privacy Act of 1974 (no applicability 
to businesses); FERPA; The Cable Communications Policy Act (subscribers need to be informed about 
the whereabouts of their personal data); ECPA; Video Privacy Protection Act; Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Acy 1999 
(any financial institution can share 'nonpublic personal information' with affiliated companies” - opt out 
possible) Solove, 2004:70. Particularly the Privacy Act illustrates how the government has always shied 
away from a comprehensive solution to privacy issues. As Solove explains: “viewed in terms of 
architecture, the government has created an identification number without affording adequate 
precautions against its misuse. In so doing, the government has exposed every citizen to significant 
vulnerability to identity theft and other crimes such as fraud and stalking”(Solove, 2004:116). In one of 
my classes, a student asked me how it was possible that companies knew her SNS without her ever 
providing it. The answer is the current legal framework according to which “[it] is currently legal for  
private firms to sell and disclose SSNs” and must be disclosed in various contexts (e.g. in case of 
bankruptcy) (Solove The Digital Person p.117.)
51
and “sectoral”. Legal scholar Daniel J. Solove explains that 
[t]his mosaic approach derives from the traditional American fear of government 
intervention in private activities and the reluctance to broadly regulate industry.  
The result of the mosaic is a rather haphazard and unsatisfactory response to 
each of the privacy concerns.89 
Colin Bennett adds: 
The approach to making privacy policy in the United States is reactive rather 
than anticipatory, incremental rather than comprehensive, and fragmented rather 
than coherent. There may be a lot of laws, but there is not much protection.90
In his fascinating comparison of US American and European attitudes towards 
privacy, James Whitman goes even further and diagnoses: “The relaxed attitude of law-
and-economics scholars toward the market is clearly widely shared among American 
policymakers”. It is in this context, Whitman explains, that the tool of self-regulation 
must be viewed as a pro-market measure that makes governmental intervention a 
unlikely, even undesirable intervention. Again Whitman: 
Most of all, when they [Americans] do propose regulation, they tend, in a 
characteristically American way, to favor market-based solutions to personal 
data protection over the strict comprehensive regulatory regime adopted in 
Europe.91 
This attitude towards regulation is mirrored in FB's intrinsic behavioral norms and 
assumptions that are driven by liberal American mindset92.
In a similar vein, critical legal commentators render the FTC as regulatory agency 
practically meaningless. Solove argues that “the FTC has been rather weak and reactive 
in its enforcement of privacy policies. […] In the end, however, the FTC is limited in its 
89 Daniel J. Solove. The Digital Person p.71.
90 Colin Bennett quoted in Solove The Digital Person p.71.
91 James Whitman. “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy; Dignity versus Liberty” The Yale Law Journal  
113.6 2004. pp.1192-1193.
92 David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect p.279.
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reach. It only ensures that companies keep their promises”93. While that remains true 
today, the FTC recently gained attention for holding Facebook accountable. The SNS was 
charged that it deceived consumers by failing to keep privacy promises94 and, ultimately, 
agreed to third-party privacy auditors for the next 20 years.
Nevertheless, Rubinstein and Good remind us that any actions carried-out via the 
FTC come with substantial procedural requirements and are based on a “notice-by-
choice” model95. In other words, it is up to private individuals to file complains and to 
react to perceived threats to their PIP. It is quite telling that the White House guidelines  
fail to mention efforts that debate the expansion of the FTC's authority to regulate privacy 
on social networking sites96.
To what extend the FTC settlement has had any meaningful impact on PIP on 
Facebook remains completely unclear. Among many others, MSNBC's Helen Popkin is 
hugely skeptical: 
Everything about Facebook is designed to make it easy for people to reveal 
things about themselves. Nothing about Facebook's (Federal Trade Commission) 
settlement -- and a spin-heavy meaculpa from the CEO and/or media consultant 
-- changes that. ... The settlement does not require that Facebook restore the 
privacy settings it rolled back in 2009, which led to the FTC investigation. Much 
of your information is still widely available to the public -- as well as to 
Facebook's business partners -- by default. If you want more privacy, you need 
to 'opt-out,' otherwise your info is out there for anyone to see. ... But hiding 
information involves granular settings, and many steps, while leaving your info 
for almost anyone to find is as easy as logging on to the site.97
93 Daniel J. Solove The Digital Person p.73.
94 FTC website “Facebook settles FTC charges” Janurary 29, 2011 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm>
95 Ira Rubinstein and Nathan Good. “Privacy by design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and 
Facebook Privacy Incidents” Report by the Social Science Research Network Rochester, NY: 2012 p.13. 
96 See Alix McKenna. “Should the FTC regulate privacy on Social Networking Sites” January  5, 2012. 
http://www.regblog.org/2012/01/should-the-ftc-regulate-privacy-on-social-networking-sites.html 
Accessed February 22, 2013.
97 See USA Today December 2, 2011 p.11A.
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All the while, the guidelines present the White House as part of a history that puts 
the information privacy of its citizens as their central priority. The guidelines rank the 
White House's efforts to protect PIP as the most recent chapter in the long legacy of the 
globally recognized Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). This legacy includes the 
HEW (Health,Education,Welfare) Advisory Committee on Automated Data Systems 
authored a comprehensive report that set out five principles that are now commonly 
referred as “Code of Fair Information Practices”. These principles are widely recognized 
for their pro-citizen stand and require: 
(1) There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is 
secret.
(2) There must be a way for a person to find out what information about a person is in 
a record and how it is used.
(3) There must be a way for a person to prevent information about a person that was 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without the person's consent.
(4) There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable 
information about the person.
(5) Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended 
use and must take precautions to prevent misuses of the data.98
These five principles where designed in order to protect sensitive health care information 
in the 1970ies and are therefore not legally binding for Facebook. They are helpful, 
though, to understand the failure of the government's to protect user rights over the last 
40 plus years. This failure is particularly apparent and alarming since these principles 
seemed to have little impact on Facebook's actual approach to PIP. 
Whereas the existence of Facebook's huge record-keeping system is no longer a 
98 These principles describe a set of guidelines and recommendation released in 1973 by the U.S. 
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare. These principles can be accessed here:  
http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/code_fair_info.html
54
secret, the extent to which the social media corporation saves our data is unclear. Thanks 
to the Austrian law student Max Schremm, Facebook now complies with the second 
principle and supplies users upon request with their personal Facebook records. Schramm 
had filed a law suit against the social network giant that forced Facebook to provide users 
the opportunity to access all their personal data that exists on its servers. However, while 
the data use policy outlines some of the ways in which Facebook uses the recorded data, 
its vagueness leaves much room for improvement.  
I already demonstrated that Facebook violates the third principle on a regular 
basis. One could even argue that Facebook's business model is based on the concept of 
secondary use – that is the use of user data for other purposes that intended. Same can be 
said about the fifth principle. In fact, the Facebook's data use policy holds accountable its 
users and thus neglects the responsibility that the principle asks for.
That is why legal scholar Daniel J Solove correctly points at the double standard 
of the White House guidelines. On the one hand, he explains, the HEW principles
established an architecture that alters the power dynamic between individuals 
and the various bureaucracies that process their personal information. […] 
Unfortunately, in the United States the Fair Information Practices have only 
been selectively incorporated into various statutes in a limited number of 
contexts.99
Consequently, it is not necessarily new guidelines and ideas for the protection of our 
private information that we need. No! What we need is a government that does not turn a 
blind eye towards already existing guidelines, such as the five HEW principles, but, 
instead, enforces these much more thoroughly. What we need in order to level the playing 
field is a government that returns to its pro-citizen commitment and remembers how it  
99 Daniel J. Solove. The Digital Person p.105.
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once took a much more active approach to regulate corporate power.
However, through its recently published guidelines, the White House chooses a 
different route entirely. Rather than boosting user rights, it proposes that companies …
... provide consumers appropriate control over personal data that consumers 
share with others and how companies collect, use, or disclose personal data. 
… choices about data sharing, collection, and disclosure that are appropriate for 
the scale, scope, and sensitivity of personal data in question.
… with regard to apps and other third parties, should also offer choices about 
personal data collection that are appropriate for the scale, scope, and sensitivity 
of data they collect.100
Moreover, throughout the guidelines, companies are held accountable to “procedures that 
best fit scale and scope of the data” - whatever that means exactly and whatever measure 
that may entail. Users, on the other hand, have a right to “access and correct personal 
data”101 in an appropriate manner. They also have a right to reasonable limits on personal 
data that companies collect and retain, and they have a right to “have personal data 
handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they adhere to the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights”102. 
The key words are obviously “appropriate” and “reasonable”, which water down 
the guidelines to such a degree that corporations are left to decided which measures 
protect their users's PIP best. Particularly the point that data collection needs to be 
focused and that consumers have the right to a reasonable limit for collected information 
is absurd in light of Facebook's data recording machine.
The difference in tone and focus, compared with the HEW principles, is striking. 
100White House report on Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World  p.11. Emphasis added.
101Ibid. p.19.
102Ibid. p.21.
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Whereas the latter emphasized people's rights, the former focuses on corporate initiatives. 
Facebook's granular approach to PIP shows the limited extend to which corporations 
implement pro-user privacy policies. My discussion of the flaws inherent to Facebook's 
privacy policy makes clear, any attempt that relies on corporate self regulation is  
effectively an irrelevant tool for user protection. 
Finally, the guidelines communicate the pro-business attitude of the White House 
when they propose that “personal data collected only for […] statistical purposes […] 
may not require extensive options for control”. It becomes very obvious that the White 
House's general frame of mind with regard to PIP takes a favorable stand towards the 
information economy, for instance the BIG DATA business sector. Critical scholarship 
about the business models undergirding information trading make clear that it is 
especially the uncontrolled collection of statistical data that causes many of the PIP 
issues. Joseph Turow's book The Daily You impressively outlines the many ways in which 
user data, collected by private companies, has become the centerpiece of a powerful 
information economy, which only seeks to maximize its revenue and which shows no 
appreciation for users's personal information privacy.
The guidelines suggest, that the White House is blind to the fact that the market 
will never be the power behind a more democratic personal privacy architecture, as 
Lawrence Lessig pointedly remarks. As he puts is: “The power of commerce is not 
behind any such change. Here, the invisible hand would really be invisible”103.  In other 
words, leaving the recording of connective data unregulated but holding corporations 
accountable for appropriate ways of dealing with user data means treating the symptoms 
103Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 p.232.
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rather than the source for PIP violations.
The White House's approach to “transparency” is shaped by a similarly 
problematic notion of what it would take to protect PIP.  The guidelines state that in order 
to execute individual user control,
companies should provide clear descriptions of what personal data they collect, 
why they need the data, how they will use it, when they will delete the data or 
de-identify it from consumers, and whether and for what purposes they may 
share personal data with third parties.104 
Looking at Facebook's Data Use Policy again, makes clear how corporations interpret the 
vagueness of the “clear descriptions” guideline. The policy outlines that Facebook 
receives and records all information you choose to share, others share about you, and a 
long list of other types of information. This list includes
• data about you whenever you use or are running Facebook, such as when 
you look at another person's timeline, send or receive a message, search 
for a friend or a Page, click on, view or otherwise interact with things, 
use a Facebook mobile app, or make purchases through Facebook.
• When you post things like photos or videos on Facebook, we may 
receive additional related data (or metadata), such as the time, date, and 
place you took the photo or video.
• data from or about the computer, mobile phone, or other devices you use 
to install Facebook apps or to access Facebook, including when multiple 
users log in from the same device. This may include network and 
communication information, such as your IP address or mobile phone 
number, and other information about things like your internet service, 
operating system, location, the type (including identifiers) of the device 
or browser you use, or the pages you visit. 
• data whenever you visit a game, application, or website that uses 
Facebook Platform or visit a site with a Facebook feature (such as a 
social plugin), sometimes through cookies.
• data from our affiliates or our advertising partners, customers and other 
third parties […].
104White House report on Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World p.14.
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This impressively comprehensive and scary list of types of information raises the 
question if Facebook has the right to record any of this information in the first place. In 
light of the comprehensiveness of the data recorded about users, how could Facebook 
users make informed choices about about the consequences of Facebook's ever expanding 
data tentacles? Holding users accountable to “evaluate their choices and take 
responsibility for the ones that they make”105 with regard to the social network sites and 
services is therefore a ridiculous proposal.
The Dutch digital media scholar Jose van Dijck helps us to look at some of the 
broader consequences of Facebook's unmonitored and unregulated recording of all user 
data for statistical purposes. Her criticism is particularly on point because she emphasizes 
the crucial connection between statistical data and PIP. Van Dijck argues:
If regulators take their concern over privacy and data protection seriously, they 
also need to pay attention to collective privacy: connective data are used to 
engineer individual as well as collective profiles of users, which in turn shape 
the productivity of sociality, creativity, and knowledge, even if subtly and 
unintentionally.106
Leaving van Dijck's oxymoronic notion of “collective privacy” aside, she still explains 
why the dismissal of more governmental control translates into a laissez-faire attitude that  
allows information companies to continue business as usual. Thus, it further curtails the 
possibilities for users to operate under conditions where their personal information and 
online habits are not exploited.
Despite all of this, the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights highlights the users's right 
to “expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are 
105Ibid. p.13.
106Jose van Dijck The Culture of Connectivity p.169.
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consistent with the context in which consumers provide data”107. The problem with this 
argument here is of course that the White House does not seem to understand how 
Facebook collapses multiple contexts into one. The definition above operates with a static 
notion of context and ignores that people use Facebook in different functions – as a 
private person, as a professional, as a friend, as a relative, as an acquaintance. Similarly, 
the perception of context might differ from user to user. Its fundamental flaw is to 
completely underestimate the complexity and dynamic nature of both the context and the 
subject itself108. 
I think it is particularly telling that the guidelines explicitly state that “the respect 
for context principle does not foreclose any particular ad-based business model”109. That 
means that no explicit permission is needed when “the company leases individual profile 
information to third parties” as long as the company's data use policy prominently states 
such information practices110. 
Finally, Facebook's own history is a case in point for why it is naïve to call on 
information companies to install themselves privacy awareness and a privacy culture. 
Arguably, what such a culture would entail is already hard to define. The mere existence 
of privacy officers and a formal commitment to the protection of user privacy are surely 
not enough, since Facebook established all of these things and yet continues to either 
breach their users' trust or to favor the expansion of their business interests over their 
users' personal information privacy interests.
107Ibid. p.15.
108Julie E. Cohen in Configuring the Networked Self makes this observation too and even criticizes legal 
scholars such as Helen Nissenbaum for assuming a static subject p.22. 
109White House report on Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World p.18.
110Ibid. pp.18-19.
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It is in this context that Facebook's ever more prominent lobbying efforts in 
Washington as well as President Obama's close relationship with the company appear in a 
particular problematic light111 - a dangerous development that most journalists actually 
criticize, too.
Somini Sengupta writes that Facebook has “quietly and deftly befriended the 
nation's top lawmakers” to have an influence on “governmental policy as a risk factor to 
prospective shareholders”. While Washington characterizes this growing relationship as a 
“familiarity [that] breeds a deeper understanding of consumer privacy issues”112, there can 
be very little doubt over Washington becoming a revolving door for Facebook's 
representatives.
The New York Times journalists Michael D. Shear and Jennifer Preston comment 
with regard to the last presidential election:
Facebook wants more friends. And it is willing to pay for them. The Silicon 
Valley social media company has for the first time formed an old-fashioned 
political action committee and will use it to distribute cash to candidates in the 
coming elections. It is just one indication of how social media companies are 
integrating with the political landscape in a season in which these businesses are 
growing presences in the campaign conversation.113
Jon Swartz reminds us that it is not just the policy makers themselves that are 
being approached by Facebook but that a growing number Facebook lobbying staff is 
taking aim at Washington's lawmakers as well114, with an impact that can be felt 
111See Washington Post: Cecilia Kang, February 3, 2012; Ian Shapira, December 30, 2009.
112Somini Sengupta. “Facebook builds network of friends in Washington” The New York Times May 19, 
2012. p.B1.
113New York Times September 26, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/us/politics/in-turn-to-
politics-facebook-starts-a-pac.html?_r=0>
114Jon Swartz. “Facebook changes its status in Washington; Social-media company spends more to protect 
its interests” USA Today January 13, 2011 p.1B.
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nationally. The evidence for this trend Swartz delivers himself115 in his report on 
Facebook's successful lobbying effort to stop a proposed Social Networking Privacy 
Act116 in California.
Cecilia Kang highlights the dangerously close relationship between the Obama 
administration and Facebook in her article and concludes: “the Obama administration 
brought Facebook and Twitter to politics. And now it's giving back”117. She rightfully 
criticizes the very problematic exchange of brain power and key actors within the field of 
SNS politics. What begins to unfold, is an image of the government as an actor that 
values user rights and civic rights when popular and convenient but serves Facebook 
whenever necessary.
Not all politicians are comfortable with Facebook's growing lobbyism and its 
tightening relationship with Capitol Hill. Among a handful of politicians, suspicion and 
oftentimes outright skepticism about Facebook's impact on personal information privacy 
has grown118. Senator John Kerry, D-Mass. has called for legislation to respect fair 
information practices and Charles Schumer, D-N.Y.; Michael Bennet, D-Colo.; Mark 
Begich, D-Alaska; and Al Franken, D-Minn have told Facebook to improve their privacy 
115Jon Swartz. “Facebook lobbied to kill bill aimed at social media” USA Today January 13, 2011 p. 2B.
116This act (SB 242), introduced by Senator Ellen Corbett, not only points to the ridiculously low barriers 
of the existing law, which, according to the bill, requires operators of websites such as Facebook to 
“conspicuously post its privacy policy”, but tried to establish concrete personal privacy expectations for 
SNSs. According to the bill, all user information but city and name would be protected by a default 
privacy setting. Furthermore, the bill called for a registration process that states privacy right, 
expectations, and obligations in plain language. Finally, it would have required social network websites 
to remove user information within 48 hours upon request or the parents' request if the user is under 18. 
Lastly, the bill suggested that any willful violation of said guidelines would subject the SNS to a civil 
penalty of up to $10.000.
117Cecilia Kang. “Internet companies eager to hire members of Obama's team” The Washington Post  
March 29, 2011 p.A17.
118Brett Molina, Byron Acohido, and Scott Martin. “Facebook invited to Capitol Hill; Tracking issues, 
porn and violence spam raise questions from lawmakers” USA Today November 18, 2011. p.7B.
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settings119. Yet, in light of the extremely pro-business attitude evident in the White House 
consumer privacy guidelines, it seems only fair to judge these efforts as marginal and as 
drops in the bucket at best. 
Overall, my analysis of the White House guidelines illustrates that in the current 
political context in the United States, little to no protection for users/citizens is offered.  
To some, this might not be a surprising insight. Yet, looking at the parallels and the 
overlap between the ideas shaping the official White House document and Facebook's 
data privacy use policy remains shocking.
At the current moment, we seem to unfortunately be part of a discussion that ties 
individual agency to technical choices and that disarticulates individual agency from the  
political context and the larger economic context within which Facebook exists. Making 
connections to the former would require an investigation of politicians's overall 
willingness to defend ordinary people's right to protect their PIP against corporate and 
governmental interest. The latter context would require an inquiry into the economic 
motivations behind Facebook and would have to take a critical approach towards the 
increasing commercialization of digital spaces.
Arguably, journalists disagree over their societal function. Nevertheless, the lack 
of trying to push back against the simplicity and trivial nature of the pro-business 
Facebook narrative is disappointing. At least in my sample, journalists miss the 
opportunity to establish the political dimension of PIP. While it is unrealistic to demand 
from mainstream journalism a coverage that takes into account the complexity and 
119Jon Swartz. “Senators request Facebook change; New Feature raises issues with privacy” USA Today 
April 28, 2010 p.3B.
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problematic notion of PIP, mainstream journalism should still raise awareness and 
provide narratives that are more distinguishable from Facebook's  PIP narrative.
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Politics of Privacy meet Shareholding Culture
[…] As Facebook turns to Wall Street in the biggest public offering ever by an 
Internet company, it faces a new, unenviable test: how to keep growing and 
enriching its hungry new shareholders. The answer lies in what Facebook will be 
able to do -- and how quickly -- with its crown jewel: its status as an online 
directory for a good chunk of the human race, with the names, photos, tastes and 
desires of nearly a billion people. […] Whether it can spin that data into enough 
gold to justify a valuation of as much as $104 billion remains unclear. […] They 
need to make the data work more,. [...] They need to provide deeper data.1
The media buzz about Facebook's IPO in April 2012 was overwhelming. US American 
Journalists eagerly speculated about the ways in which Wall Street's shareholder culture 
would change Facebook. Sominin Sengupta's article from above summarizes best the 
assumed consequences of this pivotal moment for both Facebook and its users. In a 
similar way, Jon Swartz describes PIP as a commodity. According to him, Facebook 
needs to prove that it can generate revenue without “sharing too much of its members' 
data with eager marketers and advertisers”2. Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center 
for Digital Democracy, also holds this constellation as “part of the balancing act 
Facebook has to do”3.
Sengupta and O'Brien highlight the pressure Facebook will experience from Wall 
Street “to profit from its vast trove of data, and also from regulators worldwide over the 
use of personal information”4. Somewhere else Sengupta writes that Facebook confronts 
an “unenviable test: how to keep growing and enriching its hungry new shareholders”5. 
1 Somini Sengupta. “Facebook Test: How to Please the New Faces” The New York Times May 15, 2012 
Business Section p.1.
2 USA Today May 18, 2012.
3 Quoted in Claire Cain Miller “F.T.C. Said to be near Facebook Privacy Deal” The New York Times 
November, 11 2011.
4 Somini Sengupta and Kevin J. O'brien. “Yes, Facebook Can ID Faces, But Using Them Grows Tricky” 
The New York Times September 22, 2012.
5 Sominin Sengupta “Facebook Test: How to Please The New Faces”  The New York Times May 15, 2012.
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Moreover, Sengupta states, “as [Facebook] works to better match ads to people, it 
has to avoid violating its users' perceived sense of privacy or inviting regulatory 
scrutiny.” Official Facebook documents, Sengupate quotes in her article, warn about how 
“legislative and regulatory scrutiny over user privacy may adversely affect [Facebook's] 
reputation and brand''6.
Two years prior to the IPO, Cecilia Kang already pointed at an obvious 
contradiction. While Facebook promises to “be closed, or restricted” via password 
protection, it submits to a business model according to which “the more information 
[Facebook] make[s] available to outside networks, the more monetization [Facebook] 
ha[s]”7. Jesse Kornbluth acknowledges that the intense pressure to exploit hundreds of 
millions of users has led already to irritation8. Finally, the prominent technology writer 
David Kirkpatrick ascertains:
So far there has been very little resistance among Facebook's users to using their 
data to target ads to them. But it could be where the privacy challenge becomes 
the greatest. It's easy to imagine how some error of targeting or other clumsiness 
could lead to a major ad backlash that sullies the company's reputation9.
Through Kirkpartrick's discussion it becomes perfectly clear that Facebook's future does 
not hinge on the protection of personal information privacy. Instead, Kirkpatrick and 
Sengupta agree: satisfying the shareholders now is Facebook's central concern for the 
foreseeable future. PIP, it seems, is fundamentally at odds with the inevitable pressure to 
monetize Facebook's gigantic amounts of data.
6 Somini Sengupta. “Facebook Test: How to please the new Faces” The New York Times May 15, 2012.
7 Cecilia Kang. “Facebook's test: Translating users to dollars; Trade in information could run up against 
privacy constraints” The Washington Post  July 25, 2010.
8 Jesse Kornbluth “How AOL--Aka Facebook 1.0--Blew Its Lead; The MBAs who took over didn't use 
the service the way members did” Wall Street Journal February 8, 2012.
9 Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect. p.268.
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Bloggers, oftentimes pitched as counterweight to mainstream journalists, argue 
similarly. The Daily Beast's Dan Lyons writes from a hypothetical Facebook perspective:
The truth is, we have no interest in protecting your privacy, and if you still 
believe that we do, then you are stupider than we thought, and believe me, we 
already thought you were pretty stupid. Think about it. The only way our 
business works is if we can track what you do and sell that information to 
advertisers. Did you honestly not realize that?
You are not our customer. You are the product that we sell. For us to say we’re 
going to protect you is like the poultry industry promising to create more 
humane living conditions for chickens. Sure, they say that. But you know they 
don’t mean it.
Same with us. We will never, ever stop trying to pry data out of you. How could 
we? We’re a business. We’re doing this to make money. And our investors 
would like it very much if we can make absolutely as much money as possible. 
It’s simply not in our nature to stop. You know the fable about the scorpion and 
the frog? Yeah. It’s like that.10
This brief selection illustrates how the public discourse conceives personal information 
privacy as an obstacle to Facebook's economic success rather than something that needs 
particular protection or at least attention, as user interests meet shareholder interests.
At the same time, David Kirkpatrick announces that “Facebook now sits squarely 
at the center of a fundamental realignment of capitalism [where] increasingly the people 
are in control”11. For a long time now, scholars of communication technology have 
pointed out how new technologies are typically accompanied by all kinds of 
revolutionary claims. Raymond Williams for instance states how television was supposed 
to “bring about” a new world order. Useful for my analysis is the way in which he 
10 Dan Lyons “The Truth about Facebook Privacy” The Daily Beast November 30, 2011. Blog can be 
accessed here: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/30/the-truth-about-facebook-privacy-if-
zuckerberg-got-real.html>
11 David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect p.263. Throughout this chapter, I will repeatedly focus on 
Kirkpatrick's book because it is one of the few journalistic accounts that enjoyed Mark Zuckerberg's  
collaboration.
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contextualizes such claims:
For behind all such statements lie some of the most difficult and most 
unresolved historical and philosophical questions. Yet the questions are not 
posed by the statements; indeed they are ordinarily masked by them.12
Whereas, in the previous chapter, I argued that journalists overlook or ignore the 
complexity of culture, this chapter shows how they provide a one-dimensional and 
equally trivializing account of the economy; an understanding, to use Lawrence 
Grossberg's words, which ignores “the fractured and contradictory truth of contemporary 
capitalism”13. Unlike in the previous chapter, though, I focus on the economic dimension 
of the PIP discourse and examine more closely Facebook's SEC statements, Facebook's 
quarterly business reports, and other internal Facebook documents. Moreover, I include 
in my newspaper sample the The Wall Street Journal and Fortune Magazine because of 
their explicit and extensive coverage of Facebook's IPO14.
By placing Facebook at the center of an alleged revolution to capitalism, 
journalists prove unable to disarticulate the ideological connections between technology 
and societal or economic change. I demonstrate how Kirkpatrick and other journalists 
perpetuate instead the myth of the technological sublime and render themselves 
involuntary allies to Facebook's misleading rhetoric. In addition, I discuss Yochai 
Benkler's The Wealth of Networks to argue that some of the prominent scholarly literature 
on network culture similarly suffers from a trivializing notion of culture and user control.
Overall, this chapter investigates the discursive work necessary to maintain and 
12 Raymond Williams: Television – Technology and Cultural Form p.9.
13 Lawrence Grossberg Cultural Studies in the Future Tense p.124.
14 Between January 2012 and May 2013 I looked at 14 articles published by The Wall Street Journal that 
addressed referenced privacy, Facebook, and the IPO directly. Fortune Magazine published six articles 
that directly commented on all of these three items.
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nourish the idea that Facebook is the “nexus of an ecosystem”15. I claim that for 
journalists, Facebook officials, and some prominent scholars, to argue with Frederic 
Jameson, the distinction between what counts as cultural and what as economic becomes 
increasingly blurry and ceases to exist16. Altogether lost are the dynamic, yet ordinary, 
notions of culture that Raymond Williams summarized so lucidly:
A culture is common meanings, the product of a whole people, and offered 
individual meanings, the product of a man's whole committed personal and 
social experience. [And these common meanings] are made by living, made and 
remade, in ways we cannot know in advance17.
The discourse on Facebook's self-proclaimed “Hacker Culture” stands out for its 
failure to contextualize corporate claims and for its ignorance of the ways in which 
Facebook's business model and actual corporate culture contradicts most of the claims 
inherent to the Hacker culture myth. Jack Welch and Suzy Welch write shortly before the 
IPO announcement:
Any day now there's going to be one helluva party at Facebook. And why not? 
Companies don't go public for a gazillion dollars very often. So party on, 
Facebook. Just beware the day after. Actually, beware the year after and the year 
after that. Because once Facebook has its massive liquidity infusion, the 
company stands to get nailed by something that can hurt a lot more and last a lot 
longer than a hangover – a change in culture. […] Oh, come on, you're thinking 
now, Facebook's managers aren't stupid. They're not going to let the IPO wreak 
havoc with their winning culture. […] But a new world order is about to dawn in 
Palo Alto, one where Wall Street will soon start demanding to know how 
Facebook plans to spend the company's newly created equity.18
Welch and Welch effectively romanticize Facebook's hacker culture prior to the IPO and 
actually seem eager to protect it from Wall Street's greedy reach. To be fair, there is little 
15 David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect p.218.
16 For a more thorough discussion of Jameson see Max Haiven “Finance is Capital's Imagination” Social  
Text 29.3 2011. p.95.
17 Raymond Williams “Culture is Ordinary” Resources of Hope p.4.
18 Jack and July Welch “Dealing with the morning-after syndrome at Facebook” Fortune Magazine 165.4 
p.92.
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doubt that the Facebook corporate culture of the early days had little to do with what is 
going on inside Facebook's headquarter today. 
Arguably, insane growth and market demands are predictable side effects of an 
IPO. Karen Ho explains plausibly that with an IPO “the primary mission of corporations 
is understood to be the increase of their stock prices for the benefit of their 'true owners', 
the shareholders (that is, to create shareholder value)19. Greta Krippner explains that “the 
notion of 'shareholder value' refers to the idea that the sole purpose of the firm is to return 
value – in the form of an appreciating share price – to the owners of the company”20.
However, drawing an all too sharp line between the social network service prior 
IPO and Facebook post IPO ignores the evolution of Facebook's corporate culture 
between 2004 and 2012. The flattening out of Facebook's corporate history in order to 
pitch the assumed advantages of Facebook's Hacker culture against the grim realities of a 
publicly traded company perpetuates Zuckerberg's myth that Facebook was built merely 
“to accomplish a social mission – to make the world more open and connected”21.
Dan Primack offers another post IPO example, for this problematic 
juxtapositioning of Hacker Culture and Wall Street culture. He writes: 
Do you remember Facebook before the IPO? It was the Fonz, somehow 
straddling the invisible line between accessible and unobtainable. Then came 
May 18, and Facebook suddenly morphed into Potsie – more style than 
substance, and just a bit creepy. In short, uncool.22
To Primack, the Hacker Way stands for coolness, authenticity, and some enigmatic 
attraction that suddenly disappeared the moment Facebook went public. Primack's 
19 Karen Ho Liquidated p.3.
20 Greta Krippner Capitalizing on Crisis p.7.
21 Ibid.
22 Dan Primack “How Facebook killed the big IPO” Fortune Magazine 166.6 p.72.
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admiration culminates in his observation that Facebook was not creepy prior to the IPO, 
an assertion that practically ignores everything I criticized in the first chapter of this  
dissertation.
Shayndi Raice from The Wall Street Journal pursues a similarly trivializing 
approach in which she wonders whether the recent IPO has hurt Facebook's culture. 
While Raice honors Facebook's achievements, she ignores Facebook's controversial 
history:
In just eight years, Facebook has become the world's social bazaar, where 
friends gossip, play games and swap 250 million photos per day. It has also 
emerged as a potent political tool, helping to topple regimes across the Middle 
East last year. But for all its success, the question remains just how Facebook 
will manage its growth into a mature, global business, keeping both advertisers 
and subscribers happy while balancing demands of privacy and profits. The 
filing left a few clues that Facebook's founder, 27-year-old Mark Zuckerberg, is 
worried about how wealth and public scrutiny may change the company's 
culture.23
From Raice's article we get the impression that Facebook was once a perfect company, 
whose CEO “has long been fearful of the damage an IPO could do to the company's 
culture [and who] wants employees focused on making great products, not the stock 
price.”24 While it might factually be true that Zuckerberg feared the pressures to 
accompany the IPO, Raice seems to say that before 2012, Facebook somehow pursued a 
more user-friendly approach to PIP.
Nowhere is the celebration of the Hacker Way more obvious than in Heft et al. 
from Fortune Magazine.
Ever since he hatched the social network in his Harvard dorm room in 2004, 
Zuckerberg has fought to preserve the so-called hacker ethos that is at the root of 
23 Shayndi Raice “Facebook Sets Historic IPO” The Wall Street Journal February 2, 2012
24 Ibid.
71
how Facebook really operates. He's largely succeeded: Facebook remains a 
place where engineers stay up all night to mock up new features. It's a place 
where managers will scrap the site's most sacred elements, like the traditional 
profile page, if there's a potential for something better. It's a place where the best 
ideas become products whether they were dreamed up by a low intern or Zuck 
himself. It's a place where everyone takes to heart the dictates written on posters 
plastered all over campus: DONE IS BETTER THAN PERFECT and MOVE 
FAST. BREAK THINGS. […] But becoming a publicly traded company may be 
the biggest threat to the culture of reinvention that has made Facebook a success 
so far. Countless other startups were so transformed by their IPOs, through the 
pressures of quarterly earnings, the sudden employee wealth, and the sheer size, 
that they lost their edge.25
The authors echo Raice and ask wether this clash will “at once chip away at [Facebook's] 
essence and spirit?”26 
The harsh reality is that we have little reason to share Helft's et al. celebratory 
diagnosis, that “at Facebook, the Hacker Way is capitalized”27. The next passages 
contextualize Facebook's Hacker Way and show that even before the IPO, Facebook's 
internal culture was far from being a meritocracy. If anything, the IPO has only further 
cemented already existing corporate hierarchies. That is why, treating the Hacker ethos as 
something that exists outside of capitalistic motivations or even as counterweight to them 
gets some of Facebook's story backwards. It ignores the ways in which Facebook had 
integrated elements of hacking subculture into the logic of capital generation long before 
it went public.
Former Facebook employee Katherine Losse explains in her memoir how the 
Hacker way has never described an alternative meritocratic system outside of capitalist 
interests. Instead, she ascertains:
25 Helft et al. “Inside Facebook” Fortune Magazine 165.4 2012
26 Helft et al.
27 Ibid.
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In the ideology of the new Silicon Valley, work was for the owned. Play was for 
the owners. There was a fundamental capitalism at work: While they abhorred 
the idea of being a wage slave, the young men of Silicon Valley were not trying 
to tear down the capitalist system. They were trying to become its new masters.28
Furthermore, while the early stages of Facebook seem to believably result from 
the hard work of a few people including Zuckerberg, to whom the Hacker ethos did seem 
to apply, Helft and his co-authors leave out the majority of the other 6,33729 Facebook 
employees. Helft et al. exclusively justify their admiration for the Hacker ethos with 
respect to the engineering side of Facebook's corporate structure and, thus, ignore all the 
other employees, for instance in customer relations, who make a social network service 
of Facebook's scale possible.
However, a rich body of critical ethnographic work on tech laborers in Silicon 
Valley has long argued how local labor conditions favor the few and exploit the many30. 
As Facebook's 51st employee, Katherine Losse's memoir provides a more realistic picture 
of what the working conditions for the many non-technical employees at Facebook were 
like. She writes: 
Customer-support employees were hourly rather than salaried workers and thus 
could not be called on twenty-four hours a day, but we were nonetheless 
expected to remain alert to any critical emails and available to drop other plans 
and help with any last-minute testing or crisis response. We did not have a non-
work life: Life was work and work was life.31
28 Katherine Losse The Boy Kings p.54.
29 http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts  as of February 6, 2014.
30 Douglas' Microserfs presents a similar story of exploitation focussing on Microsoft workers. Tiziana 
Terranova  in her article Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy  develops and equally 
compelling, albeit more general and theoretical, argument about the state of labor in our digital age. 
Katherine Losse's memoir The Boy Kings provides probably the most compelling insight into the 
workings of Facebook. Naturally and because of the particular limitations that come with the genre of 
the memoir, Losse's observations need to be treated with care. However, in her book she manages to 
convey the tonality of Facebook and oftentimes provides the critical eye that was missing from David 
Kirkpatrick's The Facebook Effect.
31 Katherine Losse The Boy Kings p.74.
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Living within the mile meant you were all-in, willing to compromise all other 
aspects of your life in order to remain fully available to Facebook. Some 
employees still chose to live in San Francisco, which gave them the option of 
spending time with non-Facebook employees, but that seemed like a suspect 
choice to those of us within the mile, whose lives revolved around the 
company.32
Somewhere else in her book, Losse recalls her own shocked surprise when she 
learned that customer-support employees were not only paid a third of the engineers' 
salary, but that they were also not eligible for the $600 rent subsidy that Facebook offered 
to anyone living within a mile of the company's campus. Pretty quickly, Losse gives us a 
sense that Facebook has never been the meritocratic organization many journalists seem 
to believe it was.
Losse makes transparent the contradictions inherent to Zuckerberg's description of 
“Hacker culture” as being “extremely open and meritocratic”33. He ascertains:
History tells us that systems are most fairly governed when there is an open and 
transparent dialogue between the people who make decisions and this who are 
affected by them. We believe history will one day show that this principle holds 
true for companies as well, and we're looking [forward] to moving in this 
direction with you.34
Zuckerberg keenly wants us to believe that the Hacker way describes a corporate culture 
that commits to the concepts of transparency and openness. What he implies is that 
Facebook is a company governed fairly, too.
A group that also escapes the journalists's attention entirely and that certainly has 
32 Ibid. p.79.
33 The letter by Mark Zuckerberg must be viewed as Facebook's mission statement. In an unusual effort,  
Zuckerberg uses the letter to speak to multiple stakeholders – Facebook user, journalists, future 
shareholders. The letter was part of the S1 statement that every company that goes public has to file 
with the SEC (pp.67-69). In the letter Zuckerberg outlines Facebook's social, cultural, political, and 
economic vision. This quote is from page 69. The document can be accessed here: 
<http://investor.fb.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-12-34517&CIK=1326801>
34 Quoted in David Kirkpatrick: The Facebook Effect p. 309. Zuckerberg issued this statement in response 
to a user initiative that lamented unannounced changes to Facebook's terms of services in 2009.
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never benefited from the Hacker ethos, while arguably making the social network service 
possible in the first place, are the ordinary Facebook users. It is important to remember 
that many of Facebook's operations fundamentally depend on the free labor of its users. 
Communication scholar Nicole S. Cohen highlights that 
[u]nderstanding Facebook's reliance on free or immaterial labor theoretically 
situates the site within the broader development of capitalism's ongoing attempts 
to harness general intellect to bring it under the logic of accumulation.35 
Facebook is just one example that illustrates that “low-cost and no-cost content is 
becoming the norm”36. Cohen offers yet another reason to completely debunk 
Zuckerberg's notion of Facebook being separate and outside of an economic rational.
With regard to the relevance of free labor for Facebook's business model, critical 
media scholar Tiziana Terranova provides the most compelling theoretical analysis. She 
states:
The provision of 'free labor' […] is a fundamental moment in the creation of 
value in the digital economies. […]. Free labor is the moment where this 
knowledgeable [voluntary] consumption of culture is translated into productive 
activities that are pleasurably embraced and at the same time shamelessly 
exploited.37
Burston et al. offer yet another analysis of the ways in which digital technologies such as 
Facebook “repurpose” labor to create the “prosumer”38 - individuals that are 
simultaneously involved in the production and consumption of culture. The Italian 
Marxists Cristina Morini and Andrea Fumugalli explain how the production of value 
today “directly results from the use of the relational, emotional and cognitive faculties of  
35 Nicole S. Cohen “The Valorization of Surveillance” Democratic Communiqué 22.1 2008 p.10.
36 David Carr “ Media Companies Cash In” The New York Times February 13, 2012.
37 Tiziana Terranova “Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy” in Laurie Ouellette The 
Media Studies Reader p.333.
38 Jonathan Burston, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Alison Hearn “Digital labour: workers, authors, citizens” 
ephemera 10.3/4 (2010). p.215.
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human beings”39.
Hesmondhalgh usefully cautions us not to ignore the fact that “most cultural 
production in history has been unpaid, and that scholars of digital labour are well advised 
to refrain from an overuse of the concept of exploitation, which in the Marxian sense is a 
historical, explanatory, and ethical concept that revolves around certain notions of class, 
labour and compulsion”40. For him, the creative labour on Facebook – the uploading of 
pictures, video, music, and be-friending – marks some form of exploitation but can 
“hardly be a priority” in the struggle against unfair labor conditions. Instead, to 
Hesmondhalgh, the struggle for paid internships, for instance, should be prioritized as it 
prevents working class young people from upward social mobility and cements class 
hierarchies. 
Hesmondhalgh is right, Facebook is for the most of its users entertaining, for 
some incredibly informative, and for others it helps to maintain the contact to friends 
across vast distances. What justifies the use of the exploitation metaphor, is the fact that 
in its current version, Facebook, uses the appeal of all the aforementioned benefits of 
digital networking to generate profits.
Burston et al. furthermore highlight that “labour [under conditions of digital 
capitalism] can no longer only be seen as a factor in industrial relations, or as a subject of 
interest exclusive to political economists; it must also be understood as a larger category 
with which to analyse many different facets of daily life”41. Facebook then, emerges as 
39 Cristina Morini and Andrea Fumagalli “Life put to work” ephemera 10.3/4 (2010) p.235.
40 David Hesmondhalgh “User-generated content, free labor, and the cultural industries” ephemera 10.3/4 
(2010) p.274.
41 Jonathan Burston, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Alison Hearn “Digital labour: workers, authors, citizens” 
ephemera 10.3/4 (2010). p.215.
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one venue through which the principles of labour exploitation under conditions of digital 
capitalism become visible and through which digital capitalism itself can be imagined. 
Losse's Facebook experience is captured by the idea that our lives are put to work. 
For those, who literally live and work within the confines of Facebook, the Fordist 
distinction between work and leisure, professional commitment and private fun seems to 
have ceased to exist. On a more general level, too, Facebook's enormous value seems to 
be based to a large extend on the 1.2 billion users, who contribute for free their own 
subjectivity to the production of value.
Moreover, the unquestioned admiration for the Hacker ethos ignores more 
traditional forms of labor exploitation as well. For instance, the outsourced workers that 
mine Facebook's data to implement its decency standards and fulfill other data 
management chores remain equally invisible. For example, Adrian Chen reports on the 
California-based outsourcing firm oDesk, which hires people from all over the third 
world to moderate content for Facebook42. These shadow workers earn a meager 
maximum of $4 per day. To them the idea of earning Facebook stock will always remain 
a fantasy.
Allan Sloan comments about the ways in which Facebook's future stock structure, 
is reason enough to seriously doubt the validity of the Hacker ethos's meritocracy claim.
Hypocrisy: A key selling point of social media is that it's a democratizing force - 
everyone's on an equal footing, yadda, yadda, yadda. But Facebook's stock 
structure, like Google's, is far from democratic. There's one class of voting stock 
for the public peasants, and a higher voting class that ensures control for the 
elite insiders. Everyone's equal in theory. Just not in practice.43
42 Adrian Chen “Inside Facebook's Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade” 
<http://gawker.com/5885714/inside-facebooks-outsourced-anti+porn-and-gore-brigade-where-camel-
toes-are-more-offensive-than-crushed-heads>
43 Sloan Allen: “Facebook's IPO: A Study in Arrogance” Washington Post February 14, 2012
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Jack and Suzy Welch highlight yet another irony of the hacker ethos: 
After its IPO, Facebook is going to have two classes of citizens […]. Some of its 
3,000 or employees will have significant riches in the hand. Newer hires, 
though, will mostly have options in the bush.44
I include these critical comments here not so much to participate in the rather 
polemical debate over whether all Facebook users or employees should have received a 
fair financial compensation in the context of the IPO45. Instead, I show how the 
“capitalizing of the Hacker Way” is not a success story but a rhetorical feature to mask 
the ways in which new tech companies produce value. I argue that pitching Facebook's 
corporate culture against Wall Street is misleading – at least as far as questions of labor 
are concerned – as it helps to construct a false villain versus victim binary.
In light of Facebook's revolutionary claims about being a meritocratic, an open 
and transparent, and a more democratic corporation, the actual corporate reality pokes 
huge wholes into this rhetoric. For example, Zuckerberg has managed to tie the “Hacker 
culture” to a quasi “cult of Zuck”, which Fortune Magazine describes as “downright 
Jobsian in its intensity”46. As Jeffrey Sonnenfeld states:
Zuckerberg's power is almost total. Despite selling more than $1 billion of stock 
and having 28 percent of the equity, he has maneuvered classified shares to 
maintain 57 percent control of Facebook voting stock - expected to be worth $28 
billion.47
As most critical technology scholars know full well, Steve Jobs – the long-time CEO of 
Apple – much like Microsoft's former CEO Bill Gates – had a reputation for being a 
44 Jack Welch and Suzy Welch: “Dealing with the morning-after syndrome at Facebook” Fortune 
3/19/2012 Vol. 165 Issue 4 p.92.
45 See for example Adam Ostrow “Are Facebook Application Users Worth $1.40 a Piece? 
http://mashable.com/2008/01/16/snap-interactive/  Mashable.com January 16, 2008.
46 Helft et al. “Inside Facebook” Fortune.
47 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld “Facebook's Year of the Dragon” The Washington Post May 20, 2012.
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ruthless business man, brilliant at forming a brand rather than the technology genius that 
he is celebrated for publicly. Tellingly, Apple experiences increasing scrutiny for the 
merciless exploitation of its employees48. Facebook seems to duplicate this story as the 
celebration of its “Hacker Culture” is yet another example in the long list of rhetorical 
tricks to mask the exploitative structure of labor conditions in Silicon Valley.
Journalists contribute to this masking work, too, albeit not always intentional. It 
would be unfair to say that business journalists actively perpetuate Facebook's rhetoric 
against their own knowledge of the troubled labor conditions in Silicon Valley. However, 
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld's article provides evidence for how this masking work is an inevitable 
side effect of the peculiar überemphasis on the Facebook CEO in the context of the IPO. 
Part of the work that Sonnenfeld does, is that he pitches the interests of the super-hero 
CEO Zuckerberg against the greedy interests of Wall Street, as if these are entirely 
different. Sonnenfeld writes:
Investing in the company, after all, means investing in founder Mark Zuckerberg 
- the 28-year-old, hoodie-draped "face" of Facebook - while standard good-
governance practices are shelved. 
Ominously, 2012 is the Chinese year of the dragon. Studies of business folk 
heroes remind us that, like authentic national and spiritual heroes, those who are 
self-styled redeemers or dragon-slayers in their early careers can grow to 
resemble dragons themselves by late career.49
While later in the article, Sonnenfeld gestures towards the many privacy issues 
Zuckerberg is involved in, Sonnenfeld is mainly concerned with how to reconcile the 
image of the Facebook hero with the pressures unfolding from the IPO. In fact, his article 
48 Forms of labor exploitation vary of course widely. In the design and marketing as well as the 
developing and engineering departments, employees suffer from the enormous pressure to increase sales  
and to release products ever more quickly and with a larger profit margin. Meanwhile, people employed 
in the production facilities abroad suffer from quotas and other inhumane labor conditions.
49 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld: “Facebook's year of the dragon” The Washington Post May 20, 2012
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provides instructions on how to best manage the CEO genius while making sure that the 
company meets Wall Street's expectations. Sonnenfeld concludes:
The right answer is for a board to develop governance practices that show they 
know how to partner with the genius they are privileged to have among them. 
The boards of Microsoft, Amazon, Dell, Starbucks and, ultimately, Apple 
figured out how to work with Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Michael Dell, Howard 
Schultz and Steve Jobs. In fact, some firms, such as Intel, have shown that they 
can collaborate with maverick leaders and even groom generations of innovative 
leaders. These boards, having forged alignment between the needs of their 
founder CEOs and their shareholders, offer lessons for Facebook's board and 
investors.50
Another way in which journalists contribute to the myth that Wall Street somehow caused 
Facebook to abandon its noble mission, is related to the false impression that Facebook 
merely chose to go to Wall Street. Jon Swartz quotes an analyst who argues: "Going 
public is one of the worst things that a tech company can do," […]. An IPO 'exposes' 
(Facebook) to scrutiny that they did not have"51. This misleading statement fails to 
mention that the government legally requires companies to go public once they have 
reached more than 500 investors and assets of more than $10 million52. Blogger Michael 
Neubarth explains the disadvantages of going public:
Why do companies try so hard to keep their business process automation 
improvements a secret? Automating business processes gives these firms a 
substantial competitive edge—enabling them to process transactions faster and 
more reliably, increase productivity, lower costs, get to market faster, serve 
customers better, and more. These companies don’t want their competitors to 
know how they have gained these advantages. The competitors, meanwhile, can 
be surprised and shocked when they discover that a key competitor has gained 
significant advantages by automating its business processes.53
50 Ibid.
51 Quoted in Swartz, Jon USA Today May 18, 2012
52 In all fairness, other journalist do include this information. Kang and Tsukayama: “Facebook files for 
stock sale” in the Washington Post.  Even Jon Swartz himself, together with Scott Martin includes this 
important detail in his piece: “Facebook files for massive IPO” in USA Today
53 Michael Barth “Secret to Success: A competitive Edge with Enterprise Content Management” 
business2comunity October 3, 2013. <http://www.business2community.com/content-marketing/secret-
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In theory, at least, going public can help to level the playing field in that it supposedly 
makes more transparent the business activities of companies. In theory, going public 
provides journalists, shareholders, but also ordinary people with business sensitive 
information about companies that allow intervention. Therefore, one could reasonably 
argue that, in an ironic twist, Facebook's IPO has generated more transparency and now 
holds the corporation more accountable to its own ideals of openness and radical 
transparency. The reality of going public has, of course, produced mainly business 
numbers for the SEC and Facebook's shareholders and has contributed very little to truly 
level the playing field for Facebook's ordinary users.
Evidently, policy makers understand the theoretical business disadvantage for 
companies that results from going public. That is why, as another piece of evidence for 
Washington's overly business friendly attitudes, congress passed a law that increased this 
outside-shareholder limit fourfold and, thus, provided companies more space and time to 
pursue their businesses in the shadows of secrecy54. For Facebook, however, this 
legislation was passed few months too late. 
The celebration of Facebook's Hacker ethos as the antithesis to Wall Street's 
shareholder culture is part of a more fundamental problem about the ways in which 
business journalists report about the economy. In Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, 
Lawrence Grossberg remarks that we tend to see the economy as one, rather than a 
discursive formation of many, oftentimes contradictory, elements. For the journalists in 
my sample, there is only one digital economy and this economy is, in turn, threatened by 
success-competitive-edge-enterprise-content-management-0635851>
54 Dan Primack “How Facebook killed the big IPO”  October 8, 2012 Fortune 
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the greedy and equally monolithic Wall Street.
However, breaking down the actual number of parties involved in Facebook's 
IPO, reveals a much more complicated and diverse set actors and institutions, each with 
their own historical and economic pathway. The journalists in my sample ignore the 
complicated relationship between so called “angel investors” and Wall Street. Angel 
investors are wealthy individuals that invest in start-ups and receive compensation in the 
form of equity. Angel investors are one of the principle sources for funding in Silicon 
Valley and count as accredited investors for the SEC. Peter Thiel is probably the most 
widely known angel investor involved in the early stages of the Facebook's evolution.
In addition, there is a venture capital infrastructure located in San Francisco, 
which is crucially important to tech start ups, but that remains geographically separate 
from yet structurally interconnected with Wall Street. Zizi Papacharissi, a leading scholar  
of network culture, argues that “venture capital as an investment strategy to this day 
presents the dominant mode of embracing technologically convergent ventures within 
capitalist infrastructure, rendering them a subspecies of industrial capitalism”55. She 
explains that “the growth of venture capitalism as an investment strategy is associated 
with the financing of Silicon Valley start-ups in the seventies”56. 
At the same time, as John Cassidy points out, Wall Street banks have played an 
ever smaller role in the financing of start ups – for Goldman Sachs corporate finance 
accounted for only 13 percent of revenue for the time July to September of 201057. In the 
case of Facebook, most of the coverage on the IPO simply ignores the fact that Wall 
55 Zizi Papacharissi A Private Sphere. p.56. 
56 Ibid.
57 John Cassidy: “What good is Wall Street” The New Yorker November 29, 2010.
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Street actors such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs joined other investors fairly late in 
the evolution of Facebook. It is again John Cassidy, who highlights that during 
Facebook's early history, Zuckerberg relied on local Silicon Valley venture capitalists 
such as Thiel, rather than Wall Street actors, to finance the social network service58.
In other words, part of the complicated relationship between Wall Street and Silicon 
Valley has to do with the fact that today, Wall Street banks and technology capital 
investment are largely separate industries. What all of the different investors have in 
common though, is that each in their own way, they interpolate start-ups into the cycle of 
finance capitalism. Furthermore, all of these actors are part of the macro-economic 
changes that characterize the US American economy.
Interestingly, venture capitalism in Silicon Valley emerges and claims center-stage 
at the very same time that Greta R. Krippner and Karen Ho diagnose the macro-economic 
shift towards finance as the central pillar of the United States economy. Facing political,  
economic, and social legitimization crises, Krippner explains, how private capital and 
finance took over critical governmental functions59. Moreover, Ho exemplifies how the 
nature of corporations shifted from social institutions to shareholder institutions.
A few journalists attempt to struggle with a more heterogenous notion of our 
economy and a more complex relationship between Wall Street and the other economies. 
James Surowieckie, for example, has observed “a significant shift in power from 
shareholders to entrepreneurs and managers, one that may make the stock market less 
58 John Cassidy: “Me Media” The New Yorker May 15, 2006.
59 Krippner's Capitalizing on Crisis. The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance is a breath-taking 
endeavor into the political dimension of Finance capitalism which presents finance as then convenient 
solution to truly systemic issues. Every journalists investigating Facebook's IPO is well advised to read 
the book since we are currently at a similar conjuncture. Today, many among the post-privacy advocates 
argue that the government is equally incapable of solving the issues we face.
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central to American capitalism”60. His argument is noteworthy because it acknowledges 
that Wall Street's role during US American economic history is itself a discursive 
formation, is dynamic and contradictory. Unfortunately Surowieckie presents this shift as 
part of a revolution and radical transformation rather than a gradual change, a process of 
contradictions, and set backs61. 
Moreover, my analysis provides little evidence to support Surowieckie's claim 
that Wall Street's hegemonic function has come to an end. As I suggest above, its role 
might be more complicated than many observers acknowledge, yet Facebook's IPO 
suggests that Steve Fraser's observation about the turn of the last millennium is still valid: 
“Wall Street's ideological, political, and cultural influence penetrat[es] more deeply into 
the fiber of the nation than ever before”62. If anything, Facebook's IPO is another case 
study for why “finance today is more integrated into everyday life and more expansively 
global than ever before”63.
There is absolutely no reason to believe that any of the cultural capital amassed by 
the US American financial industry is lost. To the contrary, Simon Johnson is right, the 
prevailing ideology claims that “what was good for Wall Street was good for the 
country”64. Counter to all populistic claims, both Congress and the Obama administration 
60 James Surowiecki: “Unequal Shares” The New Yorker May 28, 2012
61 Karen Ho has suggested that the peculiar distribution of shares, which provides Zuckerberg absolute 
power over Facebook, can be interpreted as one piece of evidence for Surowieckie's theory.  
Unfortunately, the current scope and emphasis of this chapter does not provide the space to begin such a 
project. That is why it must suffice to remind the reader of the work that needs to be done in order to 
investigate the ways in which Facebook's shareholder structure interacts with Wall Street's demands and 
interests. My criticism of Surowieckie's reliance on revolutionary language remains standing but Karen 
Ho usefully encourages us to take his broader claim of a shifting relationship between technology 
CEO's such as Zuckerberg and Wall Street more seriously.
62 Steve Fraser: Every man a speculator: A history of Wall Street in American Life p.615.
63 Max Haiver: Finance as Capital's Imagination p.94.
64 Simon Johnson: “The Quite Coup” The Atlantic May 2009 p.5.
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continue to support Wall Street and have missed multiple opportunities to significantly 
curtail its power. The fact that Obama has publicly announced that “[t]here is no dividing 
line between Wall Street and Main Street. We will rise or we will fall together as a 
nation”65 only further proves to the point. It seems reasonable to argue that Facebook's 
IPO provides the Wall Street – Washington corridor new points of entry into our private 
homes, our mobile devices, and our relationships.
Again, I criticize business journalists for their failure to report and think outside 
of a particularly narrow context that überemphasizes the juxtaposition between 
Facebook's Hacker Ethos and a presumably monolithic Wall Street shareholder culture. It 
is therefore quite telling, that Eric Lindemann, a digital signal processing engineer and 
not a professional journalist, added a more nuanced understanding of the economic 
possibilities under finance capitalism at the digital age. 
He insists, in a letter to the New York Times, on the possibility that “it's probably 
never been easier to build a nonprofit communication infrastructure”, which is not built 
on the need to “compromise privacy for profit”66. His statement is so remarkable because 
it does not simple dismiss social network sites as always already caught up in the process 
of user exploitation and data trading, but looks beyond the IPO hype to point out the 
revolutionary potential of technology (without actually ignoring the “irony of 
technology” as described by Susan Douglas).
By contrast, journalists continue to be preoccupied with the discussion of the 
various IPO effects on the social network service. Somini Sengupta for instance observes, 
65 Quoted in John Cassidy “What good is Wall Street” The New Yorker 2010 p2.
66 New York Times, May 27, 2012 “Sunday Dialogue: Online Profits and Privacy” Eric Lindemann  
85
that Facebook's new search function “is plainly designed with an eye toward profits”, 
evidently with some success since “news of the new search tool offered a modest lift to 
Facebook shares”67. On the few occasions that commentators take a more critical 
approach to Facebook, they get lost in the details of the IPO at the expense of a larger 
critique of the kind that Lindemann had in mind. For example, former Wall Street analyst 
Barry Ritzhold observes how Facebook's reported 845 monthly active users (called 
MAUs) and its 483 million Daily Active Users (DAUs) are made up metrics that in the 
latter case include anyone who has clicked on a “like” button anywhere in the web68.
Another theme to the journalistic coverage around the IPO portrays Facebook as a 
monolithic force, able to single-handedly changing the economy at large. Zachary 
Karabell's comments present an illustrative case in point:
In a week when the world is being pulled back into another chapter of this 
multiyear financial crisis, the emergence of Facebook as a public company 
offers some light that the future holds possibility that the problems of the past 
cannot and will not quash. In a week when the ancient cradle of Western 
Civilization, Greece, seems to imperil the prosperity of the modern West, 
Facebook's golly-gee optimism tinged with greed, a dash of naivete, and a 
bountiful dose of hubris and hope that the world can be made anew and better, is 
something to celebrate and support.69
Karabell bestows Facebook with the power to safe the imagined monolith that is our 
economy. Others claim that Facebook's “mega-offering signals a seminal event in the 
Internet's maturation as a fundamental cog in the world economy”70 or propose that 
67 Somini Sengupta: “Facebook unveils a New Search Tool” New York Times Bits January 15, 2013.
68 Barry Ritholtz: “What's Facebook worth? Much less than advertised” The Washington Post February 
12, 2012 p G06.
69 Zachary Karabell “Don't De-friend Facebook Yet” The Daily Beast May 19, 2012. 
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/19/don-t-de-friend-facebook-yet-it-s-ipo-might-not-
mean-trouble-ahead.html>
70 Dave Morin, CEO of Path, a social network of 3 million and a former Facebook executive quoted in Jon 
Swartz: “Debut has investors at edge of their seats” USA Today May 18, 2012.
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Facebook “is transforming giant sectors of the economy, such as entertainment, media, 
and retail”71. David Kirkpatrick goes as far as to announce that “Facebook now sits 
squarely at the center of a fundamental realignment of capitalism [where] increasingly the 
people are in control”72.
In its annual 2012 report, Facebook claims to be the harbinger for a bright 
economic future:
We can help connect the next five billion people. Over the next five to ten years, 
most people with feature phones will get smart phones. Some of them will get 
smart phones just so they can use Facebook to stay connected with family and 
friends. We feel it is a great opportunity--as well as our responsibility--to help 
everyone in the world get connected and join the modern knowledge economy. 
We can establish Facebook as one of the great economic engines of our time. 
Small businesses will be able to acquire new customers and build deeper 
relationships than ever before. Great brands will be better able to tell their 
stories and build meaningful connections with consumers. E-commerce services 
will be able to sell products inline as millions of  people discuss them. 
Developers will have the tools to remake every product category and deliver 
new experiences to people everywhere.73
The report presents Facebook as crucial enabler for people to participate in the modern 
knowledge economy. More dramatically yet, it describes Facebook as a “great economic 
engine of our time”. Cheryl Sandberg, in a presentation at the DLD conference in Europe 
in 2012, reiterated this message. While facing serious criticism in the more pro-PIP 
minded European context, Sandberg countered Facebook critics by explaining that 
Facebook is “not just posts and pictures and the fun things with friends, but this is really 
serious stuff. […] This is about growth, this is about jobs and empowering people.”74
71 Helft et al. “Inside Facebook” 2012.
72 David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect p.263.
73 Mark Zuckerberg in Form 10K of the 2012 ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 
15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
74 Liz Gannes “Sheryl Sandberg: Social Media Helps Drive the Global Economy” AllThingsD January 24, 
2012 <http://allthingsd.com/20120124/sheryl-sandberg-social-media-helps-drive-the-global-economy/>
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Sandberg facilitates not only the idea that Facebook proposes a promising 
business idea in otherwise turbulent economic times, but she also threatened Facebook 
skeptics with today's all powerful argument: if you are against us you loose valuable jobs. 
For a company with only 6,337 employees such a threat is a bold move. It remains 
entirely unclear to what extent Facebook has helped to create meaningful jobs that 
include benefits and pay decent wages on a broad scale. Facebook officials simply 
assume that “the very nature of economic activity is changing, in a process of the 
culturization, informatization, and digitization of the economy”75. Scrutinizing some of 
Facebook's own claims, however, contextualizes this “self-reflexive and self-
productive”76 discourse apparatus.
Over the last decades, technology companies have fulfilled the role of an alleged 
savior of the economy more so than any other branch of the economy. Gilbert Rodman, 
who has looked at the earlier millennial debates about the power of the Internet, explains 
how the NASDAQ “in itself functions as a benchmark for economic health and hope 
especially in otherwise economically bleak time”77. Marxist geographer David Harvey 
places the faith in technology in an even broader ideological context:
Communication corporations thrive in an ideological environment that believes 
that entrepreneurial common sense relies on technological innovation driven by 
fierce competition and, in turn, the 'fetish belief that there is a technological fix 
for each and every problem'.78 
Moreover, Karen Ho insists, claims to create jobs in light of a current IPO are 
hollow promises. According to the shareholder logic, which now shapes Facebook's 
75 Lawrence Grossberg The Future of Cultural Studies p.124.
76 Ibid.
77 Gilbert Rodman “Neteffect” p.14.
78 David Harvey: A Brief History of Neoliberalism. p.68.
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business decisions, the company will go through a “complete divorce of what is 
perceived as best interest of the corporation from the interests of most employees”. 
Instead, it will become a place where “employees often no longer benefit at all (or even 
suffer) when the corporation makes a profit”79.
David Kirkpatrick reminds us that Facebook's platform market is a “winner-take-
all market”. A platform market describes a market condition according to which one 
institution, in this case Facebook, provides the infrastructure for many other actors to 
participate in the digital economy. That is why Facebook defines itself as a critical  
enabler. The truth about Facebook's altruistic claim is that all business related to 
Facebook is Facebook's business – the profit crumbs left to third parties are little else but 
a distraction from Facebook's own monopoly-like status. Hence, Nicole S. Cohen 
correctly argues that “Facebook […] has a tendency toward capital accumulation and 
penetrative commodification rather than revolutionary re-distribution of wealth and 
control”80.
In light of these broader observations, I concur with Julie Cohen's diagnosis that 
Facebook has successfully figured out how to capitalize and monetize network culture. It 
understands that accessibility today relies on participation and the sharing of information 
about one self. It is important that the motivation for participation exceeds economic 
reasoning and, instead, has to do with the fact that Facebook provides “a ready, 
convenient, and entertaining way of enriching, extending, and preserving our connections 
with others”81. Consequently, at stake in the discussion of the PIP of Facebook users is an 
79 Karen Ho: Liquidated. p.3.
80 Nicole S. Cohen “The Valorization of Surveillance” Democratic Communiqué 22.1 2008 p.7.
81 Mark Andrejevic “Social Network Exploitation” in Zizi Papacharissi A Networked Self  2012:88.
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understanding of the intersectionality of the political and economic dimension of personal 
information privacy.
Radical transparency and post-privacy advocates, who embrace openness and 
frictionless sharing, ignore the ways in which these principles automatically lead to more 
exploitation and to the capitalization of the pleasures associated with socializing online.  
What is needed, instead, is a reminder that PIP at the current media conjuncture is both a 
political and an economic statement (as if these could ever be neatly separated), with 
which users can better understand their own role and position within the information 
ecosystem to which they crucially contribute.
How Facebook negotiates its relationship to Wall Street's shareholder culture
Mark Zuckerberg insists that the social network site was found on a distinctly non-
commercial premiss. For him, it has to be seen separately from all things business. In an 
interview with journalist Jose Antonio Vargas, Zuckerberg recalls a conversation with 
friends about the idea for Facebook: 
'Isn't it obvious that everyone was going to be on the internet? Isn't it, like, 
inevitable that there would be a huge social network of people?' It was 
something that we expected to happen. The thing that's been really surprising 
about the evolution of Facebook is – I think then and I think now – that if we 
didn't do this someone else would have done it.82
As part of the S1 document, required by the SEC, Zuckerberg repeated this claim and 
stressed that “Facebook was not originally created a company”83. He has since restated 
this claim in various quarterly reports, identifying a distinct Facebook culture that is not 
all about business84. To Zuckerberg, Facebook is a neutral technology; a tool that was an 
82 Jose Antonio Vargas “The Face of Facebook” The New Yorker 2010.
83 Form S-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT Under The Securities Act of 1933 p. 67.
84 “Our culture also prioritizes user growth and engagement over short-term financial results” (from 
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inevitable part of the successful evolution of the internet and a tool that simply had to 
evolve the way it did without any economic rational behind. To him, it seems as if 
Facebook is indeed just a technology to make the world a better, more honest, open, and 
transparent place85. 
The point here is not to dispute the truth behind Zuckerberg's assertion that for him, 
“money might have never been the top priority”86. It seems only reasonable to conclude 
that for a son from an upper middle class east coast background, monetary compensation 
never needed to be the primary motivation. Instead, the point of the argument is to show 
that despite Zuckerberg's lofty words, the history of communication technology provides 
ample examples illustrating that “technological reasoning and economic reasoning are 
often inseparable”87. The point is to show that as our capitalistic economy is not outside 
of culture or society, neither is Facebook. Instead, as Gibson-Graham argue, capitalism is 
a structural formation, that Facebook is part of. Therefore, both Facebook as well as 
capitalism are distinctly inside society, not “outside”88 of it.
Questions of PIP have historically described an important dimension of this 
intersectional understanding of the relationship between technology and the economy. 
For example, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis highlight the close relationship 
between technology, economic reasoning, and perceived threats to personal information 
privacy for the people who have lived in 1890. Their now pivotal essay states:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
Quarterly Report Q 3 2012)
85 Danah boyd quoted in Vargas 2010.
86 Vargas “The Face of Facebook”.
87 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman. “Introductory essay: the social shaping of technology” in 
Mackenzie and Wajcman The Social Shaping of Technology p.12.
88 J.K. Gibson-Graham A Postcapitalistic Politics 2006. p.53.
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rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining 
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and 
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and 
invention, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and 
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.89
Fast forward to the twenty-first century, Warren and Brandeis seem to suggest 
that it does not necessarily matter that Facebook was “not originally created a company”. 
Instead, the history of communication technology demonstrates that the emergence of 
any new technology has always constituted a disruption to the expectations and tastes for 
PIP. What the burgeoning mass printing press was to Warren and Brandeis, is network 
culture to us today – a radical deterritorialization of our established boundaries for what 
counts as private information.
The following statement by Mark Zuckerberg illustrates his contradictory 
understanding of the relationship between economics, PIP, and Facebook:
The basic idea is that ads should be content. […] They need to be essentially 
organic information that people are producing on the site. A lot of information 
people produce is inherently commercial. And if you look at someone's profile, 
almost all the fields that define them are in some way commercial – music, 
movies, books, products, games. It's part of our identity as people that we like 
something, but it also has commercial value.90
For Zuckerberg, culture and the social are best described by economic principles. This 
statement makes clear, how the logic of quantifiable user preferences and the logic of 
always accessible and measurable (and thus commercially exploitable) user activities 
shape the very logic of Facebook's interface. Arguably, Zuckerberg's comment defines 
culture as a resource that produces opportunities for the commercial exploitation of user 
data. Clicking the “Like Button”, for Zuckerberg at least, translates into a business 
89 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Harvard Law Review IV.5. 1890.
90 Quoted in Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect p.260.
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opportunity related to the liked object or idea.
What emerges is a worldview according to which the value of an object, of an 
activity, or a relationship is merely a function of its potential for a future business 
opportunity. Relationships and social interactions are rendered vehicles to optimize future 
purchasing decisions. In such a context, networks and crowds become means to evaluate 
the principle commercial value of culture. Consequently, for Facebook the desire to 
protect personal information privacy presents an obstacle to the production of ever more 
quantities of data.
It follows that for the social network giant, advocating radical transparency 
always already follows an economic rational. In other words, claiming the separateness of 
Facebook's culture from its business model ignores that the latter is constitutive of the 
former. That is why for Facebook, measures to protect PIP always slow down the 
information flow and might even bring it to a momentary halt, as users are encouraged to 
evaluate their decisions and, as a consequence, may even refrain from sharing certain 
pieces of information about themselves altogether.
Facebook's official SEC documents indicate Zuckerberg's attempt to separate yet 
reconcile Facebook's non-business founding myth with its money making motive. 
Despite Gibson-Graham's claim of inclusivity above, the documents describe his attempt 
to maintain a myth that Facebook's society is, at least partly, outside of the economy. He 
describes how he first simply wanted to create something. He cared, like most other great 
people only about the project. But, Zuckerberg continues, the great people that have 
worked for and have invested into Facebook and who “care primarily about building and 
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being part of great things, [...] also want to make money”91. 
This marks the first time that Zuckerberg actively and directly acknowledges 
Facebook's money-making motive. Zuckerberg repositions and redefines himself as a 
savvy CEO, who has mastered the “process of building a team, […] a developer 
community, advertising market and investor base”. Future shareholders, who read this 
letter, must have been delighted to learn that Zuckerberg has since “develop[ed] a deep 
appreciation for how building a strong company with a strong economic engine and 
strong growth”92.
Zuckerberg maintains the myth that Facebook is a collective effort where money 
“builds better services”. His comments become outrageous when he insists that “[t]hese 
days I think more and more people want to use services from companies that believe in 
something beyond simply maximizing profits”. Finally, Zuckerberg justifies the IPO by 
saying: “We're going public for our employees and our investors”.
Throughout all documents filed after the IPO, Zuckerberg oscillates between 
maintaining loyal to its own Hacker culture principles while at the same time keeping 
Facebook's investors and the companies longterm financial prospects in mind. All 
quarterly reports state:
Our culture also prioritizes user growth and engagement over short-term 
financial results, and we frequently make product decisions that may reduce our 
short-term revenue or profitability if we believe that the decisions are consistent 
with our mission and benefit the aggregate user experience and will thereby 
improve our financial performance over the long term.93
The emphasis on long-term performance over short-term financial results is 
91 Letter from Mark Zuckerberg S1 statement for SEC p.68.
92 Ibid.
93 Quarterly Report Q 3 2013 p. 42; can be accessed here http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?
ReleaseID=802760
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interesting as it counters Wall Street's interest in short-term financial success. Therefore, 
Facebook's insistence on long-term performance can indeed be read as the attempt to 
distance the project from Wall Street. Dan Primack interprets Zuckerberg's efforts to 
highlight Facebook's cultural independence as his way of saying: “I'm being dragged into 
the public markets kicking and screaming”94.
However and more realistically, journalists who view Zuckerberg and Wall Street 
in a David versus Goliath relationship continue to falsely separate what could better be 
described as two sides of the same medal. When Dan Primack passionately empathizes 
with Mark Zuckerberg, he treats him almost outside of the logic of financial capitalism. 
Primack seems to believe that Zuckerberg is part of a tech entrepreneur generation that 
loathed going public and saw it as unnecessary evil. Viewing Zuckerberg as external to 
the economic processes that have shaped Facebook since it left its Harvard dorm, is 
dangerous as it ignores the many ways in which technology companies are systematically 
intertwined with finance capitalism95.
Just like the many journalists, who defended the Hacker ethos against greedy Wall 
Street interests, the distinction between these two sides is not quite as clear as many want 
us to believe. While their role was somewhat limited, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan 
were still directly involved as capital investors even prior to the IPO. Moreover, Sheryl 
Sandberg's arrival at Facebook, as a COO four years prior to the IPO, suggests that 
Facebook's corporate culture had begun to already shift significantly towards the stability 
and discipline desired by Wall Street.
94 Dan Primack: “How Facebook killed the Big IPO” Fortune 10/8/2012 Vol. 166 Issue 6 72-73.
95 Karen Ho proposes to actually explore this connection more thoroughly, via the discussion that 
Surowiekie has started a few pages ago, in a project that focuses on the relationship between 
financialization and Facebook.
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Other “cultural changes” internal to Facebook prior to the IPO were less directly 
related to Wall Street but made Facebook a poster child for a shareholder culture takeover 
of social networks in general. The dutch new media scholar Jose van Dijck emphasizes 
that social network sites more broadly were marked by a cultural change, which she calls 
the connective turn. This shift led social network sites to be more about profits than about 
networking and, in turn, moved them closer to Wall Street interests. It is hardly a 
coincidence that van Dijck locates this shift for the same year that Sandberg was hired. I 
don't mean to claim that hiring a single person is responsible for this shift but together 
with Facebook's market power, the decision to bring in a manager, accepted by both 
Washington and Wall Street, communicates a commitment to new corporate standards.
Network scholars danah boyd and Heszter Hargittai relate this connective turn to 
PIP and argue that “Facebook's approach to privacy for instance was initially network-
centric”96. In its early phase at Harvard, Facebook eagerly protected the boundaries of its 
network because its livelihood depended on the exclusive character of its user 
community. This was even true for its second expansive stage, during which access to the 
social network site was still limited to individuals with an official .edu email address.  
Arguably, boyd and Hargittai ignore that Facebook's very first infrastructure (and 
arguably its entire idea) was based on a PIP violation because Zuckerberg downloaded 
names and photos from local servers without the consent of their owners. Nevertheless, 
both authors rightly insist that Facebook's initial attitude towards PIP was geared towards 
protecting those inside the network form outside intrusion.
Van Dijk shows, however, that “after 2008, most corporate site owners shifted 
96 danah boyd and Eszter Hargittai “Facebook privacy settings: Who cares? First Monday 15.8.
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their focus from running community-oriented platforms to monetizing connectivity by 
maximizing lucrative data traffic between people, things and ideas”97. In her article, she 
convincingly outlines how the various products and interface updates introduced by 
Facebook mainly teased out ever more information from users via a process of self-
staging rather than self-expression. Karen Ho shows how this sense of individualism and 
self management is not only typical for new economy corporations but is also central to 
the neoclassical tradition98. 
Accordingly, the connective turn takes place exactly at the moment when the tools 
of career management are widely understood as a way of life. In other words, not just 
professionals but everyone is constantly pre-occupied with staging him or herself and is 
busy managing the self in ways similar to the management of a company99 - what Carrie 
M. Lane has called the idea of the “company of one”100.
In addition to journalists and Facebook's official rhetoric, Yockai Benkler's The 
Wealth of Networks represents an important body of scholarly literature that is 
characterized by similar generalizations that I have criticized all along. While I have 
many qualms about Benkler's argument, I look at his research “as [another] kind of 
machine for the production of discourse”101 on the central criteria of network culture. 
97 Jose van Dijck: “Facebook as a tool for producing sociability and connectivity” Television & New 
Media 13.2 p.200.
98 Karen Ho: Liquidated page 169.
99 Arguably, ever since Ervin Goffman do we understand that identities are performed and that we are all  
constantly busy gathering feedback from others that helps to asses the performance of our identity. The 
performance of the self is therefore hardly a new phenomenon. However, the extent to which we are  
constantly busying ourselves to conduct a perfect performance of our selves is not only historically 
unmatched – because we have never been monitored so comprehensively – but is also facilitated by 
Facebook in its effort to gather ever more data about its users.
100Carrie M. Lane: A Company of One: Insecurity, Independence, and the New World of White-Collar  
Unemployment Cornell, NY: Cornell UP, 2011.
101Lynn Spigel Make Room for TV p.6.
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That is why I use the final pages of this chapter to show, how widely acclaimed 
scholarship on the structural conditions that frame Facebook, relies on assumptions about 
culture and the notion of user control, that show similar shortcomings like those 
promoted by Facebook's official rhetoric.
Benkler argues that “the important new fact about the networked environment, 
however, is the efficacy and centrality of individual and collective social action”102. 
“Information, knowledge, and culture”, according to Benkler “are now produced by 
sources that respond to a myriad of motivations, rather than the primary motivation to sell 
to the market”103. Culture, to Benkler, is a resource and something to be produced rather 
than something that is lived. Limiting culture to things that are “intentionally produced”,  
ignores a vast array of activities “within which people make sense of their lives: from 
everyday expressions and practices such as a conversations over dinner or checking 
email, to institutional structures and activities such as eduction and the practices of 
defining a technology for public consumption”104.
PIP is part of the latter understanding of culture. If we want to acknowledge its 
political character we need to conceptualize it as an everyday activity that helps people to  
make sense of their lives. Just to be clear, PIP is not the only and maybe not even the 
most crucial activity of that kind, but it is one that becomes increasingly important. As 
Facebook, and with it Wall Street, is trying to capitalize more and more of these daily 
activities, PIP becomes a political strategy to curb some of their power.
102Yochai Benkler: Wealth of Networks 2006. p.22
103Ibid. p.162.
104Slack and Wise base their concept of technological culture in many ways on Raymond Williams's idea 
of culture is ordinary and discuss it accordingly on page four of their book Culture and Technology: A  
Primer New York: Peter Lang 2006.
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Benkler's language draws heavily from economic analyses and understands 
individuals are producers or sources and activities as some form of resource utilization. It 
is because Benkler does not understand culture as lived experience, that he concludes that 
“[t]he networked information economy makes it possible to reshape both the 'who' and 
the 'how' of cultural production relative to cultural production in the twentieth century”105.
As said above, Facebook's official rhetoric is rich of exactly these kinds of claims. 
Mark Zuckerberg leaves little doubt that the entire Facebook philosophy is shaped by an 
economical understanding of the world that is about maximizing the resources:
[Facebook is] a utility - we are trying to increase the efficiency through which 
people can understand their world. We're not trying to maximize the time spent 
on our site. We're trying to help people have a good experience and get the 
maximum amount out of that time.106
Jose van Dijck brilliantly remarks how the word utility is misleading. She argues that in 
the context of Facebook, utility “no longer means 'public' and 'neutral', but 'ubiquitous' 
and 'inescapable'”107. Therefore, the economics of making Facebook a tool for everyone 
have little to do with individual empowerment that Benkler advocates. Instead, utility  
refers to Facebook's platform status and its intention of becoming the irreplaceable 
gateway for our daily activities.
That is why the idea that cultural production was once limited to certain actors 
and is now “liberated” and “made accessible” via communication technologies such as 
Facebook, ignores the ways in which culture was always already what people did. 
Facebook therefore cannot claim to be the liberator of culture or to be a new hub/platform 
105Yochai Benkler: Wealth of Networks 2006. p.275.
106Quoted in David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect New York: Simon&Schuster, 2010. p.10.
107Jose van Dijck The Culture of Connectivity 2013. p.166.
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that finally allows people to produce culture. That is why Benkler's assumption that the 
networked information economy “makes culture more transparent to its inhabitants”108 
establishes a very problematic understanding of the relationship between culture and the 
people. Counter to Benkler, culture can neither be “occupied”109 nor can culture be 
inhabited.
My argument from above, that power in the case of Facebook manifests in the 
determining potential of its architecture, challenges Benkler's claims that the networked 
information society “make[s] the process of cultural production more participatory, in the 
sense that more of those live within [it] can actively participate in its creation” 110. Again, 
Katherine Losse's memoir about her life as Facebook employee helps to contextualize 
this revolutionary claim. To Losse 
social media is about bringing us online and asking us to play with another in 
digital space. Social media then is the ultimate internet game played according 
to the rules and metrics created by the boys who make the games and write the 
algorithms.111
It simply does not suffice to claim that because “participation in and contribution 
to” culture has become cheaper, individuals enjoy more power relative to the institutions 
they are facing. Where and how, as Benkler argues, people are using their newly 
expanded practical freedom to act and cooperate with others in ways that substantially 
improve the practiced experience of democracy, justice and development and that lead to 
108Yochai Benkler: Wealth of Networks p.276.
109Benkler: Wealth of Networks p.276.
110Ibid.
111Katherine Losse: The Boy Kings p.205.
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a critical culture112, and community”113, I have yet to discover.
Tellingly, Zuckerberg's claim that “[a]t Facebook, we built tools to help people 
connect with the people they want and share what they want, and by doing this we are 
extending people's capacity to build and maintain relationships”114 could be written by 
Benkler also. Facebook, too, draws on the idea that it needs a critical enabler to allow 
people to participate in culture (or even more dramatical, to build and maintain 
relationships). It becomes very clear that the claim of individual empowerment and, in 
turn, bottom-up democratization in the case of Facebook resembles a top-down 
understanding of culture. Benkler and Zuckerberg get one thing right: Facebook does 
indeed provide access to an enormous variety of resources – mostly created by the labor 
of its own users. 
However and as Andrejevic points out, “access to these resources entails 
surrendering control over the product of collective activity to those who own the 
resources”115. Katherine Losse adds: “social graces – and privacy and psychological well-
being, for that matter – are just obstacles in the way of having more information”116.
Does that sound like individual empowerment? Hardly so. The political economy of 
social network services, such as Facebook, contextualizes the individual empowerment 
myth. Even if we are sympathetic to Benkler's optimism, we must acknowledge that
112Somewhere else in his book, Benkler defines “critical culture” as a “more attractive cultural production 
system – more transparent; more malleable. Emergence of new folk culture; “culture is becoming more 
democratic: self-reflective and participatory”(p.15) – a definition that illustrates all the aforementioned 
problematic assumption about culture.
113Benkler: Wealth of Networks p.8.
114Letter from Mark Zuckerberg as part of the S1 statement 2012 p. 67.
115Mark Andrejevic “Social Network Exploitation” in Zizi Papacharissi A Networked Self New York: 
Routledge, 2011. p.89.
116Katherine Losse: The Boy Kings p.43.
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social networking takes place against the background of forms of estrangement 
associated with industrial capitalism – the very alienation for which the new 
media promise an antidote, according to the marking hype. […] the promise to 
resuscitate extended forms of community and to challenge centralized control 
over collective representations all gain their appeal against the background of 
the depredations of industrial capitalism.117
In other words and contrary to Facebook's own claim of building tools that help “giving 
people control over what they share [to create] a network built from the bottom up or 
peer-to-peer, rather than the monolithic, top-down structure”118, the social networking 
giant “privatizes” community119. 
Consequently, the personal relationships that Facebook prides itself to help build 
and maintain are not about about depth but about maximizing networked resources. 
Moreover, networked resources are not the basis for a collective attempt to rethinking 
(and experimenting with) the potential of network technology and, by extension, network 
culture. Instead, Facebook is the product of and has helped to produce a context in which, 
to argue with Nick Couldry, the “intense mobility of a networked life reduces the social 
resources from which alternative values can be built and sustained collectively”120. 
Personal Information Privacy has the potential to slow down this intense mobility and 
could help to produce spaces to imagine such an alternative to individualized efforts to 
maximize human existence. In my next chapter, I make some suggestions towards this 
goal.
117Ibid. 94
118Letter from Mark Zuckerberg S1 Statement p 67
119Mark Andrejevic “Social Network Exploitation” in Zizi Papacharissi A Networked Self p. 97.
120Nick Couldry Media Society World New York: Polity, 2012. p.128
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Towards an Articulation and Assemblage Theory of PIP
I understand that secrecy is part of, well, an aberrant behavior system. It comes 
from a bad place, not a place of light and generosity. And when you deprive your 
friends, […] you are basically stealing from them. You're depriving them of 
something they have a right to. Knowledge is a basic human right. Equal access 
to all possible human experiences is a basic human right. […] Sharing is caring. 
[…]. I think it's simple. If you care about your fellow human beings, you share 
what you know with them. You share what you see. You give them anything you 
can. If you care about their plight, their suffering, their curiosity, their right to 
learn and know anything the world contains, you share with them. You share 
what you have and what you see and what you know. To me, the logic here is 
undeniable.1
The secret produces an immense enlargement of life: numerous contents of life 
cannot even emerge in the presence of full publicity. The secret offers. So to 
speak, the possibility of a second world alongside the manifest world; and the 
latter is decisively influenced by the former.2
In his newest novel, Dave Eggers' describes a technology company called “The Circle”, 
which has gathered unprecedented amounts of data about people around the world and 
has replaced formerly popular social network sites such as Facebook. “The Circle” is 
nearing what the company calls “completion”, a process according to which everything 
about everyone gets recorded on to the company's servers. 
Over the past ten years “The Circle” established a mega vertical and lateral 
surveillance apparatus through which any imaginable information has become publicly 
accessible via the cloud. Thanks to “The Circle”, children carry underneath their skin a 
microscopic transmitter that reports their location to parents during all hours of the day – 
a revolution that has caused child abduction rates in the United States to plummet. As part 
of “The Circle's” SeeChange campaign, members of the network carry with them or 
1 Dave Eggers The Circle p.302.
2 Georg Simmel quoted in Jodi Dean Publicity's Secret. How Technoculture capitalizes on Democracy 
p.10.
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install everywhere cheap digital cameras that record constantly anything these members 
encounter. The SeeChange cameras then automatically transmit their data to the cloud. 
The SeeChange initiative caused crime rates to decrease significantly and prompts one of 
“The Circle's” CEO to describe the new Circle zeitgeist:
What if we all behaved as if we were being watched? It would lead to a more 
moral way of life. Who would do something unethical or immoral or illegal if 
they were being watched? […] we would finally be compelled to be our best 
selves. [...]. Finally, finally, we can be good. In a world where bad choices are no 
longer an option, we have no choice but to be good. Can you imagine?3
Eggers' book revolves mostly around his female protagonist Mae. We witness her 
ascendance from being a unlikely hire to the customer experience (CE) department, 
unlikely because she has no technical or programming expertise but a humanities degree, 
to being one of the three most popular employees. During the third part of the book, it is 
Mae's job to become “the Circle”. Every step of her professional as well as private life is 
recorded. Mae carries with her a wristband, which constantly relays information to her 
about how many users follow her show and it allows Circle users to interact through her 
with othe company employees. For instance, during one of her publicly viewable doctor's 
appointments, Mae finds out that she has a genetic predisposition for stomach cancer -  a 
diagnosis made available by a doctor from Scotland, who had analyzed her DNA 
markers. In short, Mae is the Web 2.0 version of Truman Burbank. Like him, her life is 
perfectly transparent. In contrast to Truman, however, she knows about it and actively 
contributes to it.
As we accompany Mae on her journey from the periphery to the center of “The 
Circle”, we learn about the many ways in which her life effectively becomes consumed 
3 Dave Eggers The Circle p.290.
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by the company's insatiable desire for ever more personal information. The first quote 
above is part of a conversation between Mae and Bailey – one of three CEO's of “The 
Circle”, all of whom are referred to reverently as the wise guys. This conversation is a 
staged event in front of all Circle employees and public per default.
Mae was invited on stage after a four eye conversation with Bailey the day before 
in which she had to apologize for a peculiar event. The night before, Mae had taken a 
rental kayak to the bay to work out. Rather than renting it from the kayak shop, she 
“borrowed” one that was leaning against the fence outside the club after closing hours. 
After returning from her trip, the police arrested her for the alleged kayak theft that one 
of the SeeChange cameras had recorded. Only the intervention of the rental club owner, 
who knew Mae well, saved her from jail. 
However, as “The Circle” had made police records publicly available for anyone 
to read, other Circle members and co-workers became aware of Mae's “deviant” behavior 
via the cloud. Interestingly, Mae's co-workers were not upset about the fact that Mae took 
the kayak without paying, they were distressed and alarmed by her unwillingness to post 
information about her whereabouts and her plans to her Circle profile. The statement 
above describes both Mae's publicly broadcasted epiphany about her wrong behavior and 
also captures a post-privacy sensibility. Later in the book, her revelations about the 
outdatedness of PIP will become front and center of “The Circle's” mission statement: 
“secrets are lies – sharing is caring – privacy is theft”4.
Arguably, Dave Eggers' The Circle is a fictional account of a fictional company. 
Yet, juxtaposed with Georg Simmel's plea for the importance of secrecy, Eggers' book 
4 Dave Eggers The Circle p.303.
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captures many of the arguments so pervasive to Facebook's official rhetoric that I 
investigated in the first two chapters of this essay. Moreover, I introduce Eggers' book 
because it highlights many of the post-privacy and radical transparency arguments with 
which I started this essay. Therefore, the passages from Eggers' book marks the transition 
from the empirical examination of the role and function of PIP in relation to Facebook to 
a more theoretical interpretation of PIP at the current conjuncture.
As I begin to outline the theoretical foundations of my articulation and 
assemblage theory of PIP, I take great inspiration from cultural studies' strategic approach 
to theory writ large. While taking a detour through privacy theory, I “take [theory] up as a 
contingent strategic resource”5. “Desacrilizing”6 theories of privacy means to me, using 
theory in order to solve a concrete and politically relevant problem. More precisely, I 
understand theory as a tool to help me explain and understand the value of PIP for 
ordinary people today. A detour through theory thus serves my approach to PIP best as it 
illustrates the political dimension immanent to the question: how do I think about and 
treat my personal information online. 
I argue that the articulation and assemblage approach underscores why personal 
information privacy continues to be a valuable concept not to be replaced by the nebulous 
idea of post-privacy. Moreover, I argue that the premature dismissal of the value of PIP 
makes nearly impossible the important interrogation of power structures so central to the 
ordinary people's personal information practices. 
The previous two empirical chapters demonstrate that both the structures and the 
5 Lawrence Grossberg Cultural Studies in the Future Tense p.27.
6 Ibid.
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processes which undergird Facebook deserve increased scrutiny. The Post (privacy) idea 
makes this impossible as it suggests that debates about the nature of PIP are something of 
the past. It silently proposes that the battle over who gets to determine which information 
is rendered private and which public is resolved. That is why I take inspiration not only 
from cultural studies but also from those scholars, who challenge the “post” claim with 
regard to gender and race. They criticize that both postfeminist and post-race discourses 
take place despite the reality that “sexism and racisms continue to structure cultural  
artifacts and communal experiences”7.
Accordingly, I argue that PIP practices continue to be an important – maybe even 
increasingly more important – element of the ways in which ordinary people experience 
their lives. The fact that Facebook and network culture in general have turned PIP issues 
into a dinner table conversation topic, only underscores the need to discuss the politics of 
PIP rather than closing the books on this increasingly controversial status.
Mary Vavrus for instance, emphasizes the troubled nature of the post-feminist 
claim when she writes: “the impulse to 'post' a politics is, I believe, one rooted in a 
generally decent, if misguided, belief that our society has reached a moment in which we 
are living out our lives on a level playing field”8. Angela McRobbie criticizes that the 
“post” proposes a “sensibility”9, to argue with Rosalind Gill, according to which 
feminism “is made redundant” and its battles are “cast into the shadows”10. 
Gill's notion of postfeminism as sensibility is such a convenient metaphor because 
7 Catherine Squires p.213.
8 Mary Vavrus “Unhitching from the 'Post' (of Postfeminism)” in Catherine Squires et al. “What is this 
'Post' in Postracial, Postfeminist … (Fill in the Blank)?” Journal of Communication Inquiry p.222.
9 Rosalind Gill “Postfeminist media Culture. Elements of a sensibility” in European Journal of Cultural  
Studies 10.2. p.3.
10 Angela McRobbie “Post-feminism and popular culture” in Feminist Media Studies 4.3. p.2.
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post-privacy can be understood as a sensibility as well – a sense that the value and 
importance of PIP inevitably deteriorates. Along these lines, a post-privacy sensibility 
renders battles over PIP a relict of the past, precisely at a historical moment when PIP 
might actually be of growing political importance for everyone of us. The German post-
privacy advocate Christian Heller speaks of a “trend towards post-privacy”11 to describe 
this elusive feeling that something about the value of our personal information is 
inevitably changing. Micheal Seemann, another leading German voice in favor of post-
privacy, simply declares that “post-privacy [is] the condition into which our society is 
headed”12.
McRobbie adds another layer to her critique of post-feminism and argues: 
“postfeminism positively draws on and involves feminism as that which can be taken into 
account, to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole new repertoire of 
meanings which emphasize that [feminism] is no longer needed, it is a spent force”13. If 
we apply Vavrus's and McRobbie's observations to PIP, then the “post” in post-privacy 
suggests that individual users, corporations such as Facebook (or “The Circle”), 
governments, and agencies such as the NSA all have equal power. Accordingly, 
announcing post-privacy not only erases all the unsolved issues foundational to the 
debates over PIP, but also forecloses the space necessary to reiterate and debate its 
political nature. Just as postfeminism ignores the reality of persistent gender inequality, 
post-privacy and radical transparency claims ignore the asymmetrical power relationship 
11 Christian Heller Post-Privacy p.155.
12 Michael Seemann “Was ist Post-Privacy für mich?” [What is post-privacy for me?] March 23, 2011.  
<http://www.ctrl-verlust.net/was-ist-postprivacy-fur-mich/> All of Seemann's comments are my 
translations.
13 Ibid.
108
between ordinary people, corporations, governments, and other institutions of power.
When I criticize the premature shift to a post-privacy society, though, I do not 
mean to ignore the many ways in which the history of privacy presents a legacy of 
discrimination against the interests of virtually any group other than white bourgeois 
men. Thus, I do not mean to ignore the long legacy of legal struggles and for civil rights 
on behalf of virtually all the marginalized populations, who sought to break down the 
barrier between private and public, which served white men throughout history to cement 
their monopoly power.
For example, at a later point in my discussion of the legal history of privacy, I 
show how Warren's and Brandeis' understanding of privacy is profoundly situated within 
the Lockean roots of Anglo-American legal theory as they are “referring to rights of 
privacy really as property rights or liberty interests in disguise”14. Cultural theorist 
Raymond Williams highlights how this notion of privacy was used in the primary sense 
to signal privilege, the advantage of limited access15.
Williams furthermore ascertained that the complexity of the term private life lies  
in the fact that it has been adopted widely outside of its positive, narrowly defined 
bourgeois view: “the ultimate generalized privilege, however abstract in practice, of 
seclusion and protection from others; the lack of accountability to them; and of related 
gains in closeness and comfort to these general kinds”16. For many marginalized groups 
this privilege became manifest in a legal and social structure which protected those few in 
power, typically white men, from public scrutiny.
14 Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.18.
15 Raymond Williams Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society Crook Helm: Fontana, 1976. p.203.
16 Ibid. p.204.
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Therefore, I do not mean to flatten out the complexities formative and inherent to 
these struggles. As my later discussion of Anita Allen's work shows, privacy in and of 
itself is not always virtuous and has, historically, described a protective mechanism only 
for those powerful enough to define the boundaries around what counts as private. 
Consequently, my attempt to reinvigorate the political dimension of PIP also requires a 
radical departure from the discriminatory history of the concept of privacy17.
With regard to race, Kent Ono defines “post” theories as a political strategy. For 
him “post-racism is the perfect elixir to help society forget about the icky historical  
abomination known as racism. It is one part cultural condition and one part political 
strategy, a creative solution to help free the mind of racism once and for all.”18 Like 
McRobbie above, Ono emphasizes that “post” connotes a feeling of forgetting; it presents 
a state of mind. Therefore, moving beyond PIP all too readily can lead us to forget why 
certain information is valued as private and why it might deserve protection. 
Post-privacy and radical transparency are political strategies to naturalize a state 
of mind according to which ordinary people make available any information about them 
at all times. Metaphorically speaking, it “frees” us from engaging the difficult questions 
that accompany the political nature of PIP. Post-privacy makes life much easier – 
frictionless, to use Facebook's terminology. At the same time, this convenience carries 
with it an enormous price tag as we voluntarily hand over the minimal control we have 
17 Laurie Ouellette's comments about the contradictory and hugely problematic history of privacy for 
women and other disenfranchised groups were of critical importance to this insight. Ouellette's 
insistence on the double-entendre of my refusal to see the benefits of a post-privacy society for women 
and other marginalized groups in the context of the fight against racism, classism, and sexism certainly 
deserve more attention beyond the scope of this chapter.
18 Kent Ono “Postracism: A Theory of a Post – as Political Strategy” in Catherine Squires et al. “What is 
this 'Post' in Postracial, Postfeminist … (Fill in the Blank)?” Journal of Communication Inquiry p.227.
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over our personal data to corporations and governments.
Rosalind Gill insists that there is “little agreement over what post-feminism” is, 
since the term is “used variously and contradictorily”19. That is interesting because 
feminism, the concept which ought to be replaced by post-feminism, itself means 
different things to different people. In other words, as post-feminism lacks conceptual 
clarity, it seeks to replace a set of political ideas, which are equally diverse and often 
times contradictory. As I argued in the introduction, privacy, too, is a messy concept in 
disarray. Therefore, why should we replace concepts such as feminism, or race, or 
privacy that are in and of themselves overly complex and politically charged with equally 
contradictory terms? If we are still fighting the old battles, is it really time to move on to  
new and unmapped territory?
Facebook sits at the heart of this debate and reminds us on a daily basis that we 
need to actively negotiated what PIP means to us. In the course of the recent acquisition 
of the technology start-up WhatsAPP for a mind blowing nineteen billion dollars, some 
claim that Facebook never was about personal information privacy, since users used the 
web service mainly as a public stage on which to seek attention20. These voices 
underestimate how Facebook's increasingly hidden but omnipresent role as portal and 
backbone to an ever growing number of online interactions and social activities already 
penetrates and records the very ordinary aspects of our lives. As a matter of fact and 
counter to these claims, Facebook users do not hide their ugly sides on their profiles as 
comment sections are full of sexist and racist comments. While it might be true that the 
19 Gill p.3.
20 Pascal Paukner Zuckerberg hat verstanden [Zuckerberg understands] Sueddeutsche.de February 20, 
2014. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/whatsapp-uebernahme-durch-facebook-zuckerberg-hat-
verstanden-1.1893836>
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acquisition of WhatsAPP provides the social media giant with renewed access to different 
types of private information, it only confirms that rather than descending to a vague post-
privacy world devoid of the political efficacy that emanates from PIP, we need to discuss 
its political value.
We should, however, not commit the mistake of dismissing the ideas behind post-
privacy entirely. Michael Seemann cautions us not to think of post-privacy as a fixed set 
of principles according to which our society is organized. Instead, he proclaims that post-
privacy is “a loose collection of theses about the relationship between tolerance and 
transparency”21. This flexibility is of great theoretical value. Moreover, Seemann's 
invitation to view post-privacy as a starting point for a discussion of the ways in which 
concepts such as tolerance and transparency might mean different things at the current 
media conjuncture is smart and laudable as well. Unfortunately, Seemann's broader 
societal observations lack this invitational tone:
The loss of control inevitably leads to a condition, that the boundary between 
public and not-public is no longer be self-determined. […] Not everything is 
public, but I am no longer the one to decide what is public and what not. There 
is a big difference between total transparency and loss of control. Both can be 
described as post-privacy, but I only believe in the latter.22
I fundamentally disagree with Seemann when he argues that we are inevitably bound for 
a society in which we lack control over our personal information. The pragmatists teach 
us that nothing is inevitable. They caution us to “foreswear the promise of total solutions 
and wholesale salvation” and insist that there simply are “no guarantees”23 that things 
21 Michael Seemann “Was ist Post-Privacy für mich?” [What is post-privacy for me?] March 23, 2011.  
<http://www.ctrl-verlust.net/was-ist-postprivacy-fur-mich/>
22 Michael Seemann “Was ist Post-Privacy für mich?” [What is post-privacy for me?] March 23, 2011.  
<http://www.ctrl-verlust.net/was-ist-postprivacy-fur-mich/> All of Seemann's comments are my 
translations.
23 James Carey “Historical Pragmatism and the Internet” New Media & Society 7.4. p.447.
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would turn out as predicted. That is why neither Facebook's current shape and corporate 
mission nor the ways in which we might conceive of PIP in the future are inevitable. 
Arguably and beyond any doubt, the ways in which we make sense of information 
control today and in the future will be subject to intense debates. 
However, simply announcing a post-privacy regime according to which the lack 
of control is inevitable, shuts down any productive discourse. Assuming the total loss of 
control simply ignores the complicated relationship between individual agency and 
structural factors and makes any negotiation between culture and power impossible. 
Therefore, as Seemann builds his notion of a post-private society on a rather fixed 
understanding of culture and of social processes, he makes push back against the top-
down prescription of information regimes by corporate actors such as Facebook nearly 
impossible. Seen in this light, both Seemann's claims as well as the already existing legal 
canon about privacy need to be rejected for their “fixed distinctions between culture and 
nature, between culture and self, and between culture and deeper social structure”24 - as 
Julie E. Cohen illustrates. 
Moreover, Seemann mistakingly assumes that there has been a time in the past 
were it was up to the people to draw the boundaries between private and public. He 
ignores what anthropologist Christena E. Nippert-Eng has called the “managerial 
conception of privacy”. This notion suggests that there is nothing “inherently or 
intrinsically private”25. In other words, not only was the boundary between private and 
public information never exclusively determined by the self, it has also always been a 
24 Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.25.
25 Christena E. Nippert-Eng Islands of Privacy  p.8.
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boundary constantly made and unmade. What the boundary meant and how it was 
relevant has always been an interactive process between individuals and a variety of 
contextual factors. 
Along a similarly flawed rational, Christian Heller suggests that “post-privacy 
makes clear, our actions are not independent and isolated. […] Post-privacy tears down 
those walls, that separate us from each other. That, in turn, increases the possible 
information flow between us”26. In other words, the total transparency of information 
helps to break down the allegedly harmful barriers between us. Like Seemann, Heller 
demonstrates an incredibly naïve and skewed understanding of the ways in which we 
carry out and make sense of our actions.
As Slack and Wise remind us, these ordinary activities consist of “practices, 
representations, experiences, and affects”27 that go hand in hand or, sometimes, work 
against each other. That means, in turn, that the boundaries between private information 
and not-private information are always already in flux as we constantly busy ourselves 
with renegotiating their meanings respectively. As I tried to make clear in previous 
passages, it is true that new technologies collapse former understandings of time and 
space at an historically unprecedented rate. But that does not mean that we can ignore the 
fact that information flows have always existed between us. Post-privacy does not 
describe the revolution of these practices fundamental to human existence. Tellingly,  
post-privacy does not discuss the one important difference between conversations of the 
past and digital conversations today: “free” and ephemeral information flows of the past 
26 Christian Heller Post-Privacy p.151.
27 Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise Culture + Technology. A Primer New York: Peter Land, 
2007. p.127.
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are now recorded and stored for all eternity and owned by corporations such as Facebook.
That is why PIP is contextual and relational, always already political. Our struggle 
over the meaning of PIP now is a political act and expression of our agency – our ability 
to push-back, at least a little bit, against the powerful forces that penetrate our daily lives.  
Therefore, Julie E. Cohen is correct when she demands that “a theory of privacy for the 
networked information society must address privacy problems in a way that corresponds 
to the experiences and expectations of real people”28. The fact that she suggest to think 
about privacy “as an interest in breathing room to engage in socially situated processes of 
boundary management”29 shows that Seemann's post-privacy prematurely buries an entire 
set of critical practices as it renders meaningless the many ordinary practices that 
encapsulate people's battle for information control.
Consequently, when Seemann announces that post-privacy “is not a politics” he 
accidentally admits the crux of this concept. If at least post-privacy was a politics – some 
sort of battle cry for new challenges to the current status quo – it would still bear the 
potential to engage the unresolved PIP issues of the past. But just like post-feminist 
claims, its a-politicness renders attempts to fight existing power structures hollow. 
Seemann's hope that post-privacy marks the “end to a uniform moral and forced 
conformity” is at odds with his claim that post-privacy is “first and foremost 
responsibility”. I cannot help but wonder how we should address public problems if there 
no longer is any sense of moral responsibility beyond just our immediate self interest?
Ultimately, the problem with post-privacy claims is that, unfortunately, upholding 
28 Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.125.
29 Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.149.
115
the idea of an inevitable or powerful trend towards the “dissolution of privacy” requires 
its advocates to ignore or at least underestimate the many actors that operate against these 
trends. Christian Heller, for instance, admits the existence of interests antithetical to post-
privacy only to quickly ascertain that they appear to be toothless30. Just a few pages after 
this insight, Heller shows convincingly that Facebook is one of the major actors who 
heavily regulates the flow of information. Apparently unaware of this contradiction, it 
seems to escape Heller's attention that Facebook is anything but toothless. Its existence 
and successful business operation undermines all the cherished principles of post-privacy. 
Therefore, this contradiction only adds to the altogether dissatisfying condition that a 
shift to post-privacy proposes.
Overall, the most important argument against any such shift remains the profound 
difficulties we have when we seek to understand PIP at the current media conjuncture. 
How can we simply move on to yet another nebulous concept if the discussion of PIP 
itself offers more questions than answers? Post-privacy only seems to be a continuation 
of the flattening-out of the complexities that already puzzle privacy scholars.
Before I finally outline my proposal to PIP, let me briefly review some of 
canonical privacy scholarship. This brief detour through the theoretical history of the 
concept first demonstrates the shortcomings of previous scholarship. In so doing, I 
acknowledge that post-privacy advocates are frustrated with current status quo that seems 
incapable of providing a framework to capture PIP within the context of the networked 
information society. At the end of the detour, however, I introduce Helen Nissenbaum's 
contextual notion of privacy, Daniel J. Solove's pluralistic notion of privacy, and Julie E. 
30 Christian Heller Post-Privacy p.152.
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Cohen's understanding of privacy as boundary management to show that privacy 
scholarship has indeed produces useful tools with which we can investigate PIP's role and 
function at the current conjuncture.
A final preliminary comment. Privacy scholarship – even at its strongest moments 
– lacks clarity in crucial ways. In my work I focus exclusively on personal information 
privacy. However, during my discussion of other scholars' work you will find me using 
their language, which means I will occasionally speak about privacy without any further 
specification. I want to emphasize that such a conceptualization of privacy is counter-
productive as it reduces a whole set of issues to one messy and vague term. For example, 
Daniel J. Solove has argued many times that the current context requires a problem-
centric and pluralistic understanding of privacy. Yet this laudable intervention is 
immediately ambushed by his failure to crack open the conceptual foundation of privacy 
itself. 
Julie E. Cohen's fabulous examination of the work visual and spatial metaphors do 
in privacy discourse, reminds us that “the way we talk about privacy shapes our 
understanding of what it is”31. Yet, she also leaves the term privacy under-scrutinized. As 
the first and second chapter of my essay demonstrate, corporate, governmental, and 
individual actors or groups of individual actors propose a pending threat to privacy and, 
in turn, demand an analytical vocabulary that reflects the relational and contextual nature  
of privacy32.
Tim Berners-Lee, one of the principle designers of the Internet as we know and 
31 Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.125.
32 I thank my advisor Gil Rodman for his comments on this point in which he urged me to pay attention to 
the problematic use of the term privacy through out the literature. 
117
use it today, makes the alarming political economy argument that individual internet users  
have become all to reliant on an infrastructure – the free internet – that faces 
simultaneously three powerful enemies33. First, Berners-Lee argues, there are 
governments, who all too eagerly monitor every activity of ordinary people, other 
governments, and foreign as well as domestic corporate actors. The second critical threat 
to the idea of a free information infrastructure are internet service providers that prioritize 
certain data and capitalize information streams.
Finally and central to my argument, Berners-Lee laments the ways in which social 
network sites such as Facebook hoard data and shield information from the rest of the 
web. In the latter case, Facebook's acquisition of WhatsAPP only proves the extend to 
which these corporate power houses have access to our very private communication. We 
simple need a more nuanced vocabulary to distinguish between a situation in which the 
NSA requires Facebook to reveal user information for the alleged fight against terrorism 
or when somebody accesses a photo on my Facebook timeline via a friend's profile (that 
is without my explicit consent).
Moreover, the fact that Facebook is widely criticizes for being a “Data Silo”34, an 
institution demanding gigantic amounts of information while at the same time shutting 
down all reciprocal information flows, further proves the demand for an approach to 
privacy where individual interests, such as informational self-determination, are 
discussed alongside more structural issues. In other words, what we need is a vocabulary 
33 Quoted in Konrad Lischka “Web-Erfinder warnt vor Facebook's Datenmonopol” [Web founder warns  
against Facebook's data monopoly] Der Spiegel Online November 20, 2010. 
<http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/nutzungs-statistik-web-erfinder-warnt-vor-facebooks-
datenmonopol-a-730259.html>
34 Ibid.
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that allows us to better understand the ways in which structural and individual privacy 
issues are no conceptually separate. Only an approach to PIP that takes inspiration from 
articulation and assemblage theory manages to highlight the connections between these 
various modes of privacy violations while at the same time acknowledging their profound 
differences.
That is why Slack's and Wise's notion of “selecting, drawing together, and 
enveloping a territory” that includes individual and structural privacy issues presents such 
a useful point of departure. It makes possible to integrate into the conversation about PIP 
a whole range of “other kinds of bodies, bodies of knowledge, [and other] actions, 
passions, practices, commitments, feelings, beliefs, affects, and so on […]”35. Understood 
in such a way, theorizing privacy as an assemblage is of central importance to a new 
approach. Such a theory avoids the trivializing effects of essentialist approaches to 
privacy and, at the same time, builds a bridge between privacy studies, critical media 
studies, and cultural studies.
The goal cannot and should not be to construct, as Cohen claims, “a theory of 
privacy for the networked information society”36. Any thinking about privacy at the 
current conjuncture must account for a constantly shifting constellation of multiple 
intersecting factors. Therefore, I highlight the importance of context, conjuncture, 
articulation, and assemblage to reject the theoretical attempt to develop a unified  
framework. Most importantly, and in sharp departure from Cohen's project, I argue that 
any discussion of privacy at the current conjuncture is best served by an understanding of 
35 Ibid. p.130.
36 Jennifer E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2012. p.125.
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privacy as a site of struggle over meanings and power. That is why I adapt Slack's and 
Wise's notion of assemblage to argue that if you don't understand what you see, don't 
blame the insufficient privacy definitions – as post-privacy advocates do; understand the 
assemblage that maps this peculiar cultural moment37.
The theoretical detour of the history of privacy in the context of the United States 
must begin with Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. Their pivotal essay “The 
Right to Privacy”, published in 1890, marks the beginning of the long standing legal 
tradition to insist on privacy as someone's right to “exercise extensive civil privileges”. 
As I described in the second chapter, to Warren and Brandeis contemporary 
communication technology and news corporations presented “an invasion upon his (sic) 
privacy, subjected him (sic) to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted 
by mere bodily injury”38. The authors make clear that privacy is an individual right 
according to which only an individual had the “right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others”39. Alan 
Westin cemented this notion of privacy in his canonical book From Privacy and  
Freedom. In 1967 he wrote that privacy had to be understood as the “claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others”40.
Despite the prominence of Warren's and Brandeis's as well as Westin's account, a 
number of scholars have tried to define privacy as something other than an individual 
right. Jeffrey H. Reiman, for instance, describes privacy as a social practice and very 
37 Slack and Wise Culture+Technology p.132.
38 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Harvard Law Review IV.5 1890.
39 Ibid.
40 Alan F.Westin Privacy and Freedom New York: Atheneum, 1967.
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complicated social ritual, as a “precondition to personhood”41. Privacy is constitutional to 
who we are as it “protects the individual's interest in becoming, being, and remaining a 
person”42. Privacy then is the social practice through which a group communicates to an 
individual that that individual actually exists – that it has a space for him/herself that is  
respected by the community. Thus, privacy is fundamentally part of the symbolic 
interaction that shapes who we are. Reiman therefore concludes that “the elimination of 
privacy leads to the destruction of the self”43 – a profound departure from the Facebook 
claim that radical transparency leads to the expression of the true self (the Facebook self).
While I agree with the constitutional elements of Reiman's concept of privacy, I 
criticize the ways in which some of his assumptions flatten out the changing nature of 
privacy and, instead, rely on a rather static understanding of the relationship between 
subject and its perceived needs for PIP. Reiman's inability to account for the flexibility of 
subjects and their understanding of PIP thus fails to offer tools to discuss statements such 
as this one by Ben Parr:  “Privacy has not disappeared, but become even easier to control 
(as we are becoming more comfortable sharing our lives and thoughts instantly to 
thousands of people, friends, and strangers alike”44. If, indeed, privacy is so essential to 
our selfs and a precondition to personhood, why are some of us more comfortable giving 
it up than others? In other words, are those of us who share more information on their 
Facebook profile becoming lesser persons than other, more secretive, users? 
Ruth Gavison makes an interesting counterargument in which she highlights the 
41 Jeffrey H. Reiman “Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6.1 1976. p.39.
42 Ibid. p.44.
43 Ibid. p.40.
44 Quoted in David Kirkpatrick The Facebook Effect p. 214. Ben Parr was a student at Northwestern 
University where he initiated the Facebook group “Students against Facebook news feed”.
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“need to reject that privacy is a form of control”45. Instead she calls for a neutral concept 
of privacy according to which privacy is not a matter of choice46 but a “limitation of 
others' access to an individual”47. According to Gavison, perfect privacy is impossible in 
any society because it would require absolute seclusion from anything and anyone. For 
Gavison the “loss of privacy”48 is a basic requirement for any social interaction to take 
place. She highlights how the loss of privacy is an enabling rather than destructive 
process. But she also insists that it is a process in which only the degree and extent of PIP 
is subject to negotiation not its basic existence. In so doing, Gavison's article from the 
1980s foreshadows some of the more productive elements of the post-privacy argument 
without its tendency to discard the value of PIP altogether.
With regard to Facebook, Gavison's argument helps to understand that the process 
of loosing privacy is interactional. The voluntary disclosure of personal information 
requires from users a willingness to engage in certain social norms and conventions. It 
goes without saying that perfect information privacy in Gavison's sense would render 
social network sites meaningless. But since Facebook is all about being social, users 
expose themselves at times to “interferences, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, 
unfavorable decisions, and other forms of hostile reaction”49. However, all of the social 
interactions above fall under the managerial notion of privacy and include different 
scenarios for different people. In other words, what distinguishes Gavison from the 
radical rejection of PIP of the post-privacy advocates is that she conceptualizes PIP as the 
45 Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of the Law” The Yale Law Journal 89.3 1980. p.426.
46 Ibid. pp.426-428.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. p.448.
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outcome of a negotiation process in which the political stakes for every participant are 
quite high.
Finally, Anita L. Allen not only criticizes Warren, Brandeis, and Westin for their 
particularly “liberal conception of privacy”, she also challenges the assumption that all  
people want the same kind of privacy all the time. As one of the leading feminist scholars 
of privacy, Allen urges us to take seriously all those voices that don't want to be secluded 
or isolated. She insists that, maybe, we need to be careful not to force privacy onto people 
when they actually “enjoy disclosure, revelation, and exposure”50. In her many 
publications, Allen repeatedly emphasizes that marginalized groups have suffered 
oftentimes under the alleged benefits of privacy. She reminds us about the feminist 
challenges to the ideal of privacy, which for women is often associated with peril and 
subordination. For example, privacy, understood as secrecy and as the right to be alone 
and to keep secluded ones property, has served for many decades and even centuries as 
justification for domestic violence against women (and less frequently against men). 
Echoing Williams, Anita L. Allen points to women in particular as just one 
possible group that has suffered from the bourgeois ideal of privacy. In other words, 
when she concludes her essay outlining the “importance of privacy to liberalism”51, she 
wants us “to begin to take into account the [possibly positive] cumulative effects of 
eroding privacy tastes and expectations”52. Like Gavison, to Anita L. Allen the loss of 
privacy can be virtuous. But she acknowledges the political dimension of privacy, too, 
when she observes that “the hard task before us is to deciding which forms of privacy are 
50 Ibid. p.734.
51 Ibid. p.756.
52 Ibid. p.757.
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so critical that they should be matters of coercion”53.
In addition to these canonical texts about privacy, a number of scholars have 
investigated more specifically the relationship between PIP and Facebook. James 
Grimmelmann provides the most comprehensive discussion to date of this relationship. 
Unfortunately, rather than emphasizing the various connections between Facebook's 
understanding of PIP and other political, cultural, and economic factors, Grimmelmann's 
meticulous and well thought out research examines Facebook in isolation. His initial 
focus on the ways in which Facebook's notion of PIP was shaped by a particular college 
information culture college provides a useful entry into the debate over the web service's 
PIP standards and values today. Furthermore, Grimmelmann rightfully argues that the 
combination of young people's eagerness to socialize and to shape social identities has 
played a crucial role in Facebook's early rise in popularity. Grimmelmann seconds 
Gavison when he argues that “social urges cannot be satisfied under conditions of 
complete privacy”54. 
In addition, among the privacy theorists I introduce here, Grimmelmann is the 
first to highlight that what we do on social network sites, has privacy consequences for 
others, as users regularly “must delegate some privacy decisions to people with whom 
[they] don't have close relationships”55. Hence, as information about ourselves 
transgresses the preliminary boundaries of our profiles, Grimmelmann effectively 
complicates the notion of information control.
In the meantime, however, Facebook's “population” exploded and has exceeded 
53 Ibid. p.740.
54 James Grimmelmann “Saving Facebook” Iowa Law Review 94 pp.1137-1206. p.1159.
55 Ibid. p.1175.
124
college culture many times over. As Facebook has become a platform connecting 
multiple actors–professional, governmental, educational and so on–its cultures overlap, 
intersect, and contradict each other. Along these lines, Grimmelmann also underestimates 
the dynamic nature of college culture itself. Many comments or pictures that seemed like 
a smart idea during freshman year have become rather embarrassing the moment seniors 
apply for their first jobs after graduation. Therefore, answers to Grimmelmann's central 
question, “why so many Facebook users entrust it with so much personal information?”56 
depend on many factors, which are, in turn, highly contingent on shifting and overlapping 
contexts.
Isolating Facebook from other contexts is a mistake commonly made by other 
prominent researchers as well. danah boyd, who is widely considered the leading 
sociologist of social network sites, has, together with Nicole Ellison, provided the most 
popular and widely circulated working definition for SNS. They define SNS (such as 
Facebook) as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system”57.
boyd and Ellison crafted this definition a few years before Facebook's scope 
began to manifest and before Facebook would, effectively, explode the limits proposed 
by said definition. The notion of a “closed system” deserves rethinking since Facebook 
now penetrates virtually every aspect of the social. It simply is no longer true that 
56 James Grimmelmann “Saving Facebook” Iowa Law Review 94 2009. p.1151.
57 danah boyd's and Nicole B. Ellison's article  “Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship” published in the Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 13.1 2007 is widely 
recognized to provide the standard definition for social network sites.
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information exchanged and viewed on Facebook, traverses only within the boundaries of 
this system. Numerous cases point to individuals, who have lost jobs or were punished by 
schools and colleges as a consequence of information posted to their respective Facebook 
profiles.
Research on privacy and Facebook invites generalizations and conclusions that 
ignore shifting contexts and that fail to historicize the social network site. In Facebook's  
Privacy Trainwreck, boyd argues that “privacy is a sense of control over information, the 
context where sharing takes place, and the audience who can gain access”. She concludes 
that in an era of convergence culture, this sense of “control is lost with social 
convergence”58.
An entire special issue of Cultural Studies has attempted to 1) sufficiently ground 
convergence culture in the historical development of technology, to 2) view convergence 
culture in wider contexts, and finally 3) to take into account the broader social, economic, 
cultural, and political circumstances within which convergence culture claims exist. In 
the special issue, various authors criticized that to speak of a convergence culture means 
to reduce the always existing plurality and fractured nature of culture to one monolith.
In their introduction to the special issue, Nick Couldry and James Hay insist that 
“multiple cultures that cluster around media technologies are surely too diverse for such 
an approach to be useful”59. Both authors criticize that convergence culture proposes an 
all too simple logic of before and after and that Jenkins's focus on early adopters and fans 
as highly untypical audiences might have provided him a skewed sense of the myriad 
58 danah boyd “Facebook's Privacy Trainwreck” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into  
New Media Technologies 14.1 2008.
59 Nick Couldry and James Hay “Rethinking Convergence/Culture -  An Introduction” in Cultural Studies 
25.4/5 2011. p.494.
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ways in which culture manifests itself today. Probably the biggest problem with 
convergence culture is the fact that it largely ignores “socio-economic and cultural forces 
which stratify technological access” as well as the politics of convergence. Couldry and 
Hay write:
To the extent that the most well-known of these media studies venture into 
discussions about political activism or citizenship , […] they tend to emphasize 
the virtue of interactivity and to cast the nonprofessionalism of DIY media, and 
the grassroots of media mobilization, in terms of a generalized, universalist 
understanding of democracy rather than in terms of the messy contradictions and 
contingencies of democratic citizenship in the historical and geographical 
production of convergence/cultures and, we might add, wider politics.60
Altogether, Jenkins ignores or leaves out and under-investigates international 
perspectives, longer histor(ies) of convergences, and insights into the demographic reality 
of the agents of convergence culture. The existence of new media is equated with a new 
culture – a trend post-privacy advocates all to readily adopt as well. That is why boyd, in 
relying too narrowly on Jenkin's notion of convergence culture, opens pandora's box 
rather than adding clarity to our understanding of PIP at the current media conjuncture.
Danah boyd is probably best known for her ethnographic work on youth and the 
internet and, more specifically, on teenagers' privacy practices online. Boyd's and 
Hargittai's research shows that young adult users understand that managerial dimension 
of PIP online to some extent. Those with higher online skills were more likely to 
customize the default privacy settings on Facebook, whereas the “vulnerability of the 
least skilled online is magnified by how companies choose to set or adjust”61 these 
settings. This classic digital divide argument underlines why PIP is such a political 
60 Ibid. p.481.
61 Danah boyd and Eszter Hargittai “Facebook privacy settings: Who cares? First Monday 15.8. August 2, 
2010. <http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3086/2589>
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important issue. In ways not so different from Jenkins, post-privacy advocates seem to be 
under the assumption that the conditions according to which we participate in the new 
information environments are the same for everyone. 
For boyd and Hargittai, the digital divide has both a class as well as a gender 
dimension as the loss of privacy gets articulated to a “culture of fear”. Going back to 
Allen's comment about the detrimental effects of coercing a liberal notion of privacy on 
to marginalized groups, both authors argue that discourses of fear deprive many girls of 
the “opportunities to explore the potential advantages of engaging in public and the right 
to choose which privacy preferences and corresponding privacy settings on sites like 
Facebook serve their needs best”62. Some of the case studies from the first chapter in 
which journalists provide mothers and grandmothers with instructions on how to fortify 
their daughter's Facebook accounts illustrate this dilemma convincingly.
danah boyd's and Alice Marwick's analysis of an impressive 163 in-depth 
interviews with young people about their privacy management strategies is another foray 
into the political dimension of PIP. Their research establishes quickly that for young 
people, information is public by default and that navigating privacy is a daily task. As a 
young woman states: “Facebook is public-by-default, private-through-effort”. Moreover, 
for most teenagers the meaning of privacy is context-bound as they lack a shared and 
uniform set of privacy values. boyd and Marwick discuss a variety of “structural and 
social strategies” with which teenagers are trying to protect their privacy. Yet, in the end, 
both authors diagnose the illusion of control and that “privacy is in a state of flux” 
62 Ibid.
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because the “infrastructure through which people engage with each other has changed”63.
While boyd and Marwick carefully dissect the interviews to analyze the insightful 
comments of their young interviewees, they fall prey to what might best be considered 
soft-technological determinism. Susan Douglas's “irony of technology” states clearly that 
infrastructures (technologies) can indeed shape our actions. Yet, it is not because of 
characteristics inherent to the technology – technologies always have contradictory 
consequences – but because “the economic, the political, and the ideological system 
trump […] the revolutionary potential of technologies”64. In other words, it is not 
Facebook as such that shapes the ways in which the teenagers understand and negotiate 
their privacy. Instead, it is the economic, political, and cultural context(s) within which 
Facebook exists that shape both the infrastructure that Facebook resembles, as well as the 
activities of its users and its makers.
Plurality, Context, Boundary Management – PIP
Together Helen Nissenbaum, Julie E. Cohen and Daniel J. Solove represent a 
camp of legal scholars, who have devoted their scholarly lives to the herculean task of 
updating privacy theories. I understand their work as an invitation to discuss the meaning 
and relevance of PIP today. I want to emphasize again, that post-privacy scholars, too, 
make valuable contributions as they seek ways to understand the conditions according to 
which we should problematize PIP. Consequently, they are part of the conversation 
between these three scholars, cultural studies scholars, and my approach as well. 
However, in contrast to the post-privacy and radical transparency advocates, this 
63 Paper presented by dana boyd and Alice Marwick “Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens'  
attitudes, practices, and strategies” at Oxford Internet Institute's 'A decade in Internet Time: Symposium  
on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society 2011.
64 Susan Douglas “The Turn Within” in Laurie Ouellette The Media Studies Reader p.97.
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collaboration takes into account the intellectual history of privacy and, to argue with Julie 
E. Cohen, promotes an approach to PIP that is “temperamentally postliberal and 
methodologically eclectic”65.
In his first major book The Digital Person, Solove criticizes legal approaches to 
privacy issues for their inability to think about privacy in the context of information 
flows. Rather than engaging this new context, he argues, (tort)law views privacy issues in 
isolation66. Solove rightfully contends that our current information environment demands 
an understanding of privacy issues as a phenomenon that involves multiple different 
entries and flows of information. Hence, at stake in the current battle over the meaning of 
PIP are systemic and collective issues of power distribution and not so much individual 
actors. Yet the current legal practice, which follows the liberal tradition and emphasizes 
individual rights, only holds accountable the latter.
In a remarkable effort to systematically organize all existing privacy issues, 
Solove's  taxonomy of privacy shifts the conversation “away from the vague term 
'privacy' and toward specific activities that pose privacy problems”67. In so doing, Solove 
abandons the phantasy of a unified meta-narrative about privacy and turns, effectively, to 
a context-bound and object-centric approach – two important methodological strategies.  
He effectively declares privacy to be a concept too complicated “to be boiled down to a 
single essence”. Instead, he argues for a reinterpretation of privacy as an “umbrella term, 
referring to a wide and disparate group of related things”68.
Borrowing from Wittgenstein's philosophical framework, Solove ascertains that 
65 Ibid. p.126.
66 Daniel J. Solove The Digital Person p.61.
67 Daniel J. Solove “Taxonomy of Privacy” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154.3 2006. p.482.
68 Ibid. p.485.
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privacy is “a plurality of things that do not share one element in common but that 
nevertheless bear a resemblance to each other”69. It is this pluralistic understanding of 
privacy that resonates most with cultural studies scholarship, which has long understood 
and conceptualized the social as a territory on which the meaning of categories is 
something to be fought over and subject to change. The term “walking signifyer” has 
become synonymous with cultural studies scholarship and encapsulates the struggle over 
the meaning of symbolic categories such as privacy. Polysemy is another related and 
equally important idea, often invoked by cultural studies scholars to explain that some 
concepts have multiple and simultaneously existing meanings. Privacy, too, is polysemic.
Almost be accident, Solove formulates an even stronger invitation for a cultural 
studies inspired approach to privacy when he makes clear that privacy is “itself a form of 
social control that emerges from a society's norms”70. In other words, our understanding 
of privacy is constantly negotiated and highly contingent on changing cultural norms and 
involves a balancing of both individual and collective/societal interests. Only such a 
flexible and dynamic interpretation allows for an interpretive and analytical framework 
that looks at the social in its entire complexity. Lastly, Solove argues “privacy must be 
mapped like terrain”71. He draws on pragmatic philosophy and declares that “privacy 
issues should be worked out contextually rather than in the abstract”72. 
Helen Nissenbaum is another legal scholar, whose work overlaps greatly with the 
ideas of cultural studies. Nissenbaum has invested a great deal of work into the 
69 Daniel J.Solove “'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy” San Diego Law 
Review 44 2007. p.756.
70 Ibid. p.763.
71 Daniel J. Solove Understanding Privacy p.ix.
72 Ibid. p.40.
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development of the contextual integrity model, according to which the privacy of an 
individual is violated, when that person feels that information no longer flows 
appropriately73. Nissenbaum claims that what enrages people about the current privacy 
crisis is not 
that contemporary systems and practices of information gathering, aggregation, 
analysis, and dissemination [...] diminish our control and pierce our secrecy, but 
that they transgress context-relative informational norms”. [These norms, she 
adds,] “preserve the integrity of the social contexts in which we live our lives, 
and they support and promote the ends, purposes, and values around which these 
contexts are oriented.74
Moreover, Nissenbaum ascertains that “the private/public dichotomy is not useful as 
foundation of a normative concept of privacy”75 – an insight that was discussed before 
vis-a-vis the case study Facebook. 
While I and other critical media studies scholars such as Zizi Papacharissi applaud 
her attempt to lay to rest the private/public dichotomy – Nissenbaum unfortunately still  
clings on to the idea of relatively stable social contexts. This is particularly problematic  
when she defines privacy as “a right to context-appropriate flows”76. In so doing, she 
underestimates the ways in which social network sites such as Facebook have made it 
increasingly difficult to speak of separate contexts to begin with. At the very least, we 
need to realize that contexts increasingly overlap and blur on Facebook. How then, to 
argue with Nissenbaum, is information published on my Facebook profile valid in one 
context while simultaneously violating the norms of another context?
Nissenbaum's argument is clearly useful when information flows from one 
73 Helen Nissenbaum Privacy in Context p.2.
74 Ibid. p.186.
75 Ibid. p.16.
76 Ibid. p.187.
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institutional or corporate context to another. For instance, when third parties purchase 
personal information from Facebook and then use it for unrelated commercial purposes, 
the contextual integrity of this particular piece of personal information is clearly violated.  
Similarly, if the government, as part of their massive surveillance campaign, demands 
data from Facebook's servers, the sovereignty of the boundaries that mark contextual 
integrity are ignored, too. The problem lies in the fact that these are different types of 
privacy violations. Thus, we should not commit the mistake and reduce them to one 
problem of contextual integrity. Nevertheless, despite this shortcoming, Nissenbaum's 
proposal encourages us to think about the particularities of contexts.
Jonathan Sterne explains that cultural studies “is primarily concerned with the 
production of context for a text, […] how the possibilities for meaning are themselves 
organized”77. Why do we think about privacy the way we do? How are our tastes and 
expectations for privacy shaped and why are certain aspects seemingly more important 
than others to us at this very moment? Answers to these questions are generally ignored 
by the legal scholarship on privacy but of critical importance to cultural studies. 
Lawrence Grossberg has made it a tenet of his writing to stress that cultural studies relies 
on “radical contextualism” and described cultural studies as “the discipline of 
contextuality”78 and as “a theory of how contexts are made, unmade, and remade”79.
In a recent interview he re-emphasized this point by saying that “cultural studies 
is not [about a particular object], it's about the context, in which [said object matters]”80. 
77 Jonathan Sterne “Thinking The Internet. Cultural Studies Versus the Millenium” p.262.
78 Lawrence Grossberg “Cultural Studies: What's in a Name (One More Time)” Taboo 1.Spring 1995. 
p.10.
79 Ibid. p.18.
80 Comment by Lawrence Grossberg to James Hay in an interview for Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 10.1 2013. p.73.
133
Consequently, an approach to PIP inspired by cultural cultural produces an entirely new 
catalogue of research questions all of which are concerned with why PIP matters to us to 
such an extend at this very moment. The move away from the object to the question of 
why said object matters, finally puts an end to the cumbersome definitional debate 
rightfully lamented by Solove and Cohen alike.
This shifting emphasis brings with it, of course, a host of issues that are difficult 
to solve (and are certainly impossible to address in this short essay). When confronted 
with the question, how one would know when the “right” context for a particular object 
was remade, Grossberg introduces the term conjuncturalism81, which I have used 
throughout the dissertation, to signal that the specificity of the particular research project 
defines the boundaries of the context at stake. Recalling discussions with Stuart Hall over 
how to define a particular conjuncture relevant for their own projects, Grossberg admits 
that such an attempt is always already flawed and its boundaries debatable. The point is, 
however, that these discussions or even these disagreements are productive as they force 
us to reconsider the relationship between an object and its context. Most importantly, 
Grossberg insists on articulation as “the methodological face of a radically contextualist 
theory”82.
In other words, in order to remake the context within which PIP issues need to be 
investigated, it is important to understand that there is not one single reason or issue that 
explains the increasing panic over the loss of privacy. To use Slack and Wise again, 
“rather, there are multiple dimensions that need to be understood in order to get an 
81 Ibid. pp. 73 and 89.
82 Lawrence Grossberg “Cultural Studies: What's in a Name (One More Time)” p.18.
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adequate grasp of the place [of PIP] in contemporary culture”83. The concept of 
articulation draws our attention to the possible yet not necessary connections between 
people, things, and practices that constitute the social. The theory of articulation 
functions, therefore, as a useful reminder to understand PIP as a daily, dynamic practice.
Thinking about PIP in terms of articulation requires scholars to go beyond merely 
the legal concepts which are but one component among many different dimensions of the 
assemblage. Further following Slack and Wise, PIP issues in the post 9/11 United States 
need to be understood as “being particular contingent relationships among (at least)”84 
notions of space (the public/private dichotomy), the emergence of new technologies (such 
as Facebook), physical arrangements (such as the proliferation of surveillance cameras or 
other surveillance technologies like body scanners), new forms of crime such as identity 
theft, the financial crisis and the perception of growing social and economic inequality 
which seems to serve a small minority, and so on.
In theory at least, all articulations can be re-articulated, that means they can be 
undone and remade. Slack and Wise employ Stuart Hall to remind us that some 
articulations, however, are harder to undo and are more firmly welded together. Hall used 
the term “lines of tendential force”85 to indicate that disarticulation and rearticulation are 
always a theoretical possibility but sometimes prove difficult or nearly impossible in 
“real” life. 
Anita Allen has unknowingly pointed to one of these firm articulations already 
and has suggested the benefit of re-articulating this particular connection for women – 
83 Slack and Wise Culture+Technology. A Primer. p.126.
84 Slack and Wise Culture+Technology. A Primer. p.128.
85 Quoted in Slack and Wise p.128.
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namely the connection between privacy and safety. Many other feminist scholars have 
pointed out that women have often suffered from this seemingly steady connection 
between the idea of home and the idea of safety. Yet, despite evidence to the contrary, the 
broader public continues to hold on to this idea especially in countries such as the United 
States where the privacy of the home is constitutionally protected.
Above, I mentioned how Grossberg wants cultural studies to be the study not only 
of context but of conjunctures. Slack and Wise introduce the term “constellation” which, 
in turn, they borrow from the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to 
initiate a conversation about yet another concept useful to a cultural studies approach to 
privacy: that is assemblage. They introduce it in order to understand how all the different 
articulations fit together. 
Grossberg, in an recent interview with James Hay, uses the analogy to an epoch to 
explain the necessity for such an analytical step. Can we, for instance, identify a starting 
point or event or even a change in terms of the meaning of PIP which would indicate a 
new constellation? If so, how and why did this particular constellation emerge and and 
why has there been a shift from the previous arrangement of articulations? In short, and 
to go back to Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage or a conjuncture “is a particular 
constellation of articulations that selects, draws together, stakes out and envelops a 
territory that exhibits some tenacity and effectivity”86.
Again, legal scholars such as Julie E. Cohen already started the conversation 
about the value of “hybrid assemblages” for the interpretation of privacy already. Yet, 
what I argue here is that she has missed to initiate an active exchange between the robust 
86 Ibid. p.129.
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body of literature that cultural studies scholars of technology and media have created 
over the last two decades and her own group of legal scholars. To be fair, her goal is to 
battle the idea of the autonomous subject as central tenet of legal theory and instead, 
introduce the concept of the socially constructed subject to U.S. Privacy theorists87; a 
scholarly project, Cultural Studies scholars can only applaud. 
Similarly, her arguments that a “privacy analysis for the information age must 
focus on something other than physical location”88, and “the ability to control the terms of 
self-exposure in networked space is largely illusory”89 fall right within the research 
program of cultural studies scholars. That is why my goal is not so much a criticism of 
Cohen but the attempt to outline already existing similarities between her work and 
cultural studies, to strengthen the bridges that exist between the two bodies of scholarly 
work, and to push the conversation even further.
 In an interesting theoretical move, Cohen seems to open and at the same time 
close such a theoretical space. For instance, she borrows from Haggerty and Ericson the 
concept of surveillant assemblage, which is defined as:
A heterogeneous set of public and private processes that are interlinked and seek 
to harness the raw power of information by fixing flows of information 
cognitively and spatially […] as part of surveillance society [which] is not the 
grim social dystopia that privacy advocates have assumed – and that privacy 
skeptics argue has failed to materialize. In return for its benefits and pleasures, 
however, surveillant assemblage demands full enrollment.90
While it seems as if Facebook epitomizes the idea of a surveillant assemblage, it narrows 
the discussion of what it means to use Facebook. In its own way and by requiring “full 
87 See Julie E. Cohen's discussion of the evolving nature of the subject in her book Configuring the 
Networked Self p.110.
88 Ibid. p.142.
89 Ibid. p.145.
90 Quoted in Julie E. Cohen Configuring the Networked Self p.137.
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enrollment”, surveillant assemblage forecloses a conversation that centers around the 
contradictory user practices and a CS approach that wants to focus on the struggle over 
the meaning of privacy.
Again, the conceptual parallels between cultural studies and Solove's new 
theoretical framework for privacy are striking. What becomes important is how certain 
understanding(s) of privacy are organized and how some meanings are selected over 
others. Moreover, research questions are concerned with the ways in which certain 
meanings of privacy are foregrounded by certain actors, who, in turn, play a particular 
role within a constellation of multiple elements. Understanding how these elements are 
organized and mapped onto a particular territory then becomes a fundamentally new task 
and challenge in the scholarly attempt to grasp the relevance of and relationship between 
PIP and culture.
The concept of assemblage, in other words, provides yet another way to better 
understand PIP. Understanding the assemblage that makes up the different meanings of 
PIP forces us to think about people (who are concerned about their privacy), practices 
(privacy understood as a daily task), all sorts of tangible things (surveillance cameras) 
and less tangible things (such as Facebook), but also “a range of other kinds of bodies: 
human bodies, governmental bodies, economic bodies, geographical bodies, bodies of 
knowledge, and so on”91.
Cohen's own definition of privacy as “an interest in breathing room to engage in 
socially situated processes of boundary management”92 seems more along these lines. I 
91 Ibid. p.130.
92 Ibid. p.149.
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understand her definition as an attempt to conceptualize agency for the purpose of 
understanding privacy. She, thus engages one of the fundamental issues cultural studies is 
concerned with, namely the relationship between the individual ability to bend space and 
to make something happen and the social and material constrains which prevent 
individual agency. Cultural studies scholars typically take this assumption as point of 
departure for their analyses and cite Marx's phrase that people make their own history but 
not under conditions of their own choosing. They thus signal the ultimate departure from 
the liberal tradition of privacy and begin a new conversation about the value, meaning, 
and role of PIP now.
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Teaching PIP – Introducing a New Curriculum
Posting something online is almost as bad as getting a tattoo, […]. The act of 
pulling it off or making it disappear ultimately is expensive, and it's never 
complete. No matter what you do about it, it leaves a little scar.1
Social networks are amassing about a thousand times more data about us then 
they were a year ago. We don't really know what it means yet, or how it will 
impact us, […]. What people don't realize is that every one of these buttons is 
like one of those dark video cameras. If you see them, they see you.2
 I am a critical media studies scholar interested in the intersections of privacy studies, 
cultural studies, and media studies. This final dissertation chapter is my attempt to offer a 
contribution that can be readily applied to teaching. That is why this chapter culminates  
in a syllabus that is designed with a college class room in mind. I want to emphasize, that 
the basic ideas and the philosophy that shape this syllabus as well as my pedagogical 
approach to PIP, are applicable to any teaching environment. Since it is not just students, 
whose lives are impacted by the ways in which they use media, raising awareness for the 
importance of PIP is a mission that transcends university campuses. That is one of the 
many reasons why my teaching approach takes inspiration from cultural studies. The 
formidable cultural theorist bell hooks explains the fascination of cultural studies with the 
following words:
To me, that's the exciting dimension of cultural studies, that it can take place, not 
as me writing a privatized article, but as a response to students asking what type 
of critical thinking allows them to engage this cultural production in a way that 
informs our political practice.3
1 Paco Underhill, consumer researcher, quoted in Ylan Q. Mui. “In shoppers' Web networks, privacy has 
no price tag” The Washington Post May 22, 2010 p.A01.
2 Rob Shavell, a co-founder of Abine – a privacy software maker, quoted in Riva Richmond. “As 'Like' 
Buttons spread, so do Facebook's tentacles” The New York Times Bits Blog September 27, 2011.
3 Quoted in  John Storey “Cultural Studies: an introduction” in What is Cultural Studies? A Reader. John 
Storey. London: Arnold, 1996. p.5.
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Teaching PIP or any subject for that matter, means being able to answer questions by 
non-academics, the quintessential task of cultural studies according to Lawrence 
Grossberg4.
I have to admit, after having taught a class on “Communication in the age of 
Twitter and Facebook”, I was shocked to learn how little my students contemplated their 
own PIP. Despite empirical evidence to the contrary5, I found myself confronted with 
students, who were incredibly insecure, sometimes even naïve, with regard to the 
complex dimensions of PIP. Many of my students were the living prove for Andrejevic's 
observation that we rely on these technologies for socialization because “they provide a 
ready, convenient, and entertaining way of enriching, extending, and preserving our 
connections with others”6. 
If I wanted to teach students something about the value of PIP in the context of 
social network sites, dismissing the usefulness of social network sites such as Facebook, 
as one possible strategy to increase student's control over personal information, surely did 
not describe a useful teaching strategy. Moreover, my knowledge of dana boyd's research 
about the extensive tactics with which young people sought to protect their online PIP, 
made contributions of behavioral scientists such as Alessandro Acquisi7 equally 
dissatisfying. Acquisi argues that in theory, we all are concerned about our PIP but this 
4 Lawrence Grossberg “Cultural Studies: What's in a name (one more time)?” Taboo p.22.
5 The PEW Internet and American Life Project reports that 85 percent of Facebook and 24 percent of  
Twitter users have some sort of privacy protection mechanism in place. The PEW Internet & American 
Life Project “Teens, Social Media and Privacy” data can be accessed here:  
http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/2013/Teens-Social-Media-And-Privacy.aspx
6 Mark Andrejevic “Social Network Exploitation” in Zizi Papacharissi A Networked Self p.88.
7 Quoted in Somini Sengupta “Letting down our guard with web privacy” New York Times March 13, 
2013.  <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/web-privacy-and-how-consumers-let-down-
their-guard.html?_r=1&>
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concern does not translate into our actual daily activities. Focussing exclusively on the 
perils of online activities seemed to, at best, present a similarly limited approach to PIP. I  
began to question, whether critical scholarship could provide any meaningful approach to 
PIP.
However, after writing this dissertation, I am convinced that classes in 
communication studies and media studies offer one possible space to alert students to the 
increasingly vital role PIP plays in their lives. Since I take great inspiration from Nick 
Couldry's socially oriented media theory, which focuses on the whole range of “social 
processes that media constitute and enable”8, the curriculum I propose could be a starting 
point for a discussion that transcends the boundaries of communication studies 
departments. Doing media studies from a perspective that is less-media centric but that 
looks at the entire social, cultural, economic, and politic spectrum invites the active 
exchange with other disciplines such as technology studies, anthropology, sociology or 
even computer sciences to name just a few.
Nevertheless, the context of critical digital media studies is probably best suited 
for interrogating the meaning and relevance of PIP from a perspective that acknowledges 
that our notion of PIP is “directly oriented to media, involve media, [or are] conditioned 
by media”9. Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that our expectations and tastes 
for PIP are constitutive of who we are as citizens and, hence, are foundational to the ways 
in which we shape and make sense of our democracy. If both media and PIP play such a 
fundamentally important role in our lives as citizens, it seems only plausible to develop a 
8 Nick Couldry Media, Society, World p.8.
9 Nick Couldry Media, Society, World p.180.
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curriculum that helps students to investigate this particular relationship.
My curriculum borrows Nick Couldry's wonderful question “what role should 
media play in our lives”10 and sends students on an exploration tour of their own 
embedded media habits as far as their personal information privacy is concerned. 
However, the goal of such an endeavor must be to go even further, as Couldry 
emphasizes, and should ask what it would mean to live a good life with media or “what is 
it to live ethically with, and through, media?”11 PIP is, as this dissertation demonstrates, 
an increasingly important dimension of this question, albeit one that remains overlooked 
and under-explored. A shortcoming that the proposed syllabus at the end of the chapter 
seeks to mitigate.
I propose that the extremely polarizing ways of talking about PIP, which I quoted 
at the very beginning of this chapter, teach us very little about the actual value and role of  
PIP since they fail to provide students the tools necessary to negotiate the their own role 
vis-a-vis PIP. Instead, my teaching approach proposes three separate but arguably related 
ways of thinking about PIP: (a) the political and ordinary dimension of PIP, (b) the 
relationship between accountability and PIP, and (c ) the pragmatist approach to PIP. It is 
important to emphasize that these ideas are interconnected and cannot and should not be 
separated as neatly as this writing suggests. Instead, the goal of the curriculum is to foster 
a teaching environment in which all three ideas work simultaneously. Finally, while the 
ideas remain rather abstract, they ultimately lead to lesson plans and exercises that help 
students to apply the discussion to very concrete problems in their lives.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p.28.
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First, PIP (just like culture) is ordinary, a constitutive element of us becoming who 
we are, and an increasingly important aspect of our everyday experiences. Hence, PIP is a 
political practice because people actively participate in the meaning making processes  
that shape PIP at the current conjuncture. Conceptualizing PIP as ordinary “grounds” the 
concept and, to say it with Lawrence Grossberg, “begins where the people are”12. 
Secondly, teaching PIP requires us to investigate the extend and degree of 
accountability for our own activities as well as the activities of other people. What are the 
very standards against which I hold myself and others accountable with regard to PIP? 
Should we rely on individuals to account for the ways in which information flows – lets 
say from one Facebook account to another? What are possible processes that help to 
negotiate accountability for information flows in contexts that affect more than one 
individual? What are ways in which we should hold governments or corporations 
accountable for the channeling and protection of certain information flows?
Post-privacy advocates dismiss the notion of collective accountability and, 
instead, favor radical individual accountability. However, somewhere else in this 
dissertation, I quoted Allen's critique of the traditional liberal approach to privacy and its  
negative impact on marginalized groups. For Anita Allen, accountability is foundational 
to her work13. To her, privacy is our “repose [from social participation] and accountability 
our engagement [with social participation]”14. In the context of Facebook, students must 
be reminded that their individual actions have ethical consequences. Being accountable 
12 Lawrence Grossberg. “Cultural Studies: What's in a Name (One more time)” Taboo 1 Spring, 1995. 
p.22.
13 Among other places, Anita Allen discusses the nature of accountability in the Daniel J. Meador Lecture,  
delivered 2003 and titled: “Privacy is not everything: Accountability as a personal and social good” 
published in Alabama Law Review 54.4 2003 pp. 1375-1391.
14 Ibid. p.1376.
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means that you take into consideration that your personal communication habits, such as 
trading away your own privacy for certain benefits, might have. In a recent study, the 
PEW research center has found out that “others posting things about you or pictures of 
you without permission” ranks on top of a list of Facebook activities that its users 
strongly dislike15. In other words, thinking about accountability requires students to leave 
behind the egoistical perspective that is all to easy to adopt when you are sitting in front 
of your computer in your own room.
Interestingly, thinking about PIP from an accountability perspective does not 
mean to dismiss the participation in online networking at all. In fact, when students 
investigate the stakes involved in their engagement with social participation, they might  
find out that giving away a particular amount of information about themselves is 
perfectly justified in light of the value they gain by having access to a network of friends. 
I, myself, have negotiated the value of this exchange many times as my personal social 
network spans multiple continents and thousands of miles. While I am keenly aware of 
Facebook's privacy problems, I have yet to quit my account. Instead, in my 
communication activities, I try to be accountable towards my friends and Facebook's 
curious data tentacles.
Overall, the dialectical relationship between PIP and accountability encourages 
students to think about the ways in which the norms, values, expectations, and tastes that 
shape this relationship are also products of a particular historical context. This approach 
teaches students that our standards for accountability can best be described as a web of 
15 Aaron Smith “6 new Facts about Facebook” PEW Research Center February 3, 2014. 
<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/>
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relationships that is “both flexible and sticky”16. 
The accountability net is sticky “in the sense that socially determined and 
reinforced expectations impel us” to act in certain ways in certain contexts. At the same 
time though, the accountability net is flexible “in the sense that we have a good sense of 
freedom to stretch and mold the connections to suit individual taste”17. Students must be 
taught to recognize the very fact that both the meaning of accountability as well as the 
meaning of PIP are constantly negotiated, made, and unmade. This, in turn,  requires 
students to contemplate their role and the extend to which they actively participate in the  
making of these standards with respect to their friends, families, coworkers, and 
acquaintances within all the many overlapping contexts pertinent to their daily lives.  
More abstractly, it forces students to reflect on the relationship between their own agency 
and certain structural constrains in order to evaluate how sticky yet flexible their very 
own accountability net truly is18.
Thirdly, students must be equipped with a pragmatic attitude towards PIP that 
“refuses any and all dreams of universal, absolute, complete, and perfect truth”19. Guided 
by this “intellectual modesty”, students are taught to contextualize and historicize the 
revolutionary claims made by the various engines of discourse that I introduced 
throughout the dissertation. These can include statements which celebrate Facebook's 
commitment to radical transparency, arguments about the a-political nature of post-
16 Anita Allen discusses the nature of accountability in the Daniel J. Meador Lecture, delivered 2003 and 
titled: “Privacy is not everything: Accountability as a personal and social good” published in Alabama 
Law Review 54.4 2003 p.1389.
17 Ibid.
18 I thank my advisor Gil Rodman for alerting me to this dimension of the accountability argument.
19 Lawrence Grossberg Cultural Studies in the Future Tense p.9 and also James Carey “Historical 
Pragmatism and the Internet”.
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privacy, or the general tendency to view PIP's destiny as doomed. The goal of my 
teaching approach to PIP is to enable students to complicate these narratives in ways that 
allows them to re-discover their own agency.
Moreover, the goal of the curriculum is to make students aware of a paradox, 
namely to install in the them a keen sense for the importance of PIP, while debunking 
alarmist and all too ambitious arguments that render privacy as the one and only issue at 
stake in the shifting boundaries that mark personal and private information. Such an 
approach to PIP creates the space to address the number of important yet not inevitable 
connections between PIP, capitalism, politics, and culture. It facilitates a bottom-up 
understanding of PIP and encourages students to actively think about their own political 
stakes within the debate.
My approach to teaching PIP describes a radical departure from and break with the 
technological and market-place approaches to PIP that journalists and Facebook advocate 
for in the previous chapters. A number of scholars point to the flaws of technological 
solutions. James Grimmelmann convincingly argues that Facebook offers ample 
“evidence for the surprising ineffectiveness of technical controls [of privacy]”20. 
The main problem with relying on technical solutions is of course that students do 
not learn to consider alternative ways of conceptualizing PIP that exist outside of 
Facebook's technological infrastructure. In the absence of viable alternatives, users have 
to rely on the PIP protection measures, which are always already situated within 
Facebook's data use policy. Hence, these solutions help little to alleviate the actual harm 
that emanates form Facebook's rather lax approach to its users' PIP. In other words, 
20 James Grimmelmann “Saving Facebook” Iowa Law Review 94. 2009. p.1140.
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technological solutions usually fail to account for the ways in which either a protective or 
an adverse PIP attitude is already integral to web services.
Lawrence Lessig is probably the most prominent advocate of this architectural 
approach to digital PIP.  The point he convincingly makes, is that the architecture of an 
organization such as Facebook already determines whether individuals will be “able to 
control information about themselves”21. Teaching students the ways in which certain 
political and economic motivations are intrinsic components of web architecture,  forces 
us to interrogate the question of regulation more broadly. 
“Who regulates us?” is the difficult question that Lessig wants us to contemplate. 
Thinking about the possible ways in which governments, commerce, social and cultural 
norms, and architecture each regulate what we can do online, encourages students to 
scrutinize the extent to which any single form of regulation can ever propose a 
satisfactory condition for the protection of PIP22.
Ira S. Rubinstein's plea for “Regulating Privacy by design” provides an 
impressive overview of similar arguments. Her proposal is particularly relevant to my 
subject as she convincingly describes the ways in which PET (privacy enhancing 
technologies) are unable to effectively deal with today's challenges to PIP. In other words, 
a curriculum based on technological solutions establishes an “inward-looking” 
perspective rather than a context-specific perspective. It risks that contemplating PIP 
remains limited to “how-to” questions rather than inquiries into the political, cultural, and 
economic ideologies that motivated Facebook's infrastructure in the first place. 
21 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 p.231.
22 I thank Gil Rodman again for helping me understand Lessig's larger intellectual project and for bringing 
to my attention the ways in which Lessig so effectively deconstructs the multiple dimensions of the idea 
of regulation.
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Grimmelman warns that “[t]he availability of technical controls further invite 
users to think in terms of boundedness, even though the actual network boundaries are 
highly porous”23. Instead, students need to be reminded that the new information reality 
online is characterized by hyperfluidity. For example, my students still envisioned the 
various google services (google mail, chat etc) as bounded services rather than 
interconnected parts of the google empire, all designed to collect data from us. Moreover, 
many of my students were shocked to learn that the now ubiquitous “Like” button allows 
Facebook to track user activities beyond the boundaries of the actual website. If we limit 
teaching PIP to technological solutions, we fail to install in the students the ability to 
distinguish between the world they experience as Facebook user and the world as it 
presents itself to the Facebook corporation.
Yet, making students aware of this distinction is crucial in order to understand the 
means by which corporations such as Facebook or google attempt to become an 
indispensable utility to social life itself. To de-naturalize this processes is one of the 
principle tasks of teaching the political dimension of PIP. Interestingly and in surprising 
ways, this argument pays homage to Jenkins' convergence culture claim. He argues that 
whereas the “collective intelligence/power” of most web 2.0 processes “is so far mostly 
used through our recreational life, soon we will be deploying those skills for more 
'serious' purposes”24.
In addition, the exclusive emphasis on technical solutions bears the risk of 
adopting a world view that reduces everything to 0 and 1. danah boyd reminds us that 
23 Ibid. p.19.
24 Henry Jenkins Convergence Culture p.4.
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[t]he tech world has a tendency to view the concept of 'private' as a single bit 
that is either 0 or 1. Data is either exposed or not. [But] privacy is not simply 
about the state of an inanimate object or set of bytes; it is about the sense of 
vulnerability that an individual experiences when negotiating data.25
Grimmelmann ads:
We think about privacy in terms of social rules and social roles, not in terms of 
access control lists and file permissions. Thus, when given the choice, users 
almost always spurn or misuse technical controls, turning instead to social 
norms of appropriateness and on informal assessments of practical obscurity.26
Rather than proposing an independent solution to the PIP challenges of our current 
conjuncture, technical questions should be understood as entry point into a debate about 
broader and more systemic issues. For instance, Facebook's granular control approach to 
PIP very much leads to and requires a debate about whether PIP should be regulated 
according to an opt-in or an opt-out model – each of which are based on fundamentally 
different assumptions about the relationship between individuals and society. 
Europeans, for instance, are hugely skeptical towards Facebook's privacy policy 
and support governmental intervention for the sake of the protection of user privacy. A 
majority of US Americans, on the other hand, mostly fear and reject governmental 
intervention. Whitman attributes this outspoken skepticism to “a European interest in 
personal integrity, threatened primarily by the mass media” and contrasts it with US 
American interests in “liberty”27. Arguably, there is not one monolithic European attitude 
towards privacy just as there are massive regional differences within the United States, 
when it comes to the interpretation of constitutional rights. While each national culture is  
25 Danah boyd “Facebook's Privacy Trainwreck” Convergence: The International Journal of Research  
into New Media Technologies 14.1 2008. p.14.
26 Grimmelmann “Saving Facebook” Iowa Law Review 94. 2009. p.36.
27 James Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty” Yale Law Journal  
p.1219.
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itself fractured, Germany seems to be a haven for privacy advocates within the EU, as its 
law-makers are recognized as staunch defenders of PIP and bold adversaries to US 
American companies such as Facebook28. And even here, regional differences in pro-
privacy attitudes vary. Nevertheless Whitman's article illustrates, going beyond the 
limitations of a purely technological discourse allows students to internationalize and de-
provincilize technological solutions to PIP.
In an effort to pursue a transnational and thus comparative perspective to PIP and 
Facebook, students should be invited to discuss among others the European Data 
Protection Directive 95/46 EC29, the European Convention on Human Rights30, or the 
OECD Privacy Guidelines31. Comparative assignments should, however, not be limited to 
European or US American contexts but, instead, should look at the ways in which privacy 
is an important issue to societies around the world. What are the contexts that shape the 
assumably different understandings of privacy around the globe? This assignment is 
particularly useful for the integration of international students, whose unique perspective 
28 For two brief analyses in English: Heather Horn “Germany's War with Facebook and Google over 
privacy” The Atlantic December 2012. 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/germanys-war-with-facebook-and-google-
over-privacy/248914/> and David Meyer “The Schleswig-Holstein Question” BBC News September 10, 
2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14859813>
29 James Whitman for instance ascertains that in contrast to the US, the 1996 European Community 
Directive on Data Protection while far from perfect at least recognizes some of the dimensions of 
privacy 2004. p.8.
30 Daniel J Solove adds to Whitman a rich discussion of the differences between US American approaches  
to privacy and the European understanding. For instance he highlights how the European Convention on 
Human Rights states in Art 15: “Member states shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to 
a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based 
solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, 
such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.” The European Convention 
on Human Rights furthermore states in Art 8: “prohibits the processing of personal data revealing racial  
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life”(Solove The Digital Person p.107)
31 Internationally, OECD Privacy Guidelines provide that 'personal data should be relevant to the purposes 
for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate,  
complete, and kept-up-to-date'”(Solove The Digital Person p.106).
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can contribute to an enlightening discussion.
In addition to technological solutions to secure our PIP, the market for privacy 
enhancing technology (PET) proposes a second popular yet equally dissatisfying 
approach to teaching PIP. Adam Thierer advances what he calls the “3E approach” in 
order to advocate a “more bottom-up, multifaceted, and evolutionary”32 way of thinking 
about privacy. His 3Es stand for education, empowerment, and enforcement, the three 
principles to facilitate “critical thinking” and “digital citizenship” as educational goals.  
Accordingly, teaching PIP to students must include the following measures:
(a) how to use whatever controls are built-in to the browsers, (b) how to 
distinguish between advertising and editorial content, (c ) how to evaluate 
whatever information they come across to be able to make informed choices, (d) 
to maintain a smarter online hygiene (sensible personal data use) and 
'netiquette'(proper behavior toward others), and (e) to avoid the dangers of over-
sharing.33
To Thierer, it is particularly important that we find ways to “enhancing online safety 
without sweeping regulations”. In other words, Thierer's applied theory to PIP is 
emblematic for some of the broader US American political sentiments that Whitman 
highlighted above. He goes out of his way in order to establish firm boundaries for 
possible governmental interventions into the regulation of PIP.
Government officials can take steps to encourage the use of PETs, but it is even 
more essential that they do not block or discourage their use. For example, 
limitations on encryption technologies or mandates requiring that web surfers 
use online age verification or identity authentication technologies would 
undermine user efforts to shield their privacy.34
Thierer insists that his 3E approach is particularly suited for the US American context 
32 Adam Thierer “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World where Information Control is Failing” Harvard  
Journal of Law & Public Policy 36. 2013. p.437.
33 Adam Thierer pp.438/439.
34 Ibid. p.446.
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because of its great emphasis on “both free speech rights and the importance of online 
commerce and innovation”35. Accordingly, what is needed to enforce new ways of 
protecting privacy is not regulation because “a plethora of privacy laws, data security-
related statutes, and other consumer protection policies already exist.” These are, as he 
goes on to argue,  “[…] no substitute for a more educated, empowered, and responsible 
citizenry”36.
On first sight, the 3Es promise a comprehensive teaching curriculum and integrate 
a number of arguments widely circulated among privacy advocates. Yet, the pro-market 
attitude undergirding Thierer's 3E approach leads to important gaps in understanding PIP. 
It is Thierer's instant dismissal of governmental regulation as un-American, his 
unquestioned embrace of the self-regulatory power of markets, and the fact that the 3Es 
approach “assumes and depends upon a certain amount of personal and parental 
responsibility”37, that dwarfs the approaches' educational potential.
Why are Thierer's suggestions not enough? Could his 3E approach not describe 
the best possible scenario given the current political circumstances? Did not the first 
chapter of my dissertation outline the government's reluctancy to actively regulate 
privacy policies for information corporations and online commerce? I argue that even if 
we accept that the government is not willing to regulate corporations, Thierer is all too 
accepting of the fact that parents and users themselves are responsible for educating 
themselves about privacy.
Even if we accept that governmental regulation plays a limited role in the US 
35 Ibid. p.412.
36 Adam Thierer “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World where Information Control is Failing” Harvard  
Journal of Law & Public Policy 36. 2013. p.454.
37 Ibid. p.437.
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American context, my discussion of the HEW fair information principles shows that we 
cannot let the current administration of the hook quite so easily. Previous administrations 
experienced backlash against overly ambitious regulatory attempts as well, yet they took 
a much more pro-citizen stand than the current administration. Therefore, the symbolic 
power of demanding the current government to refrain from its pro-business attitude is 
far from trivial. In fact, if we want students to consider alternative options to the 
corporate PIP-is-dead narrative, the government should return to the pro-citizen rhetoric 
it facilitated in the 1970s.
Moreover, as I said before, the government has to inevitably play an active role in 
the regulation of PIP since the government is involved in how cyberspace overall is 
regulated. My investigation of the White House Guidelines on Consumer Privacy 
demonstrates that Thierer's dismissal of governmental action only camouflages the very 
fact that the government already plays a problematic role in the debates over and battles  
for ordinary people's PIP. For example, the White House Guidelines actively discourage 
the use of PETs. Bracketing the government's role makes it more difficult to analyze how 
Facebook, the White House, and Capitol Hill have developed an increasingly symbiotic 
rather than the check-and-balance relationship they are supposed to have. On top of this, 
parts of the NSA scandal revealed that the government actively pursues an arms race 
against encryption technology (one of the PETs Thierer promotes) with little tolerance for 
the PIP interests of the ordinary people38.
That is why student empowerment and digital citizenship must include the ability 
38 Zachary Graves “The NSA war against encryption” September 10, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zachary-graves/the-nsas-war-against-encr_b_3901328.html 
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to look critically at the government's role. Such critical inquiry should not be limited to 
the stereotypical and dichotomous big-government versus small-government argument , 
as Thierer suggests. Instead, what is at stake is the student's ability not to take the 
government's role for granted but to look at the specific ways in which it describes one 
actor among many to shape the meaning of PIP at the current conjuncture.
Whereas Thierer rightly insists that regulation alone can never satisfy the 
changing expectations and tastes for PIP, students must be taught to develop the ability to 
explore the often-times complex and troublesome connections between corporate and 
governmental interests. In so doing, they need to learn to go beyond simply assuming that 
more government means more laws and more top-down market regulation.
If regulation in the US at the current conjuncture does not describe a reasonable 
option for change, Thierer's 3E approach should consider other options to level the 
playing field. Placing the burden on individual actions will simply not be a successful 
strategy. For instance, Thierer's ambitious list of essential skills explains how young 
people need to be taught “how to distinguish between advertising and editorial 
comment”. The fact that it proved impossibly difficult to distinguish between a sponsored 
article about Scientology and regular The Atlantic content39, illustrates how it has become 
incredibly difficult even for professionals to make these judgements. 
Counter to Thierer's assessment, the Atlantic moment is another incident that 
underscores the need to thoroughly discuss the role of the government. In chapter one, I 
39 Here is a critical analysis of the scientology advertising that appeared in The Atlantic. Josh Vorhees 
from Slate magazine argues convincingly that the small yellow disclaimer right above the article hardly 
represents a satisfactory warning sign to identify the sponsored nature of this fake editorial. 
<http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/01/15/the_atlantic_scientology_magazine_yanks_sponsor
ed_content_after_outcry.html>
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criticized the fact that the White House guidelines refrain from any type of regulation of 
data collection for statistical purposes. It is precisely this type of business, as Joseph 
Turrow shows, that “is destroying traditional publishing ethics by forcing media outlets to 
adapt their traditional content to advertisers' public-relations needs”, [in the Atlantic case 
it was scientology], and slice-and-dice demands”40.
Furthermore, Thierer's reliance on rather static social standards online are another 
reason for a critical intervention. His conceptual framework ignores the managerial, 
relational as well as context-specific, and intensively subjective notion of PIP. Teaching 
PIP should highlight the idea that individuals are active participants in the political and 
the disciplining (dubiously labeled hygienic in Thierer's essay) processes of defining the 
proper netiquette and proper social network behavior. While it is obviously important to 
understand that the violation of any type of social standard might lead to sanctions, our 
teaching should emphasize the bottom-up potential of students investigating these 
processes in the first place.
From Thierer's passages, it becomes clear that he conceives digital citizenship not 
as something that users have to develop from the bottom-up and through permanent 
struggle, but as something that can be pushed-down by institutions. For instance, Thierer 
presents the FTC's guide OnGuard Online as a helpful tool to facilitate digital citizenship. 
In a previous chapter, I have already criticized the FTC's limited scope and ability to help 
ordinary users alleviate their PIP problems effectively. Thierer on the other hand, trusts 
the commission and points out how the guidelines raise “awareness about various 
40 Joseph Turrow The Daily You p.2.
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legitimate online threats, including spyware, phishing, laptop security, and identity 
theft”41. 
Another central tenet of his 3E approach is the thriving market for 'self-help' tools 
and privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that supposedly empower users to take care 
of their privacy online. To him, the existence of an impressive list of PET's “illustrates a 
well‐functioning marketplace that is constantly evolving to offer consumers greater 
control over their privacy without upending online markets through onerous top‐down 
regulatory schemes”42. Thierer advances that a pro-market ideology is fundamental to his 
3E approach for teaching PIP, since only a vibrant market “meets new challenges”43.
When Thierer makes users accountable for ignoring the various PET tools, his 
argument effectively resembles that of Facebook. Critical media studies scholars feel 
reminded of Eileen Mehan's argument in Why TV is not our Fault, when Thierer laments 
that users fail to take advantage of the opportunities the PET market provides to them. 
Similarly, Turrow's research shows that blaming users really misses the point that “the 
rhetoric of consumer power [is already loosing] credibility”. 
PETs can hardly function as meaningful defense mechanisms for user PIP, when 
consumer power is being replaced by “a rhetoric of esoteric technological and statistical 
knowledge that supports the practice of social discrimination through profiling.”44 Thierer 
seems to say that because most consumers “never take advantage of these empowerment 
tools”45, we cannot blame the marketplace for the deteriorating conditions for protecting 
41 ONGUARDONLINE, http://onguardonline.gov quoted in Thierer p.439.
42 Adam Thierer “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World where Information Control is Failing” Harvard  
Journal of Law & Public Policy 36. 2013. p.445.
43 Ibid. p.440.
44 Joseph Turrow The Daily You p.3.
45 Thierer The Pursuit of Privacy. p.440.
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PIP. Alarming are the ways in which Thierer embraces the myth of the technological fix 
according to which privacy enhancing technology promises consumer empowerment.
Let me shift to what an alternative teaching would actually and concretely look 
like. The following pages propose and discuss some possible readings but mostly explain 
the main ideas that undergird my syllabus. Most importantly, I want to point out that the 
proposition of alternative ideas about PIP in the forms of a variety of readings does not 
suffice to counter the teaching approaches criticized above. Instead, I depart radically 
from technical and pro-market approaches to PIP by connecting the theory with the 
student's own social reality, while not taking for granted the idea of privacy in the first 
place.
Accordingly, the syllabus I propose is influenced partly by John Dewey's ideas on 
education. I adapted his pragmatist writings on education in schools to my interest in PIP. 
Outlining his basic assumptions about what good education must look like, Dewey 
emphasizes how the true center of education is the social activities of our everyday 
lives46. He furthermore declares:
I believe that the only true education comes through the stimulation of the 
child's power by the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself. 
Through these demands he is stimulated to act as a member of a unity, to emerge 
from his original narrowness of action and feeling and to conceive of himself 
from the standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs. Through 
the responses which others make to his own activities he comes to know what 
these mean in social terms. The value which they have is reflected back into 
them.47
The central questions that shape the conversation I am hoping to have with students echo 
46 John Dewey “My Pedagogical Creed” in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (eds.) The 
Essential Dewey Vol.1. p.232.
47 John Dewey “My Pedagogical Creed” in Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (eds.) The 
Essential Dewey Vol.1. p.229.
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Dewey's general observations about the purpose of education. In the course of my class, I 
encourage students to think about the following, more general, questions:
• What does personal information privacy mean for you?
• What are your expectations for PIP when you are online? Are these different from 
when you are not online? If so, how?
• What are the conditions that shape your tastes and expectations for PIP?
• How do you manage your PIP?
• What are some of the practices and tactics you use to protect your PIP?
These questions are not only conversation starters, they also serve as a bridge between 
the theoretical texts I want the students to read and the social reality/context of their lives.  
Hence, the questions fulfill two functions: first, they help to investigate the relationship 
between text and context. Secondly, they not only shape my assignments but they also 
help to take the lessons from class to the everyday lives of my students, hopefully 
teaching them that work in class can make a difference in their everyday lives.
It is precisely the dialectical relationship between theory and the students's actual 
social reality that serves as backdrop for the initial discussion of the ideas behind the 
concept of privacy. The ways in which Daniel J. Soloves's theory of privacy, Helen 
Nissenbaum's work on privacy in context, and Julie E. Cohen's attempts to re-imagine 
privacy present a useful theoretical discussion of the various dimensions of privacy that 
all pertain directly to the students's lives. Obviously, an inquiry into the plethora of ideas 
that shape our expectations for PIP has to also include those voices that suggest the death 
of privacy. Part of this work gets mentioned by the three authors above. Some of those 
ideas I will introduce to the students in a lecture referring to German authors such as 
Christian Heller. Also, post-privacy voices are present throughout the class as art of 
Facebook's commitment to radical transparency and in the work of many journalists.
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However, adopting Dewey's insights forces educators to offer students more than 
text. It also demands that we provide students tools to then use, apply, and test as part of 
their social lives outside of the classroom. In one of his more promising moments, 
Thierer suggested “critical thinking” as one such tool. Unfortunately, he avoids detailed 
instructions about how educators could foster the development of this skill that is so 
difficult to teach in the classroom. My syllabus introduces a number of methods and tools 
for the inquiry into PIP that are constitutive of critical thinking but are more readily 
applicable for students. In other words, rather than announcing the grand goal of turning 
students into critical citizens, Nippert-Eng's managerial approach to privacy, James 
Carey's and Jonathan Sterne's pragmatist approach to claims about technology and the 
internet48, Anita L. Allen's notion of accountability, and Raymond Williams's concept of 
culture as ordinary provide concrete guidelines for how to investigate the PIP at the 
current conjuncture.
Along these lines, danah boyd's and Alice Marwick's research on teenager's 
attitudes towards privacy49 is a great example for how applied theory can offer students 
important scholarship as well as the opportunity to situate a theoretical inquiry within 
their own social reality. In addition to a brief theoretical introduction to privacy, students 
learn from boyd and Marwick that their interviewees were quite actively shaping their 
own notion of PIP. Students are introduced to the complicated consequences of the 
managerial notion of PIP, which include both political agency as well as the structural 
48 For example, students have to read Craig Mundie's “Privacy Pragmatism” approach from Foreign 
Affairs to demonstrate the different ways in which pragmatism can be understood and applied to the 
question of PIP.
49 danah boyd and Alice Marwick “Social privacy in Networked Publics: Teens' attitudes, practices, and 
strategies”
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limitations to this agency. The experiences that teenagers share in boyd's and Marwick's 
study provide students a context to identify with.
One of the central conclusions from boyd and Marwick is that in an information 
society, information is public by default and private by effort. Form this central insight 
follows a very useful in-class exercise that has students check their own Facebook 
privacy settings along with the various web provider options that manage internet 
browsing history, cookie regulations, and tracking settings. 
If the goal of eduction is to guide students in their effort to make sense of issues 
that matter to their social lives, then students must be provided the vocabulary, both in 
terms of abstract ideas as well as actual words, to re-imagine or even reclaim the value of 
PIP. At the very least, students must be enabled to think about and communicate what 
possible expectations for PIP might be when the focus is not on corporate or 
governmental interests but on the interests of ordinary people.
Political scientist Christopher Parson has collected and synthesized the work of a 
group of young scholars, who ignited such a conversation that dares to re-imagine 
people's relationship to social networks sites such as Facebook. Parson's Social Media  
Bill of Rights includes fourteen principles, all of which are designed to empower users 
and to facilitate a bottom-up and more democratic social network infrastructure:
1. Honesty: Honor your privacy policy and terms of service 
2. Clarity: Make sure that policies, terms of service, and settings are easy to 
find and understand 
3. Freedom of speech: Do not delete or modify my data without a clear 
policy and justification 
4. Empowerment : Support assistive technologies and universal 
accessibility 
5. Self-protection: Support privacy-enhancing technologies 
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6. Data minimization: Minimize the information I am required to provide 
and share with others 
7. Control: Let me control my data, and don’t facilitate sharing it unless I 
agree first 
8. Predictability: Obtain my prior consent before significantly changing 
who can see my data. 
9. Data portability: Make it easy for me to obtain a copy of my data 
10.Protection: Treat my data as securely as your own confidential data 
unless I choose to share it, and notify me if it is compromised 
11.Right to know: Show me how you are using my data and allow me to see 
who and what has access to it. 
12.Right to self-define: Let me create more than one identity and use 
pseudonyms. Do not link them without my permission. 
13.Right to appeal: Allow me to appeal punitive actions 
14.Right to withdraw: Allow me to delete my account, and remove my 
data50 
Parson's short document serves simultaneously as a tool to re-imagine what PIP from a 
user perspective might entail, and as a primary source against which students can 
compare corporate as well as governmental guidelines for privacy policy. These fourteen 
guidelines exceed by far the FTC FIPS (Fair Information Practices), which the White 
House endorses in order to provide stronger “protections from onerous corporate control, 
manipulation, or aggressive anti-privacy monetization schemes”. Instead, Parson's social 
media bill of rights allows students to investigate the extent to which their own rights are 
at odds with the actual social media contexts in which their activities take place.
Furthermore, via the discussion of the individually listed ideas, students should 
begin to examine the political economy of PIP. Therefore, Parson and his colleagues can 
either serve as an introduction to the questions that interests Lawrence Lessig in Code 2.0 
or their social networking bill of rights can make some of Lawrence's abstract ideas more 
50 Christopher Parson July 8, 2010. <http://www.christopher-parsons.com/on-a-social-networking-bill-of-
rights/>
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accessible. Both Lessig and Carson et. al helpfully initiate a conversation about the ways 
in which ordinary people can actively contribute to digital architectures that protect the  
“values that we believe are fundamental”51 to these social spaces.
Lessig's catalogue of political economy questions about the nature of such a third 
internet architecture includes: “Which regulators do we prefer? Which regulators should 
be controlled? How does society exercise that control over entities that aim to control 
it?”52 Undergirding this political economy of the internet is an understanding that context, 
architecture, structural conditions shape values and our very understanding of what 
privacy might mean, what it entails, and why it might matter. Lawrence Lessig insists that 
we need to think of cyberspace and Facebook in terms of both substance and structure. 
By highlighting that both of these components are outcome of economic, cultural, and 
social decisions, Lessig provides students yet another tool to critically assess who should 
be held accountable. 
Robert W. Gehl is a critical new media scholar, whose definition of web 2.0 
services (which include Facebook) emphasizes the importance of paying attention to the 
peculiar relationship between the form and content made possible of social network sites 
and the structural conditions that shape our daily lives. He writes:
As the new media capitalist technique of relying upon users to supply and rank 
online media content, then using the attention this content generates to present 
advertisements to audiences. […]. As is evident form their interfaces, these sites 
are dedicated to immediacy, social connection, and instant access to information 
[…].53
Too few people speculate about the ways in which Facebook's interface regulates, even 
51 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 New York: Soho Books, 2006. p.6.
52 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 p.7.
53 Robert W. Gehl “The Archive and the Processor” p.2.
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determines, the types of messages its users distribute. One of the more obvious Facebook 
features is the time line interface. Occasionally, observers have pointed out that its 
radically linear attempt to chronicle and organize our lives buries the complexity and 
oftentimes circular nature of our lives54. In any case, the time line feature certainly 
epitomizes Zuckerberg's naïve understanding of human identity by subordinating all life 
events to a singular progress narrative – a life free of friction, breaks or contradictions. 
Students should begin to question the ways in which infrastructure shapes our 
relationships to other users as well. What information are we comfortable sharing and, in 
turn, what information do we expect from other users? How and why does what we share 
online impact our expectations and standards for PIP? How and when should I feel 
accountable towards others? When should other individuals and/or institutional and 
corporate actors be accountable to me?
Using Facebook as a case study, students should be asked to examine the ways in 
which their own expectations for information disclosure relate to the content categories 
provided by Facebook. How do students react when their friends refuse to publish 
information about their favorite “movies”, “TV shows”, and “books”?  Arguably, 
Facebook is built on the premiss of reciprocity, according to which users are exected to 
share information with other users. In an earlier reference to Lessig's work on regulation, 
I highlighted that social and cultural norms also regulate spaces such as social networks. 
Therefore, it seems only reasonable to ask students if they have ever witnessed social 
sanctions for when one of their friends did not comply with the expectations set up by the 
54 The German journalist Nina Pauer argues that “a biography is more than merely a protocol. The heart of  
the social experience is precisely not the complete record but the contingency of the social” (my 
translation) “Die Utopie ist da” Die Zeit Online September 28, 2011. 
<http://www.zeit.de/2011/40/Facebook-Timeline>
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mere existence of these identity categories.
On a similar note, Facebook's now iconic status update can be interpreted as a 
measure of somebody's profile's liveness/popularity. Facebook reinforces this 
interpretation by providing tools such as the “like” and “share” function, which measure 
this popularity and make it more transparent. From Facebook's perspective, the status 
update feature is designed to stimulate data production as it draws attention to the website 
and makes users dwell on the website. But does the status update also dictate a 
communication standard to Facebook users? Do students even feel obligated to 
communicate? Are they accountable to others for a minimum number of posts? 
Conversely, can Facebook users rightfully demand a certain information density from 
other users? What are the consequences of a lack of frequently occurring status updates? 
As Lawrence Lessig reminds us, 
structure matters as well, though we have not even begun to understand how to 
limit, regulate, arbitrary regulatory power. […] As we slowly come to see how 
different structures within cyberspace affect us - how its architecture […] 
“regulates us” - we slowly come to ask how these structures should be defined.55
Even if it seems basic and banal, but at the current conjuncture, reminding students that 
both the substance and the structure are something to struggle over rather than something 
to passively accept, is a huge task. It is important to highlight the connections between 
these digital infrastructures and certain political ideologies, ideas, and values. Such a 
conversation is crucial in order to develop a technological and legal literacy.
The differences between digital opt-in and opt-out architectures offer a concrete 
context to teach students the relevance of these architectural issue. Lilian Edwards and 
55 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 New York: Soho Books, 2006. p.7.
165
Ian Brown cite research that convincingly argues that 
[a]fter all, if people dont' know about defaults, they will assume that any 
alternative settings are impossible or unreasonable. The influence on people's 
perceptions of their control over software configurations is a core concern with 
software regulation.56
By contrast, most of Facebook's default settings rely on an opt-out approach. For the 
social network service, this decision is perfectly reasonable since it provides individual 
users the granular control over every bit of information they post. Over and again I have 
criticized the weaknesses of the granular approach to individual user control. By contrast, 
opt-in architectures help to manage the ever-faster release of new products and privacy 
policy changes as they take the maximum privacy setting as their default and leave it up 
to the user to adjust their settings accordingly.
In my previous attempts to teach the subject, I found that the students had a keen 
interest in debating these principles and expressed great frustration with the current “opt-
out” regime that undergirds Facebook in the United States. The Internet law scholars 
Lilian Edwards and Ian Brown render opt-out as “useless”. In a surprisingly frank tone, 
they argue that:
First, defaults provide users with agency. Users have a choice in the matter: 
They can go with the default option or choose another setting. Second, a default 
guides a user by providing recommendation. […] Defaults are important not 
only in affecting a person's choice, but also in shaping norms and creating 
culture.57
Students who need to investigate the consequences of these default settings are motivated 
to speculate about the individual freedom gained from an architecture that foregrounds 
users rights and PIP by relying an opt-in model. Under its current opt-out regime, 
56 Edwards and Brown “Data Control and Social Networking” p.21.
57 Ibid.
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changes in Facebook's privacy and data management policy almost automatically lead to 
exacerbated information privacy conditions for its users.
In The Digital Person Solove neatly outlines the advantages of opt-in systems:
The effective privacy regulation must legally require an opt-in system which 
contains a meaningful range of choices as well as addresses inequalities in 
knowledge and power and other impediments to voluntary and informed 
consent.58
However, while Solove fails to acknowledge the complications integral the term 
“informed consent”, students need to be taught to take a more critical approach to the 
concept of consent based infrastructures. In Solove's defense, he is not alone in 
underestimating the radical ways in which the principle of information flow has rendered 
consent-based mechanisms almost meaningless.
In a paper about the value of consent-giving in the context of behavioral 
advertising, British scholar Andrew McStay proposes the distinction between “genuine 
consent and consent that is simply enforced agreement”. He states that, unfortunately, the 
latter serves as “modus operandi” for most websites59. In his paper, McStay insists that 
“to give [genuine] consent is to act”. It requires people to do something for which they 
have to “be informed and able to conceive an educated opinion so as to express will”. He 
explains that “in expressing will there is agency, volition, control, deliberateness and 
making something happen”60. 
James Grimmelmann and Julie E.Cohen suggest a more critical perspective on the 
idea of consent. Grimmelmann states straight-forwardly that consent in the context of 
58 Daniel J. Solove The Digital Person p.106. Emphasis added.
59 Andrew McStay “I consent”. New media & Society published online September 30, 2012. p.5.
60 Ibid.
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Facebook is “meaningless; users can't reasonably be asked to predict what new sites and 
services might become Facebook partners”61. Julie E. Cohen reminds us that the “quality 
of consent attenuates over time”62, rendering the scope of ones decision vague at best and 
leaving the significance of ones consent for future constellations uncertain. 
In contrast to McStay, Cohen distinguishes a variety of different forms of consent 
rather than reducing this complex construct to merely the one type of “informed consent”. 
Cohen underscores the importance of contextual analysis. Facebook's granular approach 
to privacy for instance, is based on the idea of “particularized consent”63 - that is to give 
consent to fragments of information. On the one hand, such an approach values the 
specificity of information and allows users to evaluate every bit of data they consider 
important. On the other hand, such an micro-managerial approach is cumbersome and, in 
the case of Facebook, distracts from the fact that by using the social network site, users 
give “silent consent” to its many problematic PIP practices anyways.
Moreover, Cohen warns that “consent is meaningless if recipients may transfer the 
data to third parties without the restrictions that accompanied the initial transfer” 64. In 
other words, giving consent to Facebook's data use policy has no binding implications for 
the hundreds of thousands of apps and games and websites have become integral to the 
service. In so doing, Facebook extends its particularized consent principle to its entire 
network. Only if students understand that information online defeats the idea of physical 
and temporal boundaries and that it cannot be controlled as suggested by Facebook's 
61 James Grimmelmann “Saving Facebook” Iowa Law Review 2008. p.45.
62 Julie E. Cohen “Examined Lives. Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object.” Stanford Law 
Review 52.5. p.1433.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
168
official rhetoric, students can develop a critical understanding for the concept of consent. 
This realization will probably not change the fact that most ordinary people don't 
get to negotiate the terms of their contractual relationship with large organizations. But 
teaching students the difference between the various forms of consent still offers a 
valuable lesson about how asymmetrical power relationships lie at the heart of consumer-
empowerment myth. In other words, the inquiry into the political dimension of PIP offers 
a broader lesson about the ways in which casting a vote on an issue or signing an 
agreement to a contract does not automatically level the playing field. It teaches students  
that, unless they are actively involved in the shaping of the contractual arrangement they 
are giving their consent to, they will always surrender some of their own agency. That in 
and of itself, describes a powerful lesson in the context of imagining a bottom-up notion 
of PIP and democracy more broadly65.
In many conversations, I realized the gulf between my student's confidence in 
being able to participate in all the new Facebook functions and their huge skepticism 
when it came to actively shaping the principles according to which services such as 
Facebook operate. Hardly any of my students envisioned themselves as playing an active 
role in such a process. Therefore, the widely assumed identity of the user and producer 
role must be taken with a grain of salt, as the role of the prosumer is limited to the 
creation of content and does not include architectural duties.
Many of my students have surrendered to the claim that programmers and hackers 
hold the power to change the world (thus echo the Facebook rhetoric). They forget that 
all technology and all code depends on the people that use it. I am not so naïve to believe 
65 I thank Gil Rodman for his encouragement to push this argument a little further.
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that my approach to PIP can help students to invent the next non-profit driven social 
network site that replaces Facebook. While I realize that my syllabus probably wont 
change the fact that governments and commerce are the ruling hand behind most of what 
is going on online it will at least offer students the tools and the vocabulary to scrutinize 
some of the corporate and governmental claims about how to best protect PIP. It will 
remind students that their everyday activities are already a function of some agency and it  
will hopefully make students mindful of the fact that social values and expectations for 
PIP are not set in stone but to some extent subject of our own making. As a consequence, 
the ability to complicate some of the PIP narrative, demonstrates to students their own 
agency.
Before I finally present the syllabus, I want to highlight some of the specific ways 
in which James Carey and cultural studies scholar Jonathan Sterne have advanced 
Dewey's pragmatist approach. Sterne's particularly relevant guidelines for a pedagogy on 
the internet which seeks “to denaturalize and radically contextualize the Internet itself”66, 
provides the theoretical backdrop for some my in-class exercises.
Sterne suggests that students pick one claim about the Internet and choose another 
medium to see if a similar claim has been made about it and if so, under what conditions 
this claim surfaced. This comparative perspective is equally useful for the study of PIP – 
especially when emphasizing the connections between communication technology and 
privacy. Students will quickly realize that the introduction of older communication 
technologies such as the telegraph, photography, the telephone, the radio, the TV, and 
66 Jonathan Sterne: “Thinking the Internet. Cultural Studies versus the Millenium” in Steve Jones Doing 
Internet Research. Critical Issues and Methods for Examining the Net Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999. 
p.
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even electricity overall had a socially disruptive effect throughout the last one hundred 
years. Brandeis's and Warren's article can start a conversation about the similarities and 
differences between the mediated world of 1890 and the “media manifold”67 we live with 
today. It thus helpfully sharpens the student's awareness for the context specific or inter-
contextual nature of certain discursive claims.
While these histories teach students to understand the ways in which both 
communication technologies and PIP are “part of the mundane fabric of social and 
cultural life”68 and are ordinary rather than revolutionary, students also learn to historicize 
PIP itself. Jonathan Sterne inspires us to take into account that privacy not only means 
different things to different people but also that it “is more important to some people than 
to others”69. What privacy means changes over time and from context to context. Why 
PIP matters is “bound up in differential power relationships”70.
Students must be taught to remake these contexts in order to understand the 
similarities and differences between the various meanings of PIP. That is where 
articulation theory proposes a particularly useful tool because it insists that “are no 
necessary correspondences among different elements (people, ideologies, places, events) 
but, rather, these correspondences have to be made”71.
For instance, in order to understand why politicians felt the urgent need to 
announce the five principles for the Fair Information Practices developed by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973, students must study the earlier 
67 Nick Couldry Media, Society, World p.16.
68 Ibid.
69 Adapting Sterne's argument about the fact that the Internet's “form and content change over time, and its 
social significance varies from context to context” Doing Internet Research p.278.
70 Sterne Doing Internet Research p.279.
71 Ibid. p.263.
171
history of the tendency to increasingly digitalize data that dominated the health care  
sector during the 1970s. How did people conceive of PIP back then? How did journalists 
write about PIP? When and under what circumstance did people expect PIP? What are 
parallels and where difference between then and now in the discussion over PIP?
In addition to teaching the importance of historical context, great effort must be 
invested in order to denaturalize Facebook as well as cyberspace itself. Along these lines, 
it is important to install in the students an understanding of lives online as integral to their  
offline lives and vice versa. Too often, the public discourse conceptualizes cyberspace as 
separate from our ordinary lives, as detached from our bodies and offline identities, and 
as a space in which all “real life” obstacles are meaningless. These separatist voices 
perpetuate claims in which cyberspace operates according to an independent set of moral 
and social principles. However, in one of my favorite pieces on this subject, Julie E. 
Cohen makes clear that:
Cyberspace is not, and never could be, the kingdom of mind; minds are attached 
to bodies, and bodies exist in the space of the world. And cyberspace as such 
does not preexist its users. Rather, it is produced by users, and not (in the most 
cases) as a deliberate political project, but in the course of going on about their 
lives.72
Discussing the nature of race online, Kolko, Nakamura, and Rodman add that 
all of us who spend time online are already shaped by the way in which race 
[and gender] matters offline, and we can't help but bring our own knowledge, 
experiences, and values with us when we log on.73
This insight is particularly useful as it encourages students to connect notions of PIP 
online to the ways in which they try to protect certain valuable information about 
72 Julie E Cohen “Cyberspace As/And Space” Columbia Law Review 107, 2007. p.218.
73 Kolko, Nakamura and Rodman quoted in Slack and Wise Technology + Culture. A Primer. p.168.
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themselves offline. Viewing PIP issues offline and online as part of the same challenge 
motivates students to interrogate the possibly different standards they apply to 
information and can jumpstart a discussion about the reasons we have to think differently 
about the value of PIP online and offline.
Part of the task of historicizing Facebook and the Internet requires the students to 
understand that the very infrastructure they rely on for most of their daily activities has 
had, itself, a history characterized by multiple ideological and structural shifts. Lawrence 
Lessig's summary of the history of the internet, which distinguishes between a first 
generation of architectures built by a non-commercial sector – universities and the 
military – and a second generation of architectures built by a commercial sector, is a 
useful starting point. 
Similarly, van Dijck's observation about Facebook's own connective turn reminds 
us that, in its brief 10 year history, Facebook experienced (even facilitated) some major 
shifts during its evolution from a small, exclusive and bound network at Harvard to the 
data behemoth it is today. An awareness for this history enables students to critically 
interrogate Facebook's revolutionary rhetoric and could help students to begin a 
conversation that imagines a digital future and that benefits from studying the Internet's  
earliest and non-commercial experiences.
Finally, a productive PIP pedagogy should be characterized by a programmatic 
openness (an oxymoron?!) that encourages a fair amount of speculation about the value 
of PIP at the current conjuncture. Arguably, at this point much of the theoretical research 
on the internet and Facebook is partly speculative as researchers deal with a moving and 
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constantly evolving research object. Therefore, students should take a rather creative 
approach to theory that takes advantage of the the merits of an eclectic and strategic 
approach to theory. That is they should test theories for their usability by remixing and 
mashing-up various ideas.
One such discussion could speculate about Lawrence Lessig's idea of PIP when he 
writes that “[f]riction is thus privacy's best friend”74? Daniel J. Solove also states that “[a] 
privacy disrupts particular activities” and calls for an understanding of privacy that 
focuses “on the specific types of disruption and the specific activities disrupted”75. 
Counter to the many claims that view information as fluid, asking about the value of 
friction proposes an interesting counter-perspective. Students should be encourage to 
speculate about reasons for this emphasis on disruption.
Returning to Julie E. Cohen's investigation of the metaphorical work that 
language does in privacy discourses, we find indirect references to friction throughout 
conversations about Facebook and the Internet. Mark Zuckerberg celebrates “frictionless 
sharing”76 and Bill Gates has notoriously described the Internet as heaven for a 
“frictionless capitalism”77. We lament constant information overflow. We “stream” data 
from server to server or “stream” movies online. Much of journalism 2.0 depends on 
“traction” in order to assess relevance. Entire websites operate on the premiss that stories 
only matter if they generate a “buzz”78. A buzz, it seems, constitutes the only measure to 
bring the constant stream of information to a momentary halt. Friction as counterweight 
74 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 p.202.
75 Daniel J. Solove Understanding Privacy 2008. p.77.
76 Mark Zuckerberg during the product release presentation for “Time Line” at the 2011 F8 Conference in 
San Francisco in 2011 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9r46UeXCzoU>
77 Quoted in Schiller Digital Capitalism. Networking the Global Market System p.1.
78 The social media news website “Buzzfeed” runs on said principle.
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to frictionless sharing; a moment for pause and contemplation.
Tiziana Terranova, in her compelling book Network Culture, begins the thrilling 
discussion of concepts such as control and power in an information culture based on these 
“informational dynamics”. Terranova seems to suggest that the relationship between 
signal and noise is increasingly blurry (just like the separation between what counts as 
private and what as public) and characterized by “fluctuations and microvariations, 
entropic emergencies and negentropic emergences, positive feedback and chaotic 
processes”79. As part of this new information reality is the relinquishing of PIP exactly 
because, as Lessig suggest, PIP interrupts flow because it provides obstacles and renders 
certain information invisible.
Jodi Dean is another scholar who thinks, albeit from a different perspective and 
with a different agenda in mind, about the changing nature of information as well as the 
consequences thereof for our society. In a similarly intriguing book, she writes: 
Under conditions of intensive and extensive proliferation of media, conditions 
wherein everyone is presumed to be producer as well as a consumer of content, 
messages get lost. They become mere contributions to the circulation of images, 
opinion, and information, to the billions of nuggets of information and affect 
trying to catch and hold attention, to push or sway opinion, taste, and trends in 
one direction rather than another.80
She too has observed the changing nature of information and proposes a theory according 
to which signals have lost their ability transmit meaningfully content and instead now 
resemble the characteristics of noise. Just as a footnote and comment on the 
“teachability” of these works. I discussed Jodi Dean's most recent book Blog Theory81 
79 Tiziana Terranova Network Culture. Politics for the Information Age. Pluto Press: New York, 2004. p.7.
80 Jodi Dean Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies Duke UP, 2009. p.24.
81 Jodi Dean Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive Polity, 2010.
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with my students and was surprised to learn how they were able to relate to her 
arguments. Many of my students were all too readily willing to accepts Dean's arguments 
and found a number of connections between her work their ordinary lives.
There is of course much more to discuss about these authors as their work offers 
food for thought and for many more dissertations to come. That is why it must suffice to 
introduce theme here only briefly and as way of illustrating how theoretical texts can 
serve as fruitful starting point for students to interrogate the meaning, role, and function 
of privacy at the current conjuncture. Lastly, as I learned from teaching both Dean and 
Terranova, that a pedagogical approach to PIP requires to also break open these critical 
theories and discussing with students who are overly sympathetic to these ideas how our 
mundane and ordinary lives might be more contradictory and complicated than these 
meta-theories assume and allow.
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“PIP is Political” -  What do we expect from Personal 
information privacy in the age of Facebook?
Privacy has been declared dead, a concept of the past, and a concept no longer relevant to 
us. The social network service Facebook has praises the advantages of radical 
transparency and its CEO Mark Zuckerberg wants all of us to believe that “if we give 
people control over what they share, they will want to share more. If people share more, 
the world will become more open and connected. And a world that's more open and 
connected is a better world”1. At the same time, privacy has been declared as essential to 
democracy and as constitutive of an emotionally and psychological healthy self. 
This class/workshop is organized around a set of questions
- What does personal information privacy mean to you?
- What are your expectations for PIP when you are online? Are these different from when 
you are not online? If so, how?
- What are the conditions that shape your tastes and expectations for PIP?
- How do you manage your PIP?
- What are some of the practices and tactics you use to protect your PIP?
- What information are we comfortable sharing and, in turn, what information do we 
expect from other users?
- Does what we share online impact our expectations and standards for PIP? If so, how?
We will investigate these questions bearing in mind that "the work of privacy – is a daily, 
dynamic task” that we perform in a variety of contexts both online and offline. That is 
why, some of the questions above take inspiration from the “managerial conception of 
privacy” and assume that there nothing intrinsically or inherently private. It is up to you 
to explore and discuss what shapes your understanding of PIP. In class, we will think 
about some of the reasons why our notions of PIP might coincide and why some of them 
differ.
Since this is a class in Communication Studies/Media Studies, we will pursue our 
inquiries from a particular perspective that the British scholar Nick Couldry calls socially  
oriented media theory. We will interrogate the meaning and relevance of PIP from a 
perspective that acknowledges that “we live with media, among media”2. One of our 
central goals is to understand how and in what ways our notion PIP is “directly oriented 
to media, involve media, [or are] conditioned by media”. We will discuss the various 
ways in which PIP helps us to think about Couldry's question: “what is it to live ethically 
with, and through, media?”3
1 Mark Zuckerberg. “A New Page in Facebook Privacy” 
2 Nick Couldry  Media, Society, and World p.180.
3 Nick Couldry The Social, Media, World. p.28.
177
We will think critically about the ways in which our expectations for PIP are made 
possible/impossible by certain regularities of context and resources. We will explore how 
and why certain PIP practices unsettle/challenge or help to restore and maintain dominant 
social structures.
Student Learning Outcomes:
This class teaches you how to interrogate the changing tastes and experiences for privacy 
as well as the various values that are attached to it in a mediated world. It will 
demonstrate that you have mastered a body of knowledge and a mode of inquiry.
This class requires you to discuss a variety of challenging and at times controversial 
topics. Hence, You will have to communicate with your fellow students and need to 
produce work – both individual essays as well as group presentations – that relies on this 
collective and cooperative effort. In order to accomplish this, you have to prove that you 
can communicate effectively in the context of group work as well as in your function as 
writer and presenter.
This class requires you to historicize, contextualize, and transnationalize various 
scholarly, journalistic, political, and corporate statements about the value of PIP. Your 
group blog post demonstrates your ability to critically evaluate these arguments.
This class requires you to actively discuss your arguments with other students. Most of 
the your assignments are group works in which written summaries of the discussions are 
graded and results are presented in front of the class. By completing assignments such as 
the “Social Bill of Rights”, you demonstrate your ability to locate and critically evaluate  
information and your capability to identify, define, and solve problems specific to your 
group's specific discussion.
Course requirements:
1. “Doing Privacy Work” essay (20%)
How do you protect your privacy?  For the “Doing Privacy Work” paper, I ask you to 
think about all the possible situations in which you actively protected some information 
about you from discovery. Take careful notes about when, where, and how you managed 
your privacy on that day (see example Rainee and Wellman: “A day in a connected life”). 
Go over your notes on Saturday morning and write an essay of 500 to 750 words in 
which you contemplate your experience. Post your essay to the class blog until Sunday, 
June 2 - 4PM. In preparation for Monday's class, read the other essays posted to the blog 
and take notes on how they are similar or different from your own experience.
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2. Thinking about digital technology and PIP – lets be pragmatic – group 
presentation. (30%)
For this assignment you will work in small groups (maximum of 5 people per group). 
Every member of the group has to individually research at least three mainstream media 
or corporate claims about the relationship between privacy and Facebook (or any other 
digital technology). The quality and comprehensiveness of your claim catalogue will be 
graded, so take this preparatory exercise seriously. Apply Carey's and Sterne's guidelines 
for internet research to every claim and take careful notes (no worries, I will introduce 
Carey and Sterne extensively in class). 
Your group gets to spend an entire class session comparing and contrasting the your notes 
on the various claims. You will use the second half of the session to prepare a 20 minute 
group presentation – more instructions for that presentation will be announced in class. 
The group presentation along with 1-page hand out.
3. Analyzing Privacy Guidelines a comparative perspective - paper (20%)
For this third assignment, you will critically analyze one document that directly pertains 
to the question of PIP. You can either choose to analyze one of the suggested documents 
listed under the case study section in the syllabus or an equally comprehensive document 
of your choice (please notify me about your choices so I can make sure that the document 
of your choice meets the requirements of the assignment). 
Please write an essay of 1000 words in which you choose one of these two options:
• Examine a historical case study (e.g. Brandeis and Warren's essay “A right to 
Privacy” or the HEW FIPS) for its intellectual purchase today. Part of the 
challenge for this essay is to reconstruct the context relevant to your case study 
and to compare that context to today. Your essay may engage with questions such 
as: What were the expectations for privacy back then and how do they compare 
with today's expectations? What social, political, and cultural processes might 
have shaped the contemporary expectations for privacy? What were some of the 
perceived threats to privacy back then? Do those threats continue to play a role in 
today's discussion of privacy?
• Compare two contemporary documents such as President Obama's opening letter 
to the White House Guidelines for Consumer Privacy with Facebook's data use 
policy with Thierer's 3E approach. For this essay you may think about the roles 
the respective documents assign to users, governments, and corporate actors 
respectively. For your essay, analyze how these documents discuss the role of 
regulation (either by the government, by social and cultural guidelines, by 
commerce). Which regulators do we prefer in the context of privacy? Which 
regulators should be controlled? How does society exercise that control over 
entities that aim to control it?
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4. “Digital Media Practices Bill of Rights” presentation (30%)
How to live well with media is the central question guiding this group assignment. You 
will spend the final third of the semester contemplating and discussing what is at stake 
both politically and ethically in the ways intersects we live with and through media every 
day. The goal is to present a “digital media practices bill of rights” that outlines tentative  
standards for how to live well with digital media today. You will work in groups to 
formulate guidelines for a media environment characterized by inclusivity and justice.  
The results of your group work are shared via a wiki entry on our moodle site and via a 
final presentation of 30-45 minutes (detailed guidelines for the final presentation will be 
provided in class) due during the last days of class.
Tentative thematic reading list
Theory:
What is 
privacy? 
▪ Daniel J Solove: “Privacy: A Concept in Disarray” and “Privacy: A 
New  Understanding” from Understanding Privacy (2008)
▪ Helen Nissenbaum: “Introduction” from Privacy in Context (2010)
▪ Julie E. Cohen: “Reimagining Privacy” from Configuring the  
Networked Self (2012)
Claims of 
Post-Privacy
▪ Lecture on Christian Heller: Post-Privacy (2011)
required readings
▪ Bruce Schneider: “Will giving the Internet eyes and ears mean the end 
of privacy?” from The Guardian May 16, 2013
▪ Somini Sengupta: “Letting down our guard with web privacy.” from 
The New York Times  March 30, 2013
A new PIP 
theory
▪ Lecture: “ordinary – pragmatic – accountable – three key concepts for 
an articulation and assemblage theory of PIP”
Methods and 
tools to 
investigate the 
role of privacy 
in our lives
▪ Nippert-Eng: Islands of Privacy (2010)
▪ James Carey: “Historical pragmatism and the Internet”(2006)
▪ Jonathan Sterne: “Thinking the Internet”(1999)
▪ Anita L. Allen: “Privacy isn't everything: Accountability as a personal 
and social good” Alabama Law Review (2004)
▪ Raymond Williams: “Culture is ordinary” from Resources of Hope 
(1989)
▪ Christopher Parson – Social Networking Bill of Rights (2010)
Theories / 
tools to 
investigate 
how the 
meaning of 
privacy relates 
to context
▪ Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise: “Defining Technology” 
and “Articulation and assemblage” from Culture+Technology. A Primer  
(2005)
▪ Lawrence Lessig: “Architectures of control” and “Privacy” from Code 
2.0 (2006)
▪ Nick Couldry: “Media Ethics and Media Justice” from Media, Society,  
World (2012)
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▪ Tiziana Terranova: “Introduction” from Network Culture (2004)
▪ Jodi Dean: “Affective Networks” from Blog Theory (2010)
▪ José van Dijck: “Ecosystem of Connective Media: Lock in, Fence off, 
Opt out?” from Culture of Connectivity (2013)
▪ Robert Gehl: “The Archive and the Processor” new media&society 
(2011)
Case studies / 
primary 
sources for 
analysis
▪ Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis: “The Right to Privacy” 
Harvard Law Review (1890!!!)
▪ Mark Zuckerberg: “A New page in Facebook Privacy” The Washington 
Post May 24, 2010
▪ Mark Zuckerberg: “Letter from Mark Zuckerberg” (2012)
▪ David Kirkpatrick: “Privacy” from The Facebook Effect (2010)
▪ danah boyd and Alice Marwick: “Social Privacy in Networked 
Publics” (2011)
▪ HEW – Code of Fair Information Practices
▪ Craig Mundie: “Privacy Pragmatism” Foreign Affairs (2014)
▪ excerpts from Dave Eggers's novel The Circle (2013)
▪ Opening letter to the White House Guidelines for Consumer Privacy by 
President Obama (2012)
▪ Bill of Consumer Rights in White House Guidelines for Consumer 
Privacy (2012)
▪ FB Data Use Policy; Tumblr Data Use Policy (or the data use policy of 
any other social network site you use)
▪ European Data Protection Directive 95/46 EC
▪ European Convention on Human Rights
▪ OECD Privacy Guidelines (or any other national directive specifically 
aimed at privacy)
▪ FTC guidelines “On Guard Online”
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